

For Six Month Period Ending 08/31/2009

(Insert date)

I - REGISTRANT

1. (a) Name of Registrant

Vision Americas L.L.C.

(b) Registration No.

5907

(c) Business Address(es) of Registrant

1150 K Street NW, Ste. 1411
Washington, DC 20005

1901 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W., Ste 303
Washington, DC 20006

2. Has there been a change in the information previously furnished in connection with the following:

(a) If an individual:

(1) Residence address(es)

Yes ☐

No ☒

(2) Citizenship

Yes ☐

No ☒

(3) Occupation

Yes ☐

No ☒

(b) If an organization:

(1) Name

Yes ☐

No ☒

(2) Ownership or control

Yes ☐

No ☒

(3) Branch offices

Yes ☒

No ☐

(c) Explain fully all changes, if any, indicated in items (a) and (b) above.

We have added an office at 1901 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W. however, the organization still operates out of the K Street address.

CRM/ISS/REGISTRATION UNIT
2009 SEP 30 PM 4:06

IF THE REGISTRANT IS AN INDIVIDUAL, OMIT RESPONSE TO ITEMS 3, 4 AND 5(a).

3. If you have previously filed Exhibit C¹, state whether any changes therein have occurred during this 6 month reporting period.

Yes ☐

No ☒

If yes, have you filed an amendment to the Exhibit C?

Yes ☐

No ☐

If no, please attach the required amendment.

¹ The Exhibit C, for which no printed form is provided, consists of a true copy of the charter, articles of incorporation, association, and by laws of a registrant that is an organization. (A waiver of the requirement to file an Exhibit C may be obtained for good cause upon written application to the Assistant Attorney General, National Security Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC 20530.)

4. (a) Have any persons ceased acting as partners, officers, directors or similar officials of the registrant during this 6 month reporting period? Yes ☒ No ☐

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name	Position	Date connection ended
Patrick T. Brennan	Advisor	06/30/09

- (b) Have any persons become partners, officers, directors or similar officials during this 6 month reporting period? Yes ☒ No ☐

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name	Residence address	Citizenship	Position	Date assumed
John M. Falk	23324 Potts Mill Road Middleburg, VA	U.S.A.	Associate	May 2009
Jose R. Cardenas	214 Ceret Court SW Vienna, VA	U.S.A.	Associate	May 2009

5. (a) Has any person named in item 4(b) rendered services directly in furtherance of the interests of any foreign principal? Yes ☒ No ☐

If yes, identify each such person and describe his service.

John M. Falk & Jose R. Cardenas- Provided strategic advice to and communicate with U.S. government policy makers on behalf of Kestral Holdings (Pvt.) Ltd. regarding U.S. policy and programs in Pakistan.

- (b) Have any employees or individuals, who have filed a short form registration statement, terminated their employment or connection with the registrant during this 6 month reporting period? Yes ☒ No ☐

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name	Position or connection	Date terminated
Patrick T. Brennan	Subcontractor/Advisor	06/30/09

- (c) During this 6 month reporting period, has the registrant hired as employees or in any other capacity, any persons who rendered or will render services to the registrant directly in furtherance of the interests of any foreign principal(s) in other than a clerical or secretarial, or in a related or similar capacity? Yes ☒ No ☐

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name	Residence address	Citizenship	Position	Date assumed
John M. Falk	23324 Potts Mill Road Middleburg, VA	U.S.A.	Associate	May 2009
Jose R. Cardenas	214 Ceret Court SW Vienna, VA	U.S.A.	Associate	May 2009

6. Have short form registration statements been filed by all of the persons named in Items 5(a) and 5(c) of the supplemental statement? Yes ☒ No ☐

If no, list names of persons who have not filed the required statement.

II - FOREIGN PRINCIPAL

7. Has your connection with any foreign principal ended during this 6 month reporting period?

Yes ☒ No ☐

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name of foreign principal

Kestral Holdings (Pvt.) Ltd.

Date of termination

July 20, 2009

8. Have you acquired any new foreign principal² during this 6 month reporting period?

Yes ☐ No ☒

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name and address of foreign principal

Date acquired

9. In addition to those named in Items 7 and 8, if any, list foreign principals² whom you continued to represent during the 6 month reporting period.

Moroccan American Center for Policy

10. **EXHIBITS A AND B**

(a) Have you filed for each of the newly acquired foreign principals in Item 8 the following:

Exhibit A ³	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	No <input type="checkbox"/>
Exhibit B ⁴	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	No <input type="checkbox"/>

If no, please attach the required exhibit.

(b) Have there been any changes in the Exhibits A and B previously filed for any foreign principal whom you represented during the 6 month period? Yes ☐ No ☒

If yes, have you filed an amendment to these exhibits? Yes ☐ No ☐

If no, please attach the required amendment.

² The term "foreign principal" includes, in addition to those defined in Section 1(b) of the Act, an individual organization any of whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in major part by a foreign government, foreign political party, foreign organization or foreign individual. (See Rule 100(a) (9).) A registrant who represents more than one foreign principal is required to list in the statements he files under the Act only those principals for whom he is not entitled to claim exemption under Section 3 of the Act. (See Rule 208.)

³ The Exhibit A, which is filed on Form NSD-3 (Formerly CRM-157), sets forth the information required to be disclosed concerning each foreign principal.

⁴ The Exhibit B, which is filed on Form NSD-4 (Formerly CRM-155), sets forth the information concerning the agreement or understanding between the registrant and the foreign principal.

III - ACTIVITIES

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11. During this 6 month reporting period, have you engaged in any activities for or rendered any services to any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement? Yes ☒ No ☐

If yes, identify each such foreign principal and describe in full detail your activities and services:

Kestral Holdings (Pvt.) Ltd. -- Vision Americas provided strategic advice relevant to the development of the business opportunities in Pakistan interacting with various components of the U.S. Government such as the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development.

Moroccan American Center for Policy- Vision Americas contacted members of Congress and their staffers on issues related to U.S.- Morocco relations including human rights developments in the region, Morocco's role in the Middle East Peace Process the Western Sahara issue. In addition, the registrant provided and continues to provide strategic advice on the aforementioned topics to the foreign principal.

-
12. During this 6 month reporting period, have you on behalf of any foreign principal engaged in political activity⁵ as defined below? Yes ☒ No ☐

If yes, identify each such foreign principal and describe in full detail all such political activity, indicating, among other things, the relations, interests and policies sought to be influenced and the means employed to achieve this purpose. If the registrant arranged, sponsored or delivered speeches, lectures or radio and TV broadcasts, give details as to dates and places of delivery, names of speakers and subject matter.

Moroccan American Center for Policy- Vision Americas will communicate with various principals and staff of the Congress and Executive Branch and attempt to educate them on Morocco-US Relationships in order to garner support for Moroccan initiatives set forth by MACP.

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13. In addition to the above described activities, if any, have you engaged in activity on your own behalf which benefits any or all of your foreign principals? Yes ☐ No ☒

If yes, describe fully.

⁵ The term "political activities" means any activity that the person engaging in believes will, or that the person intends to, in any way influence any agency or official of the Government of the United States or any section of the public within the United States with reference to formulating, adopting or changing the domestic or foreign policies of the United States or with reference to the political or public interests, policies, or relations of a government of a foreign country or a foreign political party.

IV - FINANCIAL INFORMATION

14. (a) RECEIPTS - MONIES

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal, any contributions, income or money either as compensation or otherwise? Yes ☒ No ☐

If no, explain why.

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such monies⁶.

Date	From whom	Purpose	Amount
05/8/09	Kestral Holdings	Retainer	17,500
06/12/09	Kestral Holdings	Retainer	17,500
07/13/09	Kestral Holdings	Retainer	17,500
03/16/09	MACP	Retainer	15,000
04/07/09	MACP	Retainer	15,000
05/07/09	MACP	Retainer	15,000
06/10/09	MACP	Retainer	15,000
07/13/09	MACP	Retainer	15,000
08/14/09	MACP	Retainer	15,000

142,500

Total

(b) RECEIPTS - FUND RAISING CAMPAIGN

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received, as part of a fund raising campaign⁷, any money on behalf of any foreign principal named in items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement? Yes ☐ No ☒

If yes, have you filed an Exhibit D⁸ to your registration? Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, indicate the date the Exhibit D was filed. Date _____

(c) RECEIPTS - THINGS OF VALUE

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received any thing of value⁹ other than money from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal? Yes ☐ No ☒

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name of foreign principal	Date received	Description of thing of value	Purpose
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⁶ 7 A registrant is required to file an Exhibit D if he collects or receives contributions, loans, money, or other things of value for a foreign principal, as part of a fund raising campaign. (See Rule 201(e).)

⁸ An Exhibit D, for which no printed form is provided, sets forth an account of money collected or received as a result of a fund raising campaign and transmitted for a foreign principal.

⁹ Things of value include but are not limited to gifts, interest free loans, expense free travel, favored stock purchases, exclusive rights, favored treatment over competitors, "kickbacks," and the like.

15. (a) **DISBURSEMENTS – MONIES**

During this 6 month reporting period, have you

(1) disbursed or expended monies in connection with activity on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement? Yes ☒ No ☐

(2) transmitted monies to any such foreign principal? Yes ☐ No ☐

If no, explain in full detail why there were no disbursements made on behalf of any foreign principal.

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such monies, including monies transmitted, if any, to each foreign principal.

Date	To whom	Purpose	Amount
5/8/09	John Falk	Work on behalf of Kestral (April/May)	10,000
6/12/09	John Falk	Work on behalf of Kestral (June)	5,000
5/8/09	Jose Cardenas	Work on behalf of Kestral (April)	7,500
6/12/09	Jose Cardenas	Work on behalf of Kestral (May)	7,500
7/16/09	Jose Cardenas	Work on behalf of Kestral (June)	7,500
3/16/09	KSA Consulting	Work on behalf of MACP	1,500
3/30/09	KSA Consulting	Expense reimbursement MACP	76
4/13/09	KSA Consulting	Expense reimbursement MACP	20
4/13/09	KSA Consulting	Work on behalf of MACP	1,500
4/20/09	KSA Consulting	Work on behalf of MACP	1,500
6/1/09	KSA Consulting	Expense reimbursement MACP	60

42,156

Total

(b) DISBURSEMENTS – THINGS OF VALUE

During this 6 month reporting period, have you disposed of anything of value¹⁰ other than money in furtherance of or in connection with activities on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement?

Yes ☐ No ☒

If yes, furnish the following information:

Date disposed	Name of person to whom given	On behalf of what foreign principal	Description of thing of value	Purpose
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(c) DISBURSEMENTS – POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

During this 6 month reporting period, have you from your own funds and on your own behalf either directly or through any other person, made any contributions of money or other things of value¹¹ in connection with an election to any political office, or in connection with any primary election, convention, or caucus held to select candidates for political office?

Yes ☐ No ☒

If yes, furnish the following information:

Date	Amount or thing of value	Name of political organization	Name of candidate
------	--------------------------	--------------------------------	-------------------

^{10, 11} Things of value include but are not limited to gifts, interest free loans, expense free travel, favored stock purchases, exclusive rights, favored treatment over competitors, "kickbacks" and the like.

V - INFORMATIONAL MATERIALS

16. During this 6 month reporting period, did you prepare, disseminate or cause to be disseminated any informational materials¹²?
 Yes ☒ No ☐

IF YES, RESPOND TO THE REMAINING ITEMS IN SECTION V.

17. Identify each such foreign principal.

Kestral Holdings (Pvt.) Ltd.

Moroccan American Center for Policy

18. During this 6 month reporting period, has any foreign principal established a budget or allocated a specified sum of money to finance your activities in preparing or disseminating informational materials? Yes ☐ No ☒

If yes, identify each such foreign principal, specify amount, and indicate for what period of time.

19. During this 6 month reporting period, did your activities in preparing, disseminating or causing the dissemination of informational materials include the use of any of the following:

- | | | | |
|---|---|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Radio or TV broadcasts | <input type="checkbox"/> Magazine or newspaper articles | <input type="checkbox"/> Motion picture films | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Letters or telegrams |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Advertising campaigns | <input type="checkbox"/> Press releases | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Pamphlets or other publications | <input type="checkbox"/> Lectures or speeches |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Internet | <input type="checkbox"/> Other (specify) _____ | | |

20. During this 6 month reporting period, did you disseminate or cause to be disseminated informational materials among any of the following groups:

- | | | |
|---|---|--|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Public officials | <input type="checkbox"/> Newspapers | <input type="checkbox"/> Libraries |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Legislators | <input type="checkbox"/> Editors | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Educational institutions |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Government agencies | <input type="checkbox"/> Civic groups or associations | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Nationality groups |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Other (specify) _____ | | |

21. What language was used in the informational materials:

- ☒ English ☐ Other (specify) _____

22. Did you file with the Registration Unit, U.S. Department of Justice a copy of each item of such informational materials disseminated or caused to be disseminated during this 6 month reporting period? Yes ☒ No ☐

23. Did you label each item of such informational materials with the statement required by Section 4(b) of the Act? Yes ☒ No ☐

¹² The term informational materials includes any oral, visual, graphic, written, or pictorial information or matter of any kind, including that published by means of advertising, books, periodicals, newspapers, lectures, broadcasts, motion pictures, or any means or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce or otherwise. Informational materials disseminated by an agent of a foreign principal as part of an activity in itself exempt from registration, or an activity which by itself would not require registration, need not be filed pursuant to Section 4(b) of the Act.


VI – EXECUTION

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. §1746, the undersigned swear(s) or affirm(s) under penalty of perjury that he/she has (they have) read the information set forth in this registration statement and the attached exhibits and that he/she is (they are) familiar with the contents thereof and that such contents are in their entirety true and accurate to the best of his/her (their) knowledge and belief, except that the undersigned make(s) no representation as to the truth or accuracy of the information contained in the attached Short Form Registration Statement(s), if any, insofar as such information is not within his/her (their) personal knowledge.

(Date of signature)

(Type or print name under each signature¹³)

9/30/09



2009 SEP 30 PM 4:07
CRM/ISS/REGISTRATION UNIT

¹³ This statement shall be signed by the individual agent, if the registrant is an individual, or by a majority of those partners, officers, directors or persons performing similar functions, if the registrant is an organization, except that the organization can, by power of attorney, authorize one or more individuals to execute this statement on its behalf.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FARA REGISTRATION UNIT
NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

NOTICE

Please answer the following questions and return this sheet in triplicate with your Supplemental Statement:

1. Is your answer to Item 16 of Section V (Informational Materials – page 8 of Form CRM-154, formerly Form OBD-64-Supplemental Statement):

YES X or NO _____

(If your answer to question 1 is “yes” do not answer question 2 of this form.)

2. Do you disseminate any material in connection with your registration:

YES _____ or NO _____

(If your answer to question 2 is “yes” please forward for our review copies of all material including: films, film catalogs, posters, brochures, press releases, etc. which you have disseminated during the past six months.)


Signature

9/30/09
Date

Roger Noriega
Please type or print name of
Signatory on the line above

Managing Director
Title

2009 SEP 30 PM 4:08
CRM/ISS/REGISTRATION UNIT



U.S. Department of Justice

National Security Division

Washington, DC 20530

THIS FORM IS TO BE AN OFFICIAL ATTACHMENT TO YOUR CURRENT SUPPLEMENTAL
STATEMENT - PLEASE EXECUTE IN TRIPLICATE

SHORT-FORM REGISTRATION INFORMATION SHEET

SECTION A

The Department records list active short-form registration statements for the following persons of your organization filed on the date indicated by each name. If a person is not still functioning in the same capacity directly on behalf of the foreign principal, please show the date of termination.

Short Form List for Registrant: Vision Americas, LLC

Last Name	First Name and Other Names	Registration Date	Termination Date	Role
Brennan	Patrick T.	03/06/2009		
Noriga	Roger F.	05/08/2009		
Cardenas	Jose R.	05/08/2009		
Falk	John M.	05/08/2009		

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CRM/ISS/REGISTRATION UNIT



U.S. Department of Justice

National Security Division

Washington, DC 20530

SECTION B

In addition to those persons listed in Section A, list below all current employees rendering services directly on behalf of the foreign principals(s) who have not filed short-form registration statements. (Do not list clerks, secretaries, typists or employees in a similar or related capacity). If there is some question as to whether an employee has an obligation to file a short-form, please address a letter to the Registration Unit describing the activities and connection with the foreign principal.

Name	Function	Date Hired
Not Applicable		

Signature: _____

Date: 9/30/09

Title: Managing Director

2009 SEP 30 PM 4:05
CRM/ISS/REGISTRATION UNIT

1:10 PM

09/30/09

Vision Americas
Vendor QuickReport
All Transactions

Type	Date	Num	Memo	Account	Clr	Split	Amount
John Falk							
Check	5/8/2009		April & May F...	Vision Americas		Payroll Expen...	-10,000.00
Check	6/12/2009	1031	June 15- July...	Vision Americas		Payroll Expen...	-5,000.00

2009 SEP 30 PM 4: 08
CRM/ISS/REGISTRATION UNIT

1:14 PM

09/30/09

Vision Americas
Vendor QuickReport
All Transactions

Type	Date	Num	Memo	Account	Clr	Split	Amount
Jose Cardenas							
Check	5/8/2009		April 15- May...	Vision Americas		Payroll Expen...	-7,500.00
Check	6/12/2009	1030	May 15- June...	Vision Americas		Payroll Expen...	-7,500.00
Check	7/16/2009	1040	Kestral June ...	Vision Americas		Payroll Expen...	-7,500.00

1:16 PM

09/30/09

Vision Americas Vendor QuickReport All Transactions

Type	Date	Num	Memo	Account	Clr	Split	Amount
KSA Consulting							
Check	3/16/2009	1000	MACP -	Vision Americas		Professional F...	-1,500.00
Check	3/30/2009	1007	Patrick T. Bre...	Vision Americas		Professional F...	-76.00
Check	4/13/2009	1010	Patrick T. Bre...	Vision Americas		Professional F...	-20.00
Bill Pmt -Check	4/13/2009	1011		Vision Americas		Accounts Pay...	-1,500.00
Check	4/20/2009	1014		Vision Americas		Professional F...	-1,500.00
Check	6/1/2009	1026	April, Expens...	Vision Americas		Professional F...	-60.00

Expense Account

Submit by Email

Print Form

Employee Name:

Patrick T. Brennan

Project:

MACP

Expenses From (date):

4-06-09

Expenses To (date)

4-15-09

2009 SEP 30 PM 4:08
CRM/ISS/REGISTRATION UNIT

Vision Americas, L.L.C
1150 K Street NW, Suite 1411
Washington, DC
United States
20005
Phone: 202.885.9621
Fax: 202.885.9629
www.visionamericas.com

Expense Date	Expense Description	Cost Center	Expense Amount	Comments:
4-6-09	METRO and Metro Parking		\$20.00	
4-9-09	Metro and Metro Parking		\$20.00	
4-15-09	Metro and Metro Parking		\$20.00	
Total Expenses			\$60.00	
Total Advance				
Total Reimbursement			\$60.00	

Signature:

Pat Brennan Date: *6/1/09*

Authorized By:

Alexandra

Internal Use Only

Amount Paid	Check No.	Date
<i>60.00</i>	<i>1026</i>	<i>6/1/09</i>

MACP

04/15/09 08:49:49

METRORAIL
SHADY GROVE MD
FOR CUSTOMER SERVICE
CALL 202-962-5719

15903 SOMMERVILLE DR.

MEZZANINE 18
MACHINE 39

AN: *****1334

VENDOR: 018-39-31041
REF NO: 310418647765
AUTH NO: 16849B

CREDIT PURCHASE

ADD \$20.00 VALUE

TO SMARTRIP

S/N: 002050602538483

TOTAL AMOUNT: \$20.00

THANK YOU
FOR RIDING METRORAIL

THE FUTURE IS
RIDING ON METRO

MACP

9 13:09:40

L
ON DC
OMER SERVICE
-962-5719

1STST.NE

ONE 24
31

*****1334

024-31-30643
500-381-4901
54301B

URCHASE

00 VALUE

RIP

2050602538483

OUNT: \$20.00

ING METRORAIL

FUTURE IS
RIDING ON METRO

MACP

04/06/09 16:49:51

METRORAIL
SHADY GROVE MD
FOR CUSTOMER SERVICE
CALL 202-962-5719

15903 SOMMERVILLE DR.

MEZZANINE 18
MACHINE 34

AN: *****1334

VENDOR: 018-34-31783
REF NO: 31783811178
AUTH NO: 96845B

CREDIT PURCHASE

ADD \$20.00 VALUE

TO SMARTRIP

S/N: 002050602538483

TOTAL AMOUNT: \$20.00

FOR RIDING METRORAIL

THE FUTURE IS
RIDING ON METRO

MARC

CREDIT RECEIPT

Vision America
HAVE A NICE DAY

THANK YOU FOR CHOOSING MARC TRAIN
SERVICE 1-888-226-5515

PURCHASE \$16.00

TRANSACTION NUMBER
208533
PURCHASED AT BRUNSWICK MD

BRUNSWICK MD
TO
WASHINGTON DC

CREDIT CARD NUMBER
XXXXXXXXXXXX1334
NODE 2 6:08 AM 03/13/09

Vision America

03/04/09 11:21:19

METRORAIL
WASHINGTON DC
FOR CUSTOMER SERVICE
CALL 202-962-5719

700 BLK 1STST.NE

MEZZANINE 24
MACHINE 38

AN: *****1334

VENDOR: 024-38-30069
REF NO: 300693031564
AUTH NO: 83455B

CREDIT PURCHASE

ADD \$20.00 VALUE

TO SMARTRIP

S/N: 002050602545261

TOTAL AMOUNT: \$20.00

THANK YOU
FOR RIDING METRORAIL

THE FUTURE IS
RIDING ON METRO

Vision America

03/16/09 10:40:55

METRORAIL
SHADY GROVE MD
FOR CUSTOMER SERVICE
CALL 202-962-5719

15903 SOMMERVILLE DR.

MEZZANINE 18
MACHINE 35

AN: *****1334

VENDOR: 018-35-31265
REF NO: 312656062431
AUTH NO: 48989B

CREDIT PURCHASE

ADD \$20.00 VALUE

TO SMARTRIP

S/N: 002050602545261

TOTAL AMOUNT: \$20.00

THANK YOU
FOR RIDING METRORAIL

THE FUTURE IS
RIDING ON METRO

Vision America

03/09/09 17:11:40

METRORAIL
WASHINGTON DC
FOR CUSTOMER SERVICE
CALL 202-962-5719

700 BLK 1STST.NE

MEZZANINE 24
MACHINE 40

AN: *****1334

VENDOR: 024-40-31734
REF NO: 317345481087
AUTH NO: 63448B

CREDIT PURCHASE

ADD \$20.00 VALUE

TO SMARTRIP

S/N: 002050602545261

TOTAL AMOUNT: \$20.00

THANK YOU
FOR RIDING METRORAIL

THE FUTURE IS
RIDING ON METRO



Employee Name:

Ted Brennan

Project:

MACP

Expenses From (date):

2009/03/01

Expenses To (date)

2009/03/16

Vision Americas, L.L.C
1150 K Street NW, Suite 1411
Washington, DC
United States
20005
Phone: 202.885.9621
Fax: 202.885.9629
www.visionamericas.com

[illegible]**Comments:**

Signature:

Handwritten signature: Handwritten

Date:

2009/03/18

Authorized By:

Starobin

Total Expenses

\$76.00

Total Advance

Total Reimbursement

\$76.00

Internal Use Only

Amount Paid	Check No.	Date
76.00	1204	3/30/09

Patrick S. Brennan

[Print Form](#)

VisiónAméricas

Ted Brennan

MACP

2009/03/17

2009/03/31

Vision Americas, L.L.C
1150 K Street NW, Suite 1411
Washington, DC
United States
20005
Phone: 202.885.9621
Fax: 202.885.9629
www.visionamericas.com

Comments:

Harold Prather

4/13/09

Alaiah

Amount Paid	Check No.	Date
\$ 20.40	1010	4/13/09

Patrick T Brennan



15245 Shady Grove Road, Suite 470 Rockville, MD 20850 Tel 301.869.5200 Fax 301.869.7200

MEMORADUM

TO: AMBASSADOR ROGER NORIEGA
FROM: TED BRENNAN (checks to Patrick T. Brennan)
RE: EXPENSES FROM MARCH 17 TO MARCH 31, 2009
DATE: April 2, 2009

Roger,

The following is a summary of the expenses I have incurred while working on behalf of Vision Americas (Morocco Account.) The receipt is enclosed.

METRO: \$20.00

Total: \$20.00

THANK YOU
FOR RIDING METRO
THE FUTURE IS
RIDING ON METRO

TOTAL AMOUNT: \$20.00

S/N: 002050602538483

TO SMARTTRIP

ADD \$20.00 VALUE

CREDIT PURCHASE

AUTH NO: 15941B

VENDOR: 018 37-31237

AN: *****1334

MACHINE 37

MEZZANINE 18

15903 SOMERVILLE DR.

CALL 202-962-5719

FOR CUSTOMER SERVICE

MD

SHADY GROVE

METRO

03/20/09

07:05:56

PT. Brennan
VA/Morocco

Column1	Column2	Column3	Column4	Column5	Column6
Date	VA Name	Name of principal or staff contacted	Form of contact (phone, email, meeting)	Discussion Notes	Handouts/Attachments
02/27/09	Roger F. Noriega	Staffer Maggie Fleming w/ Senator Brownback	Email	Roger F. Noriega sent an email to Maggie to try to persuade Senator Brownback to cosign a letter with Senator Harkin concerning the conditions of the Sahrawi refugee camps.	5 attachments—1) Draft_Refugee_Rights_Letter_to_State, 2) Letter to Senator Brown Back 02 27 09, 3) UNHCRIG_WFP_Reports, 4) USCRI_Algeria_2007_Survey(1), 5) USCRI_World_Survey_2008.
03/09/09	Roger F. Noriega	Staffer Nien Su w/Rep. Donald Manzullo	Meeting	Discussed various parts of the autonomy plan, the political and social realities of the region and the conditions of the camp, Discussed trade with Morocco, Nien Su requested a Congressional District by District analysis of Trade. Nien Su also requested that	Handed out MACP Briefing documents -highlight of recent terrorist attacks
03/09/09	Ted Brennan	Staffer Nien Su w/Rep. Donald Manzullo	Meeting	Discussed trade with Morocco, Nien Su requested a Congressional District by District analysis of Trade.	Handed out MACP Briefing documents -highlight of recent terrorist attacks
03/09/09	Roger F. Noriega	Staffer Toni-Marie Calabrese w/Rep. John Boozman	Meeting	Provided a brief background of the longstanding and friendly relationship between Morocco and the United States w/ particular emphasis on Morocco's autonomy plan	Handed out MACP Briefing documents -highlight of recent terrorist attacks
03/09/09	Ted Brennan	Staffer Toni-Marie Calabrese w/Rep. John Boozman	Meeting	Provided a brief background of the longstanding and friendly relationship between Morocco and the United States w/ particular emphasis on Morocco's autonomy plan	Handed out MACP Briefing documents -highlight of recent terrorist attacks
03/09/09	Roger F. Noriega	Staffer Jason Wiens w/Rep. Jerry Moran	Meeting	Goal of meeting was to engage and seek support of Rep. Moran for Morocco's effort to resolve the situation in the Western Sahara. Provided background information on situation	Handed out MACP Briefing documents -highlight of recent terrorist attacks
03/09/09	Ted Brennan	Staffer Jason Wiens w/Rep. Jerry Moran	Meeting	Goal of meeting was to engage and seek support of Rep. Moran for Morocco's effort to resolve the situation in the Western Sahara. Provided background information on situation	Handed out MACP Briefing documents -highlight of recent terrorist attacks
03/10/09	Roger F. Noriega	Staffer Lisa Williams w/Rep. Faleomavaega	Meeting	Provided an overall briefing of the good bilateral relations, including mention of the FTA, MCC compact, and extraordinary constructive cooperation on security issues	Handed out MACP Briefing documents -highlight of recent terrorist attacks
03/10/09	Roger F. Noriega	Staffer Mark Walker w/Rep. Dan Burton	Meeting		Handed out MACP Briefing documents -highlight of recent terrorist attacks

03/10/09 Roger F. Noriega	Staffer James Richardson w/ Rep. Todd Tiahrt	Meeting	Discussion on the ongoing trade and security relationship between the two nations and the importance such a relationship has on peace and stability in the region. It was explained that Morocco is a moderate Islamic nation that shares much of the same values of the United States, including human rights, rights of women and children.	Handed out MACP Briefing documents -highlight of recent terrorist attacks
03/10/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Annie Baker w/Rep. Roscoe Bartlett	Meeting	Provided a brief background of the longstanding and friendly relationship between Morocco and the United States, including first recognition of Independence.	Handed out MACP Briefing documents -highlight of recent terrorist attacks
03/10/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer James Richardson w/ Rep. Todd Tiahrt	Meeting	Discussion on the ongoing trade and security relationship between the two nations and the importance such a relationship has on peace and stability in the region. It was explained that Morocco is a moderate Islamic nation that shares much of the	Handed out MACP Briefing documents -highlight of recent terrorist attacks
03/11/09 Roger F. Noriega	Fred Fleitz (House Intel Committee)	Brief conversation at AEI Dinner	Ambassador Noriega mentioned that he wanted to talk about Western Sahara. Mr. Fleitz said he's friendly to Morocco. Ambassador Noriega told him he wanted to see if the two could move Bolton.	N/A
03/12/09 Roger F. Noriega	Staffer Lester Munson w/Rep. Mark Kirk	Meeting	Explained Morocco's push for fifth round of talks that will finally reach definitive conclusion. Said Congress' role is crucial and that we will be circulating letter.	Handed out MACP Briefing documents -highlight of recent terrorist attacks
03/12/09 Roger F. Noriega	Staffer Steve Petersen w/Rep. Rob Bishop	Meeting	Provided a brief background of the longstanding and friendly relationship between Morocco and the United States, including first recognition of Independence.	Handed out MACP Briefing documents -highlight of recent terrorist attacks
03/12/09 Roger F. Noriega	Staffer Paul Drury w/Rep. Mike Rogers	Meeting	Provided a brief background of the longstanding and friendly relationship between Morocco and the United States, including first recognition of Independence.	Handed out MACP Briefing documents -highlight of recent terrorist attacks
03/13/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Melissa Haydel w/Rep. Mike McCaul	Meeting	The team then provided a brief background of the longstanding and friendly relationship between Morocco and the United States, including first recognition of Independence, trade and security in modern times. The team handed out the briefing	Handed out MACP Briefing documents -highlight of recent terrorist attacks
03/17/09 Roger F. Noriega	Staffer Ashley Shillingsburg w/ Rep. Robert Brady	Meeting	Roger Noriega provided an overall briefing of the good historic bilateral relations, including mention of the FTA, MCC compact, and extraordinary constructive cooperation on security issues. Noriega noted the on-going efforts of Morocco to reach a negotiated solution to the Western Sahara issue through a fifth round of UN-brokered talks.	Handed out MACP Briefing documents -highlight of recent terrorist attacks
03/17/09 Roger F. Noriega	Staffer Meghan Marino w/ Rep. John C. Fleming	Meeting	Noriega noted the on-going efforts of Morocco to reach a negotiated solution to the Western Sahara issue through a fifth round of UN-brokered talks.	Handed out MACP Briefing documents -highlight of recent terrorist attacks

03/18/09 Roger F. Noriega	Staffer Mariah Moncecchi w/ Senator John Barasso	Meeting	Roger Noriega provided an overall briefing of the good historic bilateral relations, including mention of the FTA, MCC compact, and extraordinary constructive cooperation on security issues. Noriega noted the on-going efforts of Morocco to reach a negotiated solution to the Western Sahara issue through a fifth round of UN-brokered talks.	Handed out MACP Briefing documents -highlight of recent terrorist attacks
03/19/09 Roger F. Noriega	Staffer Libby Quint w/ Senator Pat Roberts	Meeting	Roger Noriega provided an overall briefing of the good historic bilateral relations, including mention of the FTA, MCC compact, and extraordinary constructive cooperation on security issues. He also provided trade data that reflected a significant increase in farm and airplane sales to Morocco, which piqued Ms. Quint's interest. Noriega noted the on-going efforts of Morocco to reach a negotiated solution to the Western Sahara issue through a fifth round of UN-brokered talks.	Handed out MACP Briefing documents -highlight of recent terrorist attacks
03/19/09 Roger F. Noriega	Staffer Aaron Douglas w/ Rep. Christopher Carney	Meeting	Noriega noted the on-going efforts of Morocco to reach a negotiated solution to the Western Sahara issue.	Handed out MACP Briefing documents -highlight of recent terrorist attacks
03/20/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Joshua Waller w/ Rep. Phil Gingrey	Meeting	The team handed out the briefing documents, including the color document which highlights recent terrorist attacks, the possibility of further attacks by Al Qaeda affiliated groups and the positive trade relationship Georgia has with Morocco.	Handed out MACP Briefing documents -highlight of recent terrorist attacks
03/20/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Daniel McAdams w/ Rep. Ron Paul	Meeting	After introductory remarks, which included a discussion of trade between Texas and Morocco, the team provided an extensive brief on the situation in Morocco, especially as it relates to military cooperation, intelligence sharing, and the ongoing	Handed out MACP Briefing documents -highlight of recent terrorist attacks
03/20/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Jamila Thompson w/ Rep. John	Meeting	After introductory remarks, which included a discussion on Morocco's increasing outreach to non Muslims, the team discussed the documents contained in the briefing packet, including the color document which highlights recent terrorist attacks, and the	Handed out MACP Briefing documents -highlight of recent terrorist attacks
03/20/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Kristin Hendee w/Rep. John Culberson	Meeting	The team provided an extensive brief on the situation in Morocco, especially as it relates to security cooperation and the ongoing social and legal reforms regarding human rights, the rights of women, children and religious minorities in Morocco.	Handed out MACP Briefing documents -highlight of recent terrorist attacks
03/24/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Rachel Houston w/Rep. Scott Garrett	Meeting	After handing out the briefing documents, the team explained in some detail the genesis of the Moroccan autonomy plan, its level of support in the United Nations, as well as in Europe and the United States. It was explained that support is needed now to push for a fifth round of negotiations.	Handed out MACP Briefing documents -highlight of recent terrorist attacks

03/26/09 Roger F. Noriega	N/A	Phone call	Roger F. Noriega's assistant called to set up a meeting for Friday, April 9. Mentioned the meeting is regarding Morocco.	
03/31/09 Roger F. Noriega	Staffer Kimberly Ellis w/ Rep. Brady	Email	Sent email to garner Congressional support for Morocco's proposal for a win-win, UN-brokered solution to the Western Sahara issue.	Western Sahara Letter
03/31/09 Roger F. Noriega	Staffer Lisa Williams w/Rep. Faleomavaega	Email	Sent email to garner Congressional support for Morocco's proposal for a win-win, UN-brokered solution to the Western Sahara issue.	Western Sahara Letter
03/31/09 Roger F. Noriega	Staffer Lester Munson w/Rep. Mark Kirk	Email	Sent email to garner Congressional support for Morocco's proposal for a win-win, UN-brokered solution to the Western Sahara issue.	Western Sahara Letter
03/31/09 Roger F. Noriega	Staffer Jason Wiens w/Rep. Jerry Moran	Email	Sent email to garner Congressional support for Morocco's proposal for a win-win, UN-brokered solution to the Western Sahara issue, provided a copy of the letter being signed by members of Congress.	Western Sahara Letter
03/31/09 Roger F. Noriega	Staffer James Richardson w/ Rep. Todd Tiahrt	Email	Sent email to garner Congressional support for Morocco's proposal for a win-win, UN-brokered solution to the Western Sahara issue, provided a copy of the letter being signed by members of Congress.	Western Sahara Letter
03/31/09 Roger F. Noriega	Staffer Aaron Davis w/Rep. Chris Carney	Email	Sent email to garner Congressional support for Morocco's proposal for a win-win, UN-brokered solution to the Western Sahara issue, provided a copy of the letter being signed by members of Congress.	Western Sahara Letter
03/31/09 Roger F. Noriega	Staffer Steve Petersen w/Rep. Rob Bishop	Email	Sent email to garner Congressional support for Morocco's proposal for a win-win, UN-brokered solution to the Western Sahara issue, provided a copy of the letter being signed by members of Congress.	Western Sahara Letter
03/31/09 Roger F. Noriega	Staffer Paul Drury w/Rep. Mike Rogers	Email	Sent email to garner Congressional support for Morocco's proposal for a win-win, UN-brokered solution to the Western Sahara issue, provided a copy of the letter being signed by members of Congress.	Western Sahara Letter
03/31/09 Roger F. Noriega	Staffer Meghan Marino w/ Rep. John C. Fleming	Email	Sent email to garner Congressional support for Morocco's proposal for a win-win, UN-brokered solution to the Western Sahara issue, provided a copy of the letter being signed by members of Congress.	Western Sahara Letter
03/31/09 Roger F. Noriega	Staffer Walter Gonzales w/ Dutch Ruppersberger	Email	Sent email to garner Congressional support for Morocco's proposal for a win-win, UN-brokered solution to the Western Sahara issue, provided a copy of the letter being signed by members of Congress.	Western Sahara Letter
03/31/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Gerry Lynam w/ Rep. John Mica	Email	Sent email to garner Congressional support for Morocco's proposal for a win-win, UN-brokered solution to the Western Sahara issue, provided a copy of the letter being signed by members of Congress.	Western Sahara Letter

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03/31/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Paul Berkowitz w/Rep. Dana Rohrabacher	Email	Sent email to garner Congressional support for Morocco's proposal for a win-win, UN-brokered solution to the Western Sahara issue, provided a copy of the letter being signed by members of Congress.	Western Sahara Letter
03/31/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Laurent Crenshaw w/Rep. Darrell Issa	Email	Sent email to garner Congressional support for Morocco's proposal for a win-win, UN-brokered solution to the Western Sahara issue, provided a copy of the letter being signed by members of Congress.	Western Sahara Letter
03/31/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Alastair Rami w/Rep. Henry Cuellar	Email	Sent email to garner Congressional support for Morocco's proposal for a win-win, UN-brokered solution to the Western Sahara issue, provided a copy of the letter being signed by members of Congress.	Western Sahara Letter
03/31/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Chris Iacarus w/Rep. Collin Peterson	Email	Sent email to garner Congressional support for Morocco's proposal for a win-win, UN-brokered solution to the Western Sahara issue, provided a copy of the letter being signed by members of Congress.	Western Sahara Letter
03/31/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Zak Tomich w/Rep. Peter Hoekstra	Email	Sent email to garner Congressional support for Morocco's proposal for a win-win, UN-brokered solution to the Western Sahara issue, provided a copy of the letter being signed by members of Congress.	Western Sahara Letter
03/31/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Alexis Rudakewych w/Rep. Patrick McHenry	Email	Sent email to garner Congressional support for Morocco's proposal for a win-win, UN-brokered solution to the Western Sahara issue, provided a copy of the letter being signed by members of Congress.	Western Sahara Letter
03/31/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Richard Mereu w/Rep. Elton Gallegly	Email	Sent email to garner Congressional support for Morocco's proposal for a win-win, UN-brokered solution to the Western Sahara issue, provided a copy of the letter being signed by members of Congress.	Western Sahara Letter
03/31/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Greg Louer w/Rep. Marsha Blackburn	Email	Sent email to garner Congressional support for Morocco's proposal for a win-win, UN-brokered solution to the Western Sahara issue, provided a copy of the letter being signed by members of Congress.	Western Sahara Letter
03/31/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Rachel Houston w/Rep. Scott Garrett	Email	Sent email to garner Congressional support for Morocco's proposal for a win-win, UN-brokered solution to the Western Sahara issue, provided a copy of the letter being signed by members of Congress.	Western Sahara Letter
03/31/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Josh Waller w/Rep. Phil Gingrey	Email	Sent email to garner Congressional support for Morocco's proposal for a win-win, UN-brokered solution to the Western Sahara issue, provided a copy of the letter being signed by members of Congress.	Western Sahara Letter
03/31/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Stephen Martinko w/Rep. Bill Shuster	Email	Sent email to garner Congressional support for Morocco's proposal for a win-win, UN-brokered solution to the Western Sahara issue, provided a copy of the letter being signed by members of Congress.	Western Sahara Letter
03/31/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Daniel McAdams w/ Rep. Ron Paul	Email	Sent email to garner Congressional support for Morocco's proposal for a win-win, UN-brokered solution to the Western Sahara issue, provided a copy of the letter being signed by members of Congress.	Western Sahara Letter

03/31/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Kristin Hendee w/Rep. John Culberson	Email	Sent email to garner Congressional support for Morocco's proposal for a win-win, UN-brokered solution to the Western Sahara issue, provided a copy of the letter being signed by members of Congress.	Western Sahara Letter
03/31/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Toni-Marie Calabrese w/Rep. John Boozman	Email	Sent email to garner Congressional support for Morocco's proposal for a win-win, UN-brokered solution to the Western Sahara issue, provided a copy of the letter being signed by members of Congress.	Western Sahara Letter
03/31/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Mark Walker w/Rep. Dan Burton	Email	Sent email to garner Congressional support for Morocco's proposal for a win-win, UN-brokered solution to the Western Sahara issue, provided a copy of the letter being signed by members of Congress.	Western Sahara Letter
03/31/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Annie Baker w/Rep. Roscoe Bartlett	Email	Sent email to garner Congressional support for Morocco's proposal for a win-win, UN-brokered solution to the Western Sahara issue, provided a copy of the letter being signed by members of Congress.	Western Sahara Letter
03/31/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Nien Su w/Rep. Donald Manzullo	Email	Sent email to garner Congressional support for Morocco's proposal for a win-win, UN-brokered solution to the Western Sahara issue, provided a copy of the letter being signed by members of Congress.	Western Sahara Letter
03/31/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Francis Gibbs w/Rep. Rep. Connie Mack	Email	Sent email to garner Congressional support for Morocco's proposal for a win-win, UN-brokered solution to the Western Sahara issue, provided a copy of the letter being signed by members of Congress.	Western Sahara Letter
03/31/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Melissa Haydel w/Rep. Mike McCaul	Email	Sent email to garner Congressional support for Morocco's proposal for a win-win, UN-brokered solution to the Western Sahara issue, provided a copy of the letter being signed by members of Congress.	Western Sahara Letter
03/31/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer James Richardson w/ Rep. Todd Tiahrt	Email	Sent email to garner Congressional support for Morocco's proposal for a win-win, UN-brokered solution to the Western Sahara issue, provided a copy of the letter being signed by members of Congress.	Western Sahara Letter
04/03/09 Roger F. Noriega	Staffer James Richardson w/ Rep. Todd Tiahrt	Email	Sent follow up email to see if his principal would sign Western Sahara letter. Email provided a list of signers.	Western Sahara Letter
04/03/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Annie Baker w/Rep. Roscoe Bartlett	Email	Email following up to see if Bartlett would sign Western Sahara letter.	N/A
04/03/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Annie Baker w/Rep. Roscoe Bartlett	Email	Follow up email to see if her principal would sign the letter	Western Sahara Letter
04/03/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Rachel Houston w/Rep. Scott Garrett	Email	Follow up email to see if her principal would sign the letter	Western Sahara Letter
04/03/09 Roger F. Noriega	Staffer Eric Schmutz	Email	Follow up email to see if his principal would sign the letter	Western Sahara Letter

04/03/09 Roger F. Noriega	Staffer Laura Hall	Email	Follow up email to see if her principal would sign the letter	Western Sahara Letter
04/07/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Megan Medley w/ Rep. Aderholt	Email	Sent email to see if principal would sign 2008 Western Sahara letter	Western Sahara Letter
04/07/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Carrie Meadows w/Rep. Goodlatte	Email	Sent email to see if principal would sign 2008 Western Sahara letter	Western Sahara Letter
04/07/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Clint Shouppe w/Rep. Bachus	Email	Sent email to see if principal would sign 2008 Western Sahara letter	Western Sahara Letter
04/07/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Andy Polk w/Rep. Myrick	Email	Sent email to see if principal would sign 2008 Western Sahara letter	Western Sahara Letter
04/07/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Brad Schweer w/Rep. Terry	Email	Sent email to see if principal would sign 2008 Western Sahara letter	Western Sahara Letter
04/07/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer James Richardson w/ Rep. Todd Tiahrt	Email	Sent email to see if principal would sign 2008 Western Sahara letter	Western Sahara Letter
04/07/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Andy Keiser w/ Rep. Rogers	Email	Sent email to see if principal would sign 2008 Western Sahara letter	Western Sahara Letter
04/07/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Hannah Walker w/ Rep. Rooney	Email	Sent email to see if principal would sign 2008 Western Sahara letter	Western Sahara Letter
04/07/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Jim Richardson w/ Rep. Todd Tiahrt	Email	Sent email to see if principal would sign 2008 Western Sahara letter	Western Sahara Letter
04/13/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer David Black w/ Rep. Duncan	Email	Sent follow up email to see if his principal would sign Western Sahara letter. Email provided a list of signers.	Western Sahara Letter
04/13/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Brad Schweer w/Rep. Terry	Email	Sent follow up email to see if his principal would sign Western Sahara letter. Email provided a list of signers.	Western Sahara Letter
04/13/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Andy Polk w/Rep. Myrick	Email	Sent follow up email to see if his principal would sign Western Sahara letter. Email provided a list of signers.	Western Sahara Letter

04/13/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Carrie Meadows w/Rep. Goodlatte	Email	Sent follow up email to see if his principal would sign Western Sahara letter. Email provided a list of signers.	Western Sahara Letter
04/13/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Clint Shoupe w/Rep. Bachus	Email	Sent follow up email to see if his principal would sign Western Sahara letter. Email provided a list of signers.	Western Sahara Letter
04/13/09 Roger F. Noriega	Staffer Laura Hall	Email	Sent follow up email to see if his principal would sign Western Sahara letter-- forwarded email from 4/3/09	N/A
04/13/09 Roger F. Noriega	Staffer Walter Gonzales w/ Dutch Ruppersberger	Email	Sent follow up email to see if his principal would sign Western Sahara letter-- forwarded email from 3/31/09	N/A
04/13/09 Roger F. Noriega	Staffer Jim Richardson w/ Rep. Todd Tiahrt	Email	Sent follow up email to see if his principal would sign Western Sahara letter-- forwarded email from 3/31/09	N/A
04/13/09 Ted Brennan	Staffer Richard Mereu w/Rep. Elton Gallegly	Email	Follow-up email to see if his principal would sign Western Sahara Letter	N/A
04/13/09 Roger F. Noriega	Staffer Jessica Moore	Email	Sent email to see if principal would sign 2008 Western Sahara letter	Western Sahara Letter
04/13/09 Roger F. Noriega	Staffer Paul Drury w/Rep. Mike Rogers	Email	Sent follow up email to see if his principal would sign Western Sahara letter-- forwarded email from 3/31/09	N/A
04/16/09 Roger F. Noriega	Dan Fisk w/ Sen. Mel Martinez	Email	Email to Dan Fisk regarding the House Western Sahara letter-- something similar in the senate.	N/A
05/01/09 Roger F. Noriega	Lester Munson w/ Rep. Kirk	Email	Email asking why Rep. Kirk signed Pro-Polasario Letter.	N/A
05/04/09 Roger F. Noriega	Staffer Maggie Fleming w/ Senator Brownback	Email	Roger F. Noriega sent an email to Maggie to try to get a time to sit-down with Senator Brownback and discuss materials sent 2/27/09.	Resent materials from 2/27/09 already on file with DOJ--5 attachments--1) Draft_Refugee_Rights_Letter_to_State, 2) Letter to Senator Brown Back 02 27 09, 3) UNHCRIG_WFP_Reports, 4) USCRI_Algeria_2007_Survey[1], 5) USCRI_World_Survey_2008.

05/26/09 Roger F. Noriega	Staffer Dan Fisk w/Senator Martinez	Meeting	Roger Noriega provided an overall briefing of the good historic bilateral relations, including mention of the FTA, MCC compact, and extraordinary constructive cooperation on security issues.	Handed out MACP Briefing documents -highlight of recent terrorist attacks
05/26/09 Roger F. Noriega	Staffer Maggie Fleming w/ Senator Brownback	Meeting	Roger Noriega provided an overall briefing of the good historic bilateral relations, including mention of the FTA, MCC compact, and extraordinary constructive cooperation on security issues.	Handed out MACP Briefing documents -highlight of recent terrorist attacks
05/26/09 Roger F. Noriega	Staffer Brian Miller, w/ Senator Judd Gregg	Meeting	Roger Noriega provided an overall briefing of the good historic bilateral relations, including mention of the FTA, MCC compact, and extraordinary constructive cooperation on security issues.	Handed out MACP Briefing documents -highlight of recent terrorist attacks

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Date	Name	Form of Contact	Person Contacted	Discussion Notes	Attachments
05/13/09	Jose Cardenas	Email	Satema Sumar	Sent letter requesting a meeting on behalf of Kestral Holdings	Kestral Holdings Background information
05/13/09	Jose Cardenas	Email	Jonah Blank	Sent letter requesting a meeting on behalf of Kestral Holdings	Kestral Holdings Background information
05/13/09	Jose Cardenas	Email	Caleb McCary	Sent letter requesting a meeting on behalf of Kestral Holdings with Jim Schmitt	Kestral Holdings Background information
05/13/09	Jose Cardenas	Email	Amb. John E. Herbst	Sent letter requesting a meeting on behalf of Kestral Holdings	Kestral Holdings Background information
05/12/09	Jose Cardenas	Email	Mark Walker	Sent letter requesting a meeting on behalf of Kestral Holdings	Kestral Holdings Background information
05/12/09	Roger F. Noriega	Email	Jasmeet Kaur Ahuja, Committee on Foreign Affairs	Sent letter requesting a meeting on behalf of Kestral Holdings	Kestral Holdings Background information
05/12/09	Jose Cardenas	Email	Nisha Desai w/ Nita Lowey	Sent letter requesting a meeting on behalf of Kestral Holdings	Kestral Holdings Background information
05/12/09	Jose Cardenas	Email	Alice Hogans, Staff to House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations	Sent letter requesting a meeting on behalf of Kestral Holdings	Kestral Holdings Background information
05/12/09	Roger F. Noriega	Fax	Assistant Secretary Richard Boucher	Sent letter requesting a meeting on behalf of Kestral Holdings	Kestral Holdings Background information
05/12/09	Jose Cardenas	Email	Paul Grove, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations	Sent letter requesting a meeting on behalf of Kestral Holdings	Kestral Holdings Background information

05/12/09	Jose Cardenas	Email	Lester Munson	Sent letter requesting a meeting on behalf of Kestral Holdings	Kestral Holdings Background information
05/12/09	Jose Cardenas	Email	Tim Reiser, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations	Sent letter requesting a meeting on behalf of Kestral Holdings	Kestral Holdings Background information
05/12/09	Jose Cardenas	Email	Stacie Oliver	Sent letter requesting a meeting on behalf of Kestral Holdings	Kestral Holdings Background information
05/12/09	Jose Cardenas	Email	Tim Morrison	Sent letter requesting a meeting on behalf of Kestral Holdings	Kestral Holdings Background information
05/12/09	Jose Cardenas	Email	Walaya Jariyadham	Sent letter requesting a meeting on behalf of Kestral Holdings	Kestral Holdings Background information
05/12/09	Roger F. Noriega	Fax	Jim Bever, USAID	Sent letter requesting a meeting on behalf of Kestral Holdings	Kestral Holdings Background information
05/12/09	Roger F. Noriega	Fax	Alonzo Fulgham, USAID	Sent letter requesting a meeting on behalf of Kestral Holdings	Kestral Holdings Background information
05/12/09	Roger F. Noriega	Fax	Dirk Djikerman, USAID	Sent letter requesting a meeting on behalf of Kestral Holdings	Kestral Holdings Background information
05/12/09	Roger F. Noriega	Fax	Lisa Chiles, USAID General Counsel	Sent letter requesting a meeting on behalf of Kestral Holdings	Kestral Holdings Background information
05/12/09	Roger F. Noriega	Fax	Mauricio Vera, Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization	Sent letter requesting a meeting on behalf of Kestral Holdings	Kestral Holdings Background information
05/12/09	Roger F. Noriega	Email	Ahuja Jasmeet w/ Congressman Berman's office	Sent letter requesting a meeting on behalf of Kestral Holdings	Kestral Holdings Background information


05/19/09	Roger F. Noriega	Meeting	Sharon Cromer	Briefing on Kestral Holdings	Kestral Holdings Background information
05/28/09	Roger F. Noriega	Meeting	Larry Dolan	Briefing on Kestral Holdings	Kestral Holdings Background information
06/03/09	Roger F. Noriega	Email	Sharon Cromer	Sent brief situation report prepared by Kestral, for the attention of U.S. officials organizing the U.S. response.	Kestral Situation Report
06/03/09	Roger F. Noriega	Email	Larry Dolan	Sent brief situation report prepared by Kestral, for the attention of U.S. officials organizing the U.S. response.	Kestral Situation Report
06/03/09	Roger F. Noriega	Email	Elizabeth Dooghan (Mr. Dolan's assistant)	Sent brief situation report prepared by Kestral, for the attention of U.S. officials organizing the U.S. response.	Kestral Situation Report
06/03/09	Roger F. Noriega	Email	Anne Patterson (State)	Sent brief situation report prepared by Kestral, for the attention of U.S. officials organizing the U.S. response.	Kestral Situation Report
07/15/09	Jose R. Cardenas	Email	Tim Reiser	Sent email to try to set up meeting on behalf of Ali Baig	N/A
07/15/09	Jose R. Cardenas	Email	Paul Grove	Sent email to try to set up meeting on behalf of Ali Baig	N/A
07/15/09	Jose R. Cardenas	Email	Alice Hogans	Sent email to try to set up meeting on behalf of Ali Baig	N/A

07/15/09	Jose R. Cardenas	Email	Nisha Biswal	Sent email to try to set up meeting on behalf of Ali Baig	N/A
07/15/09	Jose R. Cardenas	Email	Response from Alice Hogans	She said she didn't handle Pakistan-- and to contact Anne Marie Chotvac	N/A
07/15/09	Jose R. Cardenas	Email	Jordan Fahle	Assistan sent letter on JRC's behalf for meeting with Ali Baig	N/A

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Algeria	
Refugees and Asylum Seekers	95,700
Morocco	90,800
Former Palestine	4,100
New Asylum Seekers	800
Departures	28
1951 Convention: Yes	
1967 Protocol: Yes	
Reservations: None	
UNHCR Executive Committee: Yes	
African Refugee Convention: Yes	
Population: 34.1 million	
GDP: \$131.6 billion	
GDP per capita: \$3,860	

Introduction Algeria hosted around 95,700 refugees, mainly from the disputed Western Sahara, who sought shelter from the 1976 conflict between Morocco and the nationalist rebel group Polisario Front over the area's sovereignty. Around 4,000 Palestinian refugees lived in Algeria along with some 1,600 sub-Saharan asylum seekers with no recognition.



Refoulement/Physical Protection There were no reports that Algeria directly returned refugees to countries of feared persecution. In August, however, authorities deported 28 Congolese men the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had recognized as refugees, even as they awaited settlement in a third country. The Government deported them after trying them for illegal entry, without giving them

information about their trial or access to legal counsel. At the end of the journey to the Malian border, one man was missing and authorities left the rest in a zone of Malian rebel activity at Tinzaouatène. They remained there for two weeks without provisions until UNHCR Mali picked them up and took them to the Malian capital, Bamako, from which the United States resettled them.

Several times during the year, Algeria conducted mass expulsions of thousands of sub-Saharan migrants and possible asylum seekers, placing them in cages aboard trucks to Mali. It did not allow them to apply for asylum or to appeal against their expulsion.


Algeria was party to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, its 1967 Protocol, and the 1969 Convention governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. The 1989 Constitution (amended 1996) provided that in no case may a "political refugee" with the legal right of asylum be "delivered or extradited." A 1963 Decree established the Algerian Office for Refugees and Stateless Persons (BAPRA) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and called for an appellate board consisting of representatives of various ministries and UNHCR, but the authorities never requested that UNHCR designate its representative. The 1963 Decree authorized BAPRA to decide cases and stipulated its recognition of those UNHCR had already recognized. In fact, the Government considered all sub-Saharan asylum seekers who entered without visas to be illegal immigrants, even if UNHCR recognized them as refugees. The number of applicants overwhelmed UNHCR's status determination process and the time between registration and interviews was over a

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year in most cases and determinations were available only in the capital. The Government did recognize the Sahrawi and all 4,000 Palestinians as refugees, but did not permit UNHCR to conduct a census of the Sahrawi although it considered them to be UNHCR's sole responsibility.

In December, Al Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (formerly known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) bombed a bus and UNHCR's offices in Algiers, killing dozens and disrupting all activities.

Six Sahrawi former camp residents testified before the Belgian parliament that Polisario forced them to undergo military training in Tindouf and to go to Cuba for more.



Detention/Access to Courts On average, authorities arrested some 20 refugees and asylum seekers per month, generally for illegal entry, movement, and employment. Authorities in Algiers at least released those not charged with common crimes upon the intervention of UNHCR-paid lawyers and sentenced them within two weeks. Authorities expelled those of whose detention UNHCR was not aware to the Malian border area.

Polisario authorities maintained their own police, judiciary, and detention facilities and applied their own penal code with the acquiescence of the Government of Algeria. They detained up to 100 refugees in at least two jails, Hamdi Ba Sheikh for men, about 30 minutes' drive outside of Polisario's Rabouni headquarters and another for women, and a juvenile detention facility. Refugees interviewed in Morocco reported that authorities imprisoned one refugee for three months for expressing an interest in returning to the Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. Polisario authorities did not allow the International Committee of the Red Cross or UNHCR to monitor the facilities but did allow Human Rights Watch to visit the facility for men outside Rabouni in November. There was also a protective center for women pregnant out of wedlock, but it was difficult to determine whether residence was voluntary, as women reportedly had to remain there indefinitely until a man agreed to marry them or their family members agreed to raise the child. UNHCR helped construct a legal library in the camps.

Polisario issued refugee identity cards to all Sahrawis over the age of 18. UNHCR issued attestation letters to nearly 1,600 refugees and asylum seekers who approached the agency in the capital but had little presence elsewhere. The letters stated that the persons were refugees or of concern to the agency. Police officers contacted UNHCR several times to verify the certificates and released the bearers upon confirmation. Under the law, refugees were eligible for three-year residence cards, but the Government did not recognize any other than the Sahrawis and the Palestinians. Other refugees and asylum seekers did not have access to courts and avoided them for fear of arrest.

Many black Sahrawis who lived in the refugee camps were slaves under Arab Sahrawi masters, whose names the slaves took. Slave women complained that judges would not allow them to marry without the permission of the male heads of the families that owned them. In May, Polisario detained two Australian documentary filmmakers for about five hours near Rabouni and confiscated their mobile phones because they were documenting slavery in the camps, but released them after UN officials intervened. A Spanish court ruled against the return of a Mauritanian Sahrawi girl to the Tindouf camps when she testified, and SOS Slaves Mauritania confirmed, that she had been a slave. Also in June, a Polisario Ministry of Justice official formally emancipated at least one slave. In June, Polisario's

National Saharan Council ratified a new law on civil status law that modified some deficiencies in kinship and marriage cases.



Freedom of Movement and Residence The Government allowed Polisario to control the movements of some 90,000 Sahrawis in four isolated camps outside the Tindouf military zone near the Moroccan border. Refugees required permits from the Chiefs of *dairas* (districts within camps) to move from one *daira* to another within a camp or from camp to camp or to travel to the surrounding countryside, to Tindouf, or to Mauritania, which they generally issued. An estimated 3,500 Sahrawi at most lived in Tindouf with Algerian passports, some of them married to Algerians. Polisario forbade return to the Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, however, and arrested those who expressed an interest in doing so. Even so, a number managed to reach Morocco through Mauritania. To travel to Algiers, refugees needed passports from Polisario, which restricted their issuance according to criteria it did not disclose.

In the summer, Polisario guards reportedly ceased requiring all passengers on vehicles bound for Mauritania to have travel authorization papers, just the drivers. Polisario guards reportedly opened fire, however, upon at least one pair of persons attempting to cross the sand wall separating the camps from Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara. Polisario checkpoints surrounded the camps, the Algerian military guarded entry into Tindouf, and the police operated checkpoints throughout the country.

The UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara facilitated more than 2,100 flights by refugees to visit family members in the Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara. Polisario also allowed some refugees to leave for education in Algeria and elsewhere and to tend livestock in the areas of the Western Sahara it controlled and in Mauritania. Nonetheless, members could not leave with their entire families. An unknown number reportedly held Mauritanian passports. The Algerian Government also issued passports to those Polisario members permitted to travel abroad but not to other refugees.




Right to Earn a Livelihood Algerian law severely restricted the rights of foreigners to work and made negligible exception for non-Palestinian refugees. Other refugees had no more rights than other foreigners. Their lack of status and right to work legally forced refugees into the informal sector. One with an electronic engineering degree worked as a construction worker and others turned to prostitution.

The 1981 Employment of Foreign Workers Law and the 1983 Order of the Ministry of Labor allowed only single employer work permits and then only for jobs for which no nationals, even those residing abroad, were qualified. Employers had to file justifications consistent with the opinions of workers' representatives. Permits were valid for no more than two years and renewal required repetition of the same procedure. Employees could not change employers until they completed their contract and then only in exceptional circumstances after consultation with the previous employer. Violators were subject to a fine and/or imprisonment from ten days to a month. The 1990 Labor Law reiterated these requirements, without exception for refugees. A 2005 Decree established regional labor inspection offices to enforce laws regulating the employment of foreigners and to take action "against all forms of illegal work." According to UNHCR, Palestinian refugees had access to the labor market under a special policy.

Skilled refugees and asylum seekers engaged in some self-employment but risked arrest and detention for it and enjoyed no social security or labor protections. Sahrawi refugees could work in informal businesses in the remote southwest garrison town of Tindouf, near the camps, but had to have permits to work in Algiers and elsewhere and there were no reports that any received them.

Although the Constitution provided that "Any foreigner being legally on the national territory enjoys the protection of his person and his properties by the law," refugees could own only movable property. Sahrawi refugees could own goats and sheep. Legitimate commerce and smuggling cigarettes, medicine, and humanitarian aid were a major source of revenue in the camps.



Public Relief and Education In February, the World Food Programme (WFP) reported that about 39 percent of children under five in the Tindouf camps suffered chronic or acute malnutrition, with the latter often undetected, and that two thirds of women of childbearing age suffered from anemia. In July, WFP did not distribute cereal rations, the source of 70 percent of the refugees' nutrition, and food was of insufficient diversity and poor quality. The Government contributed over \$200,000 in food aid in 2006 and a large amount of wheat flour during the shortage of 2007. It also supplied health services, transportation, housing, and most of the refugees' heating and cooking fuel.

The law required all humanitarian aid to go through the Algerian Red Crescent Society, which worked with its Polisario partner, the Sahrawi Red Crescent Society. The Government's refusal to allow a registration census prevented UNHCR from profiling the population for humanitarian and protection needs or monitoring aid distribution. A joint UNHCR/WFP assessment mission in January recommended a more transparent and accountable distribution system. In March, Interfaith International testified before the UN Human Rights Council that Polisario diverted and sold humanitarian aid in other countries and "spent enormous sums of money on festivals and military parades."

UNHCR was able to increase its aid to sub-Saharan refugees and asylum seekers in Algiers and they had free public health services and medicine through its implementing partner, *Rencontre et Développement*. The Palestinian refugees had integrated and did not have contact with UNHCR.

There were primary schools in the Tindouf camps for Sahrawi children, but they lacked adequate clothing for the cold winters. There were reports that families keeping slave children as domestic servants in the camp did not allow them to attend school. Algeria did not allow sub-Saharan refugees the residency permits necessary to attend classes. UNHCR, however, paid tuition for 32 to attend private schools.

The national poverty reduction strategy, including the Common Country Assessment and the UN's joint plan of action with the Government for 2007-2011, did not include refugees.

Country Updates

Algeria


Refugees and Asylum Seekers	95,000
Morocco	90,000
Former Palestine	4,000

New Asylum Seekers	740
Departures	Unknown

1951 Convention: Yes
 1967 Protocol: Yes
 Reservations: None
 UNHCR Executive Committee: Yes
 African Refugee Convention: Yes

Population: 32.8 million
 GDP: \$114.3 billion
 GDP per capita: \$3,400

Algeria . Statistics .



Refoulement/Physical Protection

There were no reports that Algeria forcibly returned refugees to their countries of origin but it deported an indeterminate number of refugees and asylum seekers registered with the Office

of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to its border with Mali. Authorities ordered others they arrested to leave the country within 15 days but took no further action. Monitoring of interception measures in border areas was not possible. Algeria also deported thousands of other migrants, some of them likely asylum seekers, to Sub-Saharan Africa without a chance to apply for asylum or challenge their deportation. UNHCR's operational capacity in terms of legal assistance was limited to the capital.

The Government threatened to deport some 66 refugees, mostly from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Congo-Kinshasa), whom it had apprehended among some 700 migrants near the Moroccan border at the end of 2005, and sought *laissez-passers* from the Congolese Government. Third countries resettled six of them.

Algeria was party to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention), its 1967 Protocol, and the 1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, without reservation. The 1989 Constitution provided that in no case may a "political refugee" with the legal right of asylum be "delivered or extradited." A 1963 decree established the Bureau for the Protection of Refugees and Exiles (BAPRA) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and called for an appellate board consisting of representatives of various ministries and the UNHCR but, because the authorities never requested UNHCR to designate its representative, the agency did not participate. The law required applicants to

submit appeals within one month after denial or within one week in cases of illegal entry, order of expulsion, or applicants the authorities deemed a security risk. The decree authorized BAPRA to decide cases and stipulated its recognition of those UNHCR had already recognized. The Government, however, granted asylum to only one refugee during the year, an Iraqi, and he received a three-year residence permit.


The Government recognized the Sahrawi and all 4,000 Palestinians as refugees but, as in the past, delegated virtually all other cases to UNHCR during the year. Algerian authorities told a delegation of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) that responsibility for human rights and related matters lay with the government-in-exile of the Polisario rebel group from Western Sahara, a claim the delegation rejected. More than 700 persons applied in 2006, nearly half in the last quarter, including more than 300 from Côte d'Ivoire, nearly 200 from Congo-Kinshasa, and more than a hundred from Cameroon. The number of refugees (other than Sahrawi and Palestinians) and asylum seekers with cases pending at the end of the year was nearly 1,000, mostly from Congo-Kinshasa, Côte d'Ivoire, and Cameroon in urban areas and another 200 from Mali and Niger in the countryside. According to UNHCR, "Due to various factors, such as the restoration of peace and security in the country, the brisk pace of economic growth and the restrictive asylum policies in the EU zone, Algeria is in the process of becoming an asylum country for a growing number of sub-Saharan Africans. ... Durable solutions will have to be identified to a large extent locally." The official Algerian attitude, however, was that there were no bona fide sub-Saharan refugees in the country as they either should have sought protection in a neighboring state or presented themselves to the border authorities. Authorities considered all undocumented sub-Saharan Africans to be illegal aliens.

In February, torrential rains caused flooding that injured a number of Sahrawi refugees in the remote Tindouf camps and swept away the dwellings of about 12,000 refugee families. According to UNHCR, juvenile delinquency was also becoming a problem due to a lack of activities for young people.

Detention/Access to Courts

Algeria continued to detain 66 refugees (58 from Congo-Kinshasa, 7 from Côte d'Ivoire, and 1 from Eritrea) whom it had apprehended among some 700 migrants at the end of 2005 in the

Maghnia region near the Moroccan border. It charged them with illegal entry and illegal journey in Algeria and moved them to a facility in Adrar. The Government denied UNHCR access to the facility until March 2006, whereupon a protection team from UNHCR's Geneva headquarters conducted status determinations and granted them refugee status. The Government did not inform UNHCR when it detained refu-



gees or asylum seekers. The Maghnia detainees managed to contact UNHCR themselves. They remained in detention as of April 2007.

Police arrested some 30 refugees and asylum seekers per month, generally sub-Saharan Africans, and presented them to the courts. With the help of lawyers and UNHCR's intervention, refugees and asylum seekers in Algiers challenged their own detention and generally won release. Those who authorities arrested outside the capital, however, did not have access to counsel or defense. Refugees and asylum seekers did not have access to courts to vindicate their rights as they had to avoid them for fear of arrest.

The 1963 decree empowered BAPRA to issue personal documentation to refugees. UNHCR issued some 500 "To whom it may concern" letters to asylum seekers, but was only able to do so in Algiers. The security forces respected UNHCR attestations certifying that a person is a refugee or a person of concern more than they did the letters. Security constraints left the rest of the country uncovered.

Freedom of Movement and Residence The Government allowed the Western Sahara rebel group, Polisario, to confine nearly a hundred thousand refugees

from the disputed Western Sahara to four camps in desolate areas outside the Tindouf military zone near the Moroccan border. According to Amnesty International, "This group of refugees does not enjoy the right to freedom of movement in Algeria....

Those refugees who manage to leave the refugee camps without being authorized to do so are often arrested by the Algerian military and returned to the Polisario authorities, with whom they cooperate closely on matters of security." Polisario checkpoints surrounded the camps, the Algerian military guarded entry into Tindouf, and the police operated checkpoints throughout the country. In May, a UNHCHR delegation attempted to examine human rights conditions in the Polisario-administered camps but was unable to collect sufficient information and said closer monitoring was "indispensable."

The Polisario did allow some refugees to leave for education in Algeria and elsewhere and to tend livestock in the areas of the Western Sahara it controlled and Mauritania. It did not, however, allow members to leave with their entire families. An unknown number reportedly held Mauritanian



In February, flash floods destroyed thousands of refugees' mud dwellings in the camps around Tindouf, Algeria. Unlike the 4,000 Palestinians Algeria allowed to live and work in cities, it confined the 90,000 Sahrawis to desert camps where they were completely dependent on international aid. Credit: Saharawiak

Country Updates

passports and the Algerian government also issued passports to those the Polisario permitted to travel abroad.

The Government issued no international travel documents.




Right to Earn a Livelihood

Algerian law severely restricted the rights of foreigners to work and made negligible exception for non-Palestinian refugees. The one refugee to whom the Government granted asylum during the year was in the process of obtaining a work permit as of March 2007.

The 1981 Employment of Foreign Workers Law and the 1983 Order of the Ministry of Labor allowed only single-employer work permits for jobs for which no national, even one abroad, was qualified. Employers had to file justifications consistent with the opinions of workers' representatives. Permits were valid for no more than two years and renewal required repetition of the same procedure. Employees could not change employers until they completed their contract and then only in exceptional circumstances after consultation with the previous employer. Violators were subject to a fine and/or imprisonment from ten days to a month. The only unskilled foreigners the law permitted to work were those with "political refugee" status.

The 1990 Labor Law, amended in 1997, incorporated the same national labor protection requirements, without exception for refugees. A 2005 decree established regional labor inspection offices to enforce laws regulating the employment of foreigners and to take action "against all forms of illegal work." According to UNHCR, Palestinian refugees had access to the labor market under a special dispensation.

Although the Constitution provided that "Any foreigner being legally on the national territory enjoys the protection of his person and his properties by the law," refugees could own moveable property only. The desert surrounding Tindouf where the guerillas confined refugees from Western Sahara supported virtually no livelihood activity except that refugees could own goats and sheep.



Public Relief and Education

In February 2007, UNHCR and the World Food Programme (WFP) found dire conditions in the camps including anemia among pregnant and lactating women.

The refugees were entirely dependent on humanitarian aid and agencies had to cut food supplies toward the end of 2006 and had only partially restored them later. In response to the February floods, the Government sent eight army planes with 4,000 tents, 14,000 blankets, and 62 tons of food and more aid in four convoys from neighboring provinces. The European Commission donated \$1 million in flood relief. Regular aid budgets included \$21 million for the

WFP, \$3 million for UNHCR, \$2 million for operational partners, and \$860,000 for implementing partners. Algeria itself donated \$60,000 to UNHCR.

Most of the refugees in the camps around Tindouf lived in brick or mud shacks, had precarious access to health services, and could not adequately educate their children. According to WFP, about 35 percent of children under five in the Tindouf camps suffered from chronic malnutrition. An observer in late 2003 described a "system of clientelism, permitting leaders to keep a strong grip on the population. ... Everyone has to beg for the leaders' favors. These favors can consist, for example, of a medical operation abroad, studies, a job with the Polisario, the right to leave the camps, and probably economic favors as well."

The Polisario and Algerian authorities tightly controlled the activities of international aid workers and the Polisario reportedly diverted substantial amounts of aid from refugees for its own purposes. Some aid agencies distributing European Commission aid, supportive of the Polisario's political and military enterprise, did not distinguish between the organization and the refugees. The Government claimed there were about 150,000 refugees in the camp but refused to allow a registration census.

Enrollment in public schools required residence permits, which de facto and UNHCR-recognized refugees did not have. Some 21 refugee children enrolled in private schools with UNHCR paying the fees. Refugees and asylum seekers, however, did have access to free public health facilities and UNHCR paid a pharmacy to provide their medicines.

Neither the national Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Algeria prepared for international donors, the Common Country Assessment, nor the UN's joint plan of action with the Government for 2007-2011, included refugees.

Angola

Refugees and Asylum Seekers	15,600
Congo-Kinshasa	14,100

New Asylum Seekers	1,020
Departures	10

1951 Convention: Yes
Reservations: Arts. 7, 8, 9, 13, 15, 17, 18, 24, and 26

1967 Protocol: Yes
UNHCR Executive Committee: No
African Refugee Convention: Yes

Population: 15.8 million
GDP: \$43.8 billion
GDP per Capita: \$2,780

Angola - Statistics



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CRM/ISS/REGISTRATION UNIT
WFP
Food
Programme

Memorandum

CONFIDENTIAL

23/05/2005

To: James T. Morris
Executive Director
(Executive Summary only)

Through: Adnan B. Khan
Inspector General, Director Oversight
Services Division, OSD

From: Vernon Archibald
Senior Inspections and Investigations Officer, OSDI


Ref. num: OSDI/592/05

Subject: **REPORT OF INSPECTION: WFP ALGERIA (3 to 17 MARCH 2005)**


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

MODERATE IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED

Findings by Functional Area



Findings by Risk Severity



The inspection was limited to logistics, commodity management, and programming between Jan 04 and Feb 05. It did not include verification of refugee numbers. The inspection took place at the same time as a review mission from the Office of Inspector General (IGO) UNHCR. The two missions were independent but coordinated.

The inspection noted a number of weaknesses in controls and management practices within both the logistics chain and distributions, and concludes there is a risk of objectives not being achieved. However, it must be noted that the staffing of the Sub-Office in Tindouf has recently been enhanced with the addition of a Logistics Officer (P3), two Food Aid Monitors (G-5) and two drivers. The CO had therefore already begun to review some of

cc: Grasse (Executive Summary only)
Powell (Executive Summary only)
Stayton (Executive Summary only)
Morton
James
Anyanful
(above with annexes)

the weaknesses noted in this report and taken corrective action, especially with regard to increased monitoring in the camps.

Background

The current two year PRRO 10172.1 was an expansion of the previous PRRO and commenced on 1 Sept 04. It assists 158,000 beneficiaries and has a budget of approximately \$40 million. Although the funding of the previous PRRO was only 69% of requirement, and both PRROs were operational in 2004, the actual amount of food programmed to meet targets in 2004 was 32,773 MT. This figure coincides with the amount which CRA reported as being distributed. It can therefore be concluded that the amount of food distributed in 2004 was sufficient to feed the planned caseload figures. The difference between the actual funding received by WFP (69%) and the full distribution achieved may have been partially made up by bilaterals (9% in 2004), by loans from the ECHO bufferstock, or by not meeting planned distributions in 2003.

In this regard, it should also be noted that Standard Project Reports (SPR) for 2003 and 2004 confirm that the actual number of beneficiaries reached was 100% of the planned number and the actual nutritional intake exceeded the target in both PRRO's by a small percentage. The PRRO document submitted to the Executive Board in 2004 stated that the target distribution was being met.

Major Findings

1. Formal Agreements. Croissant-Rouge Algerien (CRA) is WFP's implementing partner in Algeria. CRA implements the logistics from the port to the beneficiaries. At the EDP CRA sub-contracts to Croissant-Rouge Saharaoui (CRS) – the beneficiaries – for warehousing, secondary transport, and distribution. At the time of the OSDI mission there was no formal agreement between the CO and CRA, nor between the CO and the Government, as both had expired with the previous PRRO on 31 Aug 04.

In addition, in accordance with the global memorandum of understanding with UNHCR, the management of food aid for refugees falls under UNHCR's responsibility as soon as it leaves the warehouse. The division of responsibilities concerning monitoring should be included in a country level agreement between UNHCR and WFP, but unfortunately there has never been such an agreement.

The lack of the agreements, particularly with UNHCR locally, leads to confusion over control and must be addressed.

2. Port and Primary Transport. Some weaknesses were noted in operations at the port in Oran and transport between Oran and the EDP. The transit time from Oran to the EDP should be a maximum of five days, but OSDI noted that 39 trucks spent an average of 25 days in transit. OSDI recommends that the CO investigate these delays and rigorously monitor transit times in future. Though these weaknesses were considered significant, OSDI did not find a pattern which would result in a major cause for concern in port operations and primary transport.

3. Warehouse Operations. In 2003 a Logistics Officer from WFP Chad spent six months improving warehouse operations. Visits to the warehouse were also made by the Regional Logistics Officer in 2002 and 2003 and by the Chief of ODCL in 2002. In spite of these visits and their recommendations, many significant weaknesses were still evident to the

controls were virtually non-existent.

OSDI recommends that the CO assume responsibility for management of the warehouse and that a new warehouse is established close to the SO in Tindouf. Pending this, the CO must bring existing warehouse arrangements up to an acceptable level. Again though the issues raised were individually of concern no overall pattern was detected by OSDI which would indicate significant diversions.

4. Secondary Transport, Distribution & Monitoring. Although these are UNHCR responsibilities, OSDI noted a pattern of significant issues in these areas which made verification difficult and could facilitate diversion. This combined with CRS - the beneficiaries - being responsible for the warehouse management, secondary transport, and food distribution is considered an undesirable state of affairs. OSDI recommends the CO not only urgently address these issues with UNHCR, but also take corrective measures to enhance WFP verifications and control.

a) Secondary Transport. Despite the fact that the refugee camps are situated close to the EDP - 3 no more than 50km - secondary transport took up to 4 weeks, reportedly due to an aging fleet and frequent breakdowns. In addition, OSDI noted that for more than 50% of the commodities waybills were not available. Although UNHCR has responsibility for distribution they are not taking the lead in obtaining the waybills and checking against food distributions. It is commendable that the WFP SO has assumed this role. Nevertheless there was minimal evidence of the SO taking follow-up action with either UNHCR, CRA or CRS regarding discrepancies.

OSDI considers these secondary transport issues as significant control failures and recommends that the CO ensure that UNHCR addresses the transport problems, assumes the responsibility for checking distributions against waybills and for taking necessary follow-up action.

b) Distribution Monitoring. Although UNHCR is also responsible for primary distribution monitoring, it was reported that this has not been done since 2001. In addition, as the Saharaoui leadership has refused to allow verification or registration of refugees, ration cards are not in use, and refugees do not sign for receipt of food.

OSDI considers this a fundamental control weakness of UNHCR and recommends that the CO work with UNHCR to find a solution.

c) Oversight. Regular WFP "verification" monitoring and reporting only commenced in the camps in Feb 05. Monitoring records for 2003 are virtually non-existent and in 04 there is evidence of only 11 visits. In the PRRO document presented to the EB, it states that WFP would pay particular attention to the end use of its commodities, and would regularly oversee distribution in the camps. This is echoed in the SPRs for 2003 and 2004.

OSDI considers that the amount of monitoring by both UNHCR and verification by WFP has been unacceptably low. The CO must ensure that this situation is reversed.

Finally, the current CD visited Tindouf on only one occasion since he became CD in August 2004, citing non-acceptance of his credentials until January 2005. OSDI recommends that the CD visit the SO, camps and warehouse more frequently, and at least on a monthly basis.

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ANNEXES (Available upon request)

Annex A: Transit Time of Trucks
Annex B: Food Distributed in 2004
Annex C: Action Plan – Logistics
Annex D: Action Plan – Warehouse
Annex E: Commodity Management
Annex F: Monitoring
Annex G: General

3. BACKGROUND

(i) Context of the PRRO

1. Since 1975, tens of thousands of West Saharan refugees have taken refuge in temporary camps in Algeria in the desert in the southwest part of the country. For almost ten years, between 1975 and 1984, the Algerian Government sustained the burden of the aid to the refugees, with some help from other countries. In the mid-1980s the international community and the United Nations were requested by the Algerian Government to provide relief assistance to the refugees. WFP has assisted the Government of Algeria in meeting the basic nutritional needs of the refugees since 1986.
2. The current PRRO 10172.1 began on 1 September 2004 and is an expansion of the previous PRRO 10172.0 which is a continuation of previous ones that preceded it. PRRO 10172.0 was assisting 155,430 beneficiaries. This number is based on figures established by MINURSO¹ in the repatriation planning of the refugees to Western Sahara carried out in 2000.
3. PRRO 10172.1 is assisting 158,000 beneficiaries and according to the PRRO document presented to the EB: "WFP and UNHCR carried out a population assessment during their mid-term evaluation in September 2003. Using child vaccination and primary school attendance records together with the list of eligible voters compiled by MINURSO, they concluded that the total number of refugees was closer to 158,000". Donors also participated in this assessment. The host government sent a note verbal to WFP in February 2004 requesting WFP to assist 157,821 refugees. The figure of 158,000 is rounded off from 157,821.
4. The key strategic goal of the PRRO is to ensure the timely delivery of basic food commodities to sustain the livelihood of the refugee camp population, and to contribute to the improvement of nutritional status of at risk children and women suffering from malnutrition. The budget of the current PRRO totals \$40,288,335 representing 69,168 MT.

(ii) Quantities of Commodities and the Food Basket

5. The current PRRO includes the following commodities:

	MT
Canned fish	270
Cereals and grains	51,903
High energy biscuits	425
Iodised salt	577
Oils and fats	3,047
Pulses and vegetables	7,728
Sugar	3,583
Wheat-soya blend (wsb)	1,635
Total Approved Commodities	69,168

6. These commodities are meant to provide 2,100 Kcal per person per day. The PRRO targets the entire refugee population as they all face the same critical food shortage and dependency on food aid and other basic humanitarian assistance for their livelihood and survival. There is no targeting with regards to basic food distributions. All the beneficiaries receive the same food basket.
7. Conscious of the recurrent food shortages and delays in deliveries which plagued the PRRO in prior years, a consultation meeting between ECHO and WFP/UNHCR was held in February 2001 to come up with an arrangement that would minimise the food shortages in the camps during an eventual breakdown of the food supply pipeline. ECHO agreed to establish a three month buffer stock of 3,100 tons of basic food commodities to serve as a "revolving fund" and a last resort window from which borrowings could be effected by WFP under stringent conditions. The first of such borrowings was approved by ECHO in June 2001. Other borrowings have been effected since then with a total of 31 borrowings representing 22,500 MT taking place in 2004.
8. Bilateral donations of food to the refugees amounted to approximately 3,200 MT in 2004. These donations were included in the monthly food release notes (FRN's). The bilateral donations represented approximately 9 % of food distributed in 2004. CRA informed OSDI that there has never been an annual plan of donations put forward by the bilateral donors but they more or less reflect a recurring pattern.

(iii) Set-Up of WFP Algeria

9. The WFP Algeria operation consists of an office in the capital Algiers and a sub-office in Tindouf which is approximately 1,800 km from Algiers. The only CO programme is the refugee operation. The refugees are based in four main camps near Rabouni which is approximately 23 km from Tindouf. There is a Government checkpoint on the road in between Tindouf and Rabouni which marks the unofficial "border" between Algeria and the refugee's territory. WFP commodities arrive at the Port of Oran and are transported by road to the warehouse in Rabouni.
10. There are 3 national staff and the Country Director based in the CO in Algiers. The CD, Mr. Mamadou Mbuye, took up his assignment in August 2004 although he was not officially accredited by the Government until January 2005. The sub-office in Tindouf (SO) has up until recently been staffed by a Programme Officer (P3), Programme Assistant (G-6), Logistics Assistant (G-6), and a driver. Recently the staffing of the SO was enhanced with the addition of a Logistics Officer (P3), 2 x Food Aid Monitors (G-5) and two drivers.

(iv) Oversight Visits to the CO

11. The most recent internal audit was conducted in 1997. A further audit was planned to take place in 2005 but was obviated by the inspection. A mid-term self evaluation of PRRO-10172.0 was conducted in September 2003. This covered the 12 month period to August 2003. CEDE has not conducted an evaluation of any of the PRROs.

(v) Implementing Partner

12. The CO has appointed Croissant-Rouge Algerien (CRA) as the CO's implementing partner. This is stipulated in the agreement between the CO and the Government of Algeria. CRA implements the logistics of the PRRO from the Port all the way through to the beneficiaries. WFP pays CRA an amount of Dz5, 877 per MT - approximately \$82 per MT. The import of food is consigned to CRA apparently due to the fact that only CRA are allowed to import on a duty free basis. (Neither WFP nor any other UN agency are apparently recognised as duty free importers).
13. CRA is also the sole implementing partner for the logistics food chain for ECHO and the bilateral donors as well as being the implementing partner for UNHCR for secondary transport from the EDP and final distribution. The inspection mission was unable to determine if the amounts paid to CRA by WFP, UNHCR, and NGO's represented a uniform rate since the basis for the rates differs between each entity. For example, according to CRA, UNHCR pay CRA for specific expenses incurred such as office rent and salaries of certain staff while some NGO's apparently pay per truck delivered and ECHO pay the actual cost of transport plus Euro 12/MT.
14. Food is transported by truck to the EDP warehouse in Rabouni. From this point onwards, CRA sub-contract to Croissant-Rouge Saharaoui (CRS) for warehousing, secondary transport, and distribution. Thus, WFP has a contractual relationship with CRA but not with CRS. CRS is staffed by the refugees. Thus, the warehouse management, secondary transport, and food distribution are all managed and operated by beneficiaries. OSDI considers this an undesirable state of affairs due to the potential for conflict of interest and recommends that the CO find an alternative solution in order to improve transparency and accountability.
15. At the time of the OSDI mission, there was still no formal agreement between the CO and CRA and between the CO and the Government - both had expired when the previous PRRO ended on 31 August 2004. There has never been a country level agreement between WFP and UNHCR (although a draft has been prepared by the CO). OSDI also consider this an undesirable state of affairs and recommends that the CO rectify this as soon as possible.

(vi) Micronutrient Survey

16. In February-March 2005, a Micronutrient status survey was performed in the refugee camps. The results showed that there has been quite a large increase in anemia rates in both women and children. The report only highlights the need to improve the quality of the food basket. PDPN have requested a more in depth analysis of the causes for this increase.

II. INSPECTION MISSION

17. The inspection took place in Algeria from 3 to 17 March inclusive with follow-up work being conducted at HQ thereafter. OSDI visited the CO in Algiers, the port of Oran, the SO in Tindouf, the warehouse in Rabouni, and the refugee camps. The OSDI mission took place at the same time as a review mission from the Office of Inspector General (IGO) UNHCR. The OSDI and IGO missions were independent but coordinated and in areas of overlapping interest was shared.

18. The purpose of the inspection was to review WFP operations to determine if there were weaknesses which might enable diversion of commodities. The scope was thus limited to logistics, commodity management, and programming between January 2004 and February 2005 although information and data from prior years was reviewed where considered pertinent. The inspection did not include verification of numbers of refugees.

III. FINDINGS

A. LOGISTICS

(i) Review of Transport and Logistics from Oran to Rabouni

19. COMPAS is not operational at the Port – data entry on arrivals is entered in Algiers. The CO do not have a permanent WFP presence in the port. OSDI recommends that a WFP staff member is appointed in Oran and that COMPAS becomes operational in the port. This was also recommended by the ODC Regional Logistic Officer in June 2002.
20. OSDI observed partial destuffing of containers taking place at a transporter's yard outside the port in order to comply with local legislation which prohibits road transport of loads exceeding 20MT. This partial destuffing is taking place in an uncontrolled environment and there were no waybills for the commodities leaving the port or evidence that the commodities were in the custody of CRA. OSDI recommends that the CO take corrective action.
21. OSDI reviewed a sample of seven Bills of Lading to check whether the commodities had been received in Rabouni. A total of 245 original truck waybills were reviewed by OSDI representing approximately 4,900 MT. All waybills were properly entered in COMPAS at the SO in Tindouf. The Logistics Assistant based in Tindouf collects the truck waybills as the trucks arrive at the EDP but he does not physically check the commodities on the trucks. Until February 2005, only a photocopy of the waybill was provided to the SO.
22. The transit time from Oran to the EDP should be a maximum of five days. OSDI noted that in the period January 2004 to February 2005, thirty nine trucks spent between 15 and 49 days in transit with the average of these thirty nine trucks being 25 days in transit. The list of these trucks is attached at Annex A. All trucks were transporting wheat flour which represents the majority of food transported and therefore a few trucks being delayed may not raise immediate cause for concern. OSDI recommends that the CO investigate these delays and rigorously monitor transit times in future.
23. During a visit to MSC shipping line in Oran, OSDI became aware that CRA had incurred demurrage charges of \$30,000 in 2004 with respect to containers of WFP food. A 21 day grace period is allowed by the shipping line. MSC reported that ALL containers are eventually returned to them. While such costs are not paid direct by WFP, OSDI considers that there should be no reason why CRA should incur these costs.
24. There is also no consolidated tracking system between WFP and other Donors involved with food supply to the refugees through CRA – both from Port to EDP and EDP to FDP. OSDI recommends that the CO ensure consolidation of data with other donors and Agencies.

25. WFP standard waybills are not used by CRA (nor are they used by CRS for secondary transport from the EDP) – this is in spite of a recommendation to do so in the ODC Logistic Officer's mission report in June 2002 and the printing of WFP waybills in Algeria. OSDI recommends that the CO ensure that CRA use standard WFP waybills.

26. CRA contract only two transporters, SNTR (state owned) and TMT. There appears to be no reason to limit their short-list to only two transporters. The CO has requested ODC to field a mission to Algeria to review the capacity of the local transport market and consider the feasibility of the CO assuming responsibility for logistics from the Port.

(ii) Warehouse Operations at the EDP in Rabouni

27. The EDP in Rabouni is owned and managed by CRS. The capacity of the warehouse is 10,355 MT. WFP has, over the past two years, incurred \$80,000 in construction of new warehouse buildings in the complex.

28. There is unrestricted access for CO staff to the warehouse. A Logistics Officer from Chad CO went on a six month TDY to Rabouni in 2003 to reorganise the warehouse and improve warehouse operations. Visits to the warehouse were also made by the Regional Logistics Officer in 2002 and 2003 and by the Chief of ODTL in 2002. In spite of these visits and their recommendations, the following weaknesses were observed during the OSDI mission:

- The warehouse was disorganised and messy with many hundreds of containers strewn across the warehouse compound. Containers with broken doors are used as separators, making it difficult to determine at first sight which containers are used for storage and which are used as separators. This makes inspections and inventories very difficult and is also undesirable given the extremely high temperatures during the day.
- Due to the low level of stacking of bags, the warehouse capacity was not taken full advantage of. Also the stacking is not as per WFP standards, therefore making stock counting difficult.
- The warehouse is divided, in principal, into three sections: UNHCR/ Bilateral section, WFP sections and ECHO section. However, due to operational constraints, WFP food cannot always be stored in WFP section and ECHO food in ECHO section. These operational constraints include the warehouse space constraints, i.e. arriving food is stored where a free location is found and sometimes a WFP reimbursement to ECHO happens when the food is already stacked inside the warehouse, i.e. the food stacks change "owner".
- The stacks are not aligned equally making the stock counting difficult. Food is not stacked by SI but by commodity into WFP and ECHO stacks. Thus, food from the same SI is often stacked separately. Many stacks of food were lying on the ground and were not on pallets. The stacks are not built higher than 12 layers thus occupying a lot of space.

- The documentation for receipt of commodities does not take into account that WFP commodities should be tracked by SI's. WFP waybills, tally sheets, and LTI's are not used.
 - Since the stock cards do not record SI numbers, there is no audit trail to enable follow-through of receipt of food in the warehouse and subsequent despatch. There is therefore a lack of transparency.
 - ECHO loans, reimbursements and stock ventilation also make it difficult to track commodities.
 - There were hardly any physical stock counts undertaken.
 - Warehouse staff were reported to be illiterate therefore unable to complete warehouse documents. The staff were at first unable to advise OSDI whether particular stocks belonged to ECHO or WFP. The warehouse staff are unpaid – although there is an amount included in the LTSH rate for their wages.
 - Despatches from the warehouse are not recorded in COMPAS. OSDI was informed that both CRA and CRS agreed to implementation of COMPAS and that the CO have the equipment available.
 - There are no unloading plans for receipt of commodities; trucks are offloaded when they arrive if the CRS personnel are available. The number of trucks available for secondary distribution also varies daily.
 - Deliveries to the camps are made commodity by commodity – instead of dispatching a complete food basket. This is inefficient and creates a waste of time and energy. This problem was noted in the mid-term self evaluation conducted in September 2003 and the joint WFP-UNHCR assessment mission in January 2004.
29. OSDI performed a physical stock count at the warehouse (although the results cannot be considered as completely reliable since some stocks had to be estimated due to their poor physical construction). The stock count was reconciled to CRS stock records which revealed that for all commodities counted, the actual stock count was less than the amounts reported by CRS. The differences were as follows:

WFP stock

Wheatflour – 268 MT
 Lentils 42 MT
 Veg. oil 15,375 litres

ECHO stock

Wheatflour: 345 MT
 Sugar: 104 MT
 Veg. oil 12,540 litres

30. The CO has been requested to investigate the differences. Thus, in spite of poor warehouse management, there were only relatively small differences noted in the actual stock records (approximately 2% of food distributed).
31. OSDI considers that overall warehouse management is unsatisfactory and internal controls are weak and virtually non-existent. Even in June 2002, the ODC Logistics Officer stated in his mission report "Overall the operation as it is currently implemented by the Red Crescent, in particular the poor warehouse management in Tindouf, does not meet standard WFP criteria, up to a point where it can potentially be damaging for WFP's credibility. Significant improvements are expected from the Red Crescent..."
32. The expected improvements have not taken place. Thus, OSDI recommends that the CO assume responsibility for management of the warehouse and that a new warehouse is established close to the SO in Tindouf. Pending this, the CO must bring existing warehouse arrangements up to an acceptable level. OSDI notes that the SO Logistics Officer and Logistics Assistant have recently begun to work in an office close to the warehouse which is clearly a step in the right direction.

B. COMMODITY MANAGEMENT

(i) Quantity of Food Distributed

33. In line with the terms of the global MoU between UNHCR and WFP, the management of food aid falls under UNHCR's responsibility as soon as it leaves the warehouse.
34. A Food Co-ordination meeting takes place in Algiers once a month consisting of representatives of WFP, UNHCR, CRA, CRS, ECHO, and the Government. During this meeting, a plan is outlined concerning the amount of food to be released from the warehouse. Based on this a food release note (FRN) is prepared. The FRN indicates where the food is to be obtained for the forthcoming month and this typically includes WFP stocks, borrowings from the ECHO buffer stock, and bilateral contributions. It was explained to OSDI that the FRN includes bilateral contributions since they contribute to the total food basket requirement of 2,100 kcal per person per day².
35. The FRN authorises distribution to a planned caseload which amounted to 155,450 refugees in the two years up to 31 August 2004 and 158,000 refugees thereafter.
36. In the calendar year 2004, the actual amount of food programmed through the FRN in order to achieve the target of 2,100 calories per person per day was 32,773 MT. The actual amount which CRA reported as being distributed was 32,537 MT. We can therefore reasonably conclude that the amount of food reported to be despatched from the warehouse in 2004 was virtually sufficient to feed the planned caseload figures mentioned above.

² PRRC 10172.1 presented to the EB in May 2004 stated "...to avoid duplication of resource allocations, the Executive Board agreed when approving PRRC 10172.0 in May 2002 that if bilateral donors or NGOs provided basic food assistance to refugees in the camps, WFP would reduce its deliveries accordingly. The same arrangement is proposed for the expansion phase"

37. Standard project reports for 2003 and 2004 all state that the planned number of beneficiaries was met 100% in both PRRO's and the actual nutritional intake exceeded the target in both PRRO's by a small percentage. The PRRO document presented to the SB in May 2004 for PRRO 10172.1 stated: "Thanks to a combination of WFP supplied commodities, bilateral contributions and buffer stock...it has been possible to distribute a monthly food basket providing 2,100 kcal per person per day...under PRRO 10172.0, WFP has provided aid to 155,430 refugees in the camps...in 2002-2003, contributions from multilateral and bilateral sources and the availability of ECHO buffer stock enabled WFP to provide standard rations regularly."

38. The following extract from the report on the mid-term self evaluation of PRRO 10172.0 which was conducted by the CO in September 2003 and covered the twelve month period to 31 August 2003 is also relevant:

"The resource situation of the operation has been quite satisfactory as evidenced by the 99.3% attainment of the Kcals requirements set in the PRRO. The contribution of 10,000 tons of rice made by the Algerian Government has provided a breathing space to the operation until December 2003... The combination of WFP food, ECHO Plan Global food and buffer stock, bilateral donors food and better co-ordination of food distribution among the implementing partners have contributed to the meeting of the requirement target. As mentioned earlier, the rate of coverage is 99.3%...With a case load of almost double of 155,430; the current PRRO has achieved a commendable performance. By replenishing almost entirely ECHO Buffer stocks of 8,100 tons of basic food, resource mobilisation could be viewed as satisfactory if not remarkable. The PRRO has helped meet the refugees basic food requirements as the resource situation during the period covered by this evaluation has been the best since WFP started this string of operations in 1986...The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and all those who took part in the mission and/or debriefing were satisfied by the achievements of the PRRO and the improvement of the nutritional conditions of the refugees".

39. The above findings were restated by the joint WFP-UNHCR assessment mission carried out in January 2004.

40. A distribution plan is prepared by CRS for each month. OSDI reviewed the plans for virtually all months in 2004 and noted that the CRS distribution plan always matched the total planned number of refugees. The distribution plan indicated the population levels of each camp. For January to June 2004 inclusive, the population figures in each camp did not change. In July, the population varied in three of the camps but the total remained the same at 155,430. OSDI did not receive a distribution plan for August, however the plan for September showed an increase in population levels in most camps with the total number of refugees being 158,000 - the planning figure included in the PRRO which commenced on 1 September 2004.

41. The population figures in the distribution plans for September, October, and November remained unchanged whilst the figures for December showed a change in the levels in all camps but with the overall total remaining at 158,000.

42. OSDI considers it somewhat surprising that the camp population figures as per the CRS distribution plan are always exactly the same as the planned number of refugees.

(II) Comparison of Authorised Distributions to CRA Distribution Reports

43. Each month, CRA provide a report to UNHCR showing opening stock, receipts, distributions, losses, and closing stocks ("the CRA distribution report"). UNHCR then forward this report to WFP.
44. OSDI compared the amount of food authorized for distribution by the FRN's with the amounts reported to be distributed by CRA for each month in 2004. Regarding food issued under the general distribution, OSDI found that out of 32,773 MT authorized for distribution, 32,557 was reported as distributed by CRA. Thus, a difference of 236 MT was incurred which is mostly made up of small amounts of unauthorized/excess distributions of sugar and oil. For the majority of commodities distributed; wheat flour, rice, pasta, and lentils totaling 28,756 MT, the amount which CRA reported as distributed exactly matched the amount authorized to be distributed (one small difference of 2 MT was noted regarding lentils) Specific details are attached at Annex B. A summary of areas where there were differences is as follows:
 45. Sugar: a total of seventeen distributions were authorized during 2004 for the general distribution and the nutrition programme. For all of the twelve distributions under the general distribution, the amount which CRA reported as distributed exactly matched the amount authorized to be distributed. For four distributions under the nutrition programme the amount distributed was less than the amount authorized by a total of 43 MT whilst in another distribution, there was an unauthorized distribution of 1 MT. Thus, further releases of sugar were authorised when the amounts authorised in previous months had not been distributed.
 46. Oil: a total of nineteen distributions were authorized during 2004 for the general distribution and the nutrition programme. For six of those distributions, the amount which CRA reported as distributed exactly matched the amount authorized to be distributed. For another seven distributions, the amount distributed exceeded the amount authorized. The total of these amounts to 29,033 litres. For another four distributions, the amount distributed was less than the amount authorized and this totaled 56,393 litres. Both discrepancies represent a weakness by the CO in monitoring authorised distributions against actual distributions; in particular, the authorising of further releases of oil when the authorised quantity for prior months has not been distributed. The total quantity distributed was 1,728,198 litres.
 47. Dried skimmed milk (DSM): a total of thirteen distributions were made during 2004 - twelve for the complementary feeding programme and one for the nutrition programme. For eight distributions, the amount which CRA reported as distributed exactly matched the amount authorized to be distributed. These distributions were all made from WFP stock. Regarding the other five distributions, these comprised mainly unauthorized distributions from a Spanish bilateral donor who were implementing a specific project which was not monitored by the CO. The total quantity distributed was 1,442 MT.
 48. Wheat soya blend (WSB): 440 MT of WSB arrived in Rabouni in September 2003 for a UNHCR administered nutrition programme. The WSB was provided by WFP. The amounts authorized to be distributed did not match the amounts reported to be distributed. In addition, 310 MT WSB was put in the general distribution in May and June 2004. It had been intended for a nutrition programme administered by UNHCR but due to the late

commencement of the programme, a reduced caseload and a short shelf life, 310 MT was put in the general distribution in May and June. Whilst OSDI agrees that it was preferable to put the WSB in the general distribution rather than wait for it to expire and written off as a total loss, OSDI believes that the inclusion of such a high value commodity in the general distribution is a waste of donor's resources as well as leading to unrealistic beneficiary expectations. The difference in FOB price between WSB and wheatflour is \$50 per metric ton therefore the additional cost of distributing 310 MT WSB instead of wheatflour amounts to \$15,500.

49. Given the weaknesses in the food distribution system, OSDI considers it surprising to note that the total quantity of food reported by CRA as distributed is almost exactly the same as the total quantity authorized to be distributed. OSDI asked CRA to produce evidence of the amounts they reported to be distributed. They were unable to do as and at first stated that they merely obtain this information from CRS by looking at their computer records once in a while. Later, the Head of CRA in Tindouf said he could provide such documents and approximately two days after the meeting with OSDI, he forwarded to OSDI a monthly stock report prepared by CRS. This stock report had mostly the same distribution data as the CRA distribution report although there were some unexplained differences.

50. Thus, OSDI endeavoured to obtain an opinion on the availability of documents to support the distribution figures reported by CRA.

(iii) Comparison of CRA Reported Distributions to Warehouse Despatch Records

51. CRS prepare a waybill for secondary transport (locally known as "albaron") When the truck is offloaded at the final delivery point in the camp, the head of the daïra³ is supposed to sign for receipt of the food. Within each daïra, there are a number of groups consisting of 150 beneficiaries. Each group has a female group leader who is also supposed to sign the albaron when the food arrives. One copy of the albaron is supposed to remain with the Head of the daïra whilst the other copy should be retained by the truck driver for submission to CRS.

52. The SO Programme Assistant reported that she tries to obtain the albarons from CRS and then prepares a summary of them. The Programme Assistant also advised that she has great difficulty in obtaining all the albarons and cited that the truck drivers often lose them or disregard them since they do not appreciate their significance. OSDI also ascertained from CRS that they prepare a list of the albarons but only began doing so since November 2004.

53. OSDI compared the CRA distribution reports with the albarons received by the Programme Assistant and noted the following discrepancies:

- WFP had not received any albarons for January, August, September, and October 2004.
- Wheatflour - albarons were not available for 6,360 MT, i.e. approximately one-third of the quantity distributed.

³ A daïra is similar to a province within each camp - there are between four and seven daïras in each camp.

- Lentils – albarons were not available for 1,506 MT – i.e. 42% of the total quantity distributed.
- Veg. Oil – albarons were provided for only three months in 2004, thus, albarons were not available for 1,266,000 litres of oil representing 73% of the oil distributed.
- Sugar – albarons were not available for 1,207 MT – i.e. 65% of the sugar distributed.
- Rice – albarons were not available for 2,671 MT – i.e. 45% of the rice distributed.
- Wheat soya blend – albarons were not provided for 279 MT – i.e. 60% of the wheat soya blend distributed.
- Dried skimmed milk (DSM) – albarons were not provided for 1,068 MT – i.e. 74 % of the DSM distributed.

54. OSDI considers that the above findings represent a significant control weakness – the food is reported by CRA as being distributed yet the SO did not obtain proof of delivery for at least more than 50% of the commodities said to be distributed.

55. The problem is further complicated by the fact that UNHCR has responsibility for distribution yet they do not appear to be taking the lead in obtaining the albarons and checking against food distributions. The SO has assumed this role although there was minimal evidence of the SO taking follow-up action with either UNHCR, CRA or CRS regarding discrepancies. The SO do not submit information on albarons received to the CO in Algiers.

56. OSDI considers this a significant control failure and recommends that the CO ensure that UNHCR assume the responsibility for checking distributions against albarons and taking necessary follow-up action.

57. OSDI further recommends that the CO make all efforts to obtain from CRS all albarons for 2003 and 2004 and perform a comparison against reported distributions and follow-up any discrepancies.

58. OSDI managed to obtain additional albarons from CRS as follows:

- Wheatflour for September 2004 – none of the albarons obtained by OSDI had been obtained by the SO beforehand.
- Wheatflour for November 2004 – OSDI obtained albarons for an additional 260MT beyond which the SO had originally received.
- Lentils for December 2004 – OSDI obtained albarons for an additional 119 MT beyond which the SO had originally received.
- Sugar for October 2004 – none of the albarons obtained by OSDI had been obtained by the SO beforehand.
- Wheat soya blend for June 2004 – OSDI obtained albarons for an additional 45 MT beyond which the SO had originally received.

59. The net result when comparing the total of the albarons originally received by the SO plus the additional ones obtained by OSDI with the authorized distributions is as follows:

- > Wheatflour for September 2004 - no albarons to support 47 MT said to be distributed.
- > Wheatflour for November 2004 - excess of 12 MT distributed.
- > Lentils for December 2004 - excess of 5 MT distributed.
- > Sugar for October 2004 - virtually no difference in quantities.
- > Wheat soya blend for June 2004 - excess of 10 MT distributed.

60. The above exercise illustrates that some missing albarons could be obtained from CRS thus facilitating a more accurate analysis to be performed by the CO as recommended above.

61. OSDI noted that for nine months in 2004, no albarons were obtained for oil. OSDI therefore requested all 2004 albarons from CRS. These albarons were obtained just prior to finalizing this report. OSDI has requested the CO to prepare a summary of these albarons and compare to the CRA distribution reports.

62. OSDI also reviewed all albarons for January and February 2005 and noted the following weaknesses:

- > January 2005 - out of the total of 350 albarons checked, the entire amount did not have the group leader's signature for receipt of the commodities whilst 53 did not state the quantity received.
- > February 2005 - out of the total of 316 albarons checked, the entire amount did not have the group leader's signature for receipt of the commodities whilst 30 did not state the quantity received.

63. As stated above, OSDI recommends that the CO make all efforts to obtain from CRS all albarons for 2003 and 2004 and perform a comparison against reported distributions and follow-up any discrepancies. As part of this process, the CO should verify whether the information on the albarons is complete and correct.

(iv) Other Observations Regarding Despatch of Food

64. CRA made an unauthorized borrowing of 158,000 litres oil from the ECHO buffer stock in January 2005. The CO found out and informed ECHO. OSDI considers this a significant control weakness and recommends that the CO monitor this closely in future.

65. The FRN for March 2005 was issued on 9 March whilst CRS had already begun distributing on 1 March. OSDI was informed that the CD gave a verbal go-ahead to the President of CRS to proceed with the distribution pending release of the FRN. OSDI concludes that this represented a control weakness and sets a poor example to CRS.

66. Several other errors and omissions were noted in CRA distribution reports. OSDI recommends that the CO request UNHCR/CRA to ensure complete and accurate reporting.

(v) Distribution of Food in the Dair's

67. As the Suhrawadi leadership has refused to allow verification or registration of refugees, ration cards are not in use in the refugee camps. The Head of CRA informed OSDI that beneficiaries sign for receipt of food but his assertion is not correct. The refugees do not

sign (or give their thumbprint) for receipt of food. There is therefore no definitive evidence to prove whether individual beneficiaries received their food. OSDI considers this a fundamental control weakness and recommends that the CO work with UNHCR to find a solution.

68. Although secondary transport is not part of WFP's responsibility, the performance of secondary transportation was reported to be poor with an aged fleet and frequent breakdowns. This appears to be a recurrent bottleneck to the operations and is part of the reason why distribution takes so long – up to four weeks. Notwithstanding this, the excessive distribution period is a cause for concern since three of the refugee camps are situated no more than 50 kilometres from the EDP and the fourth is only 160 km away. OSDI considers this a significant control failure which could enable food diversion and recommends the CO address the issue with UNHCR.

69. OSDI and UNHCR's senior investigator visited two refugee camps and interviewed refugees and attended food distributions. All refugees interviewed knew the amount of their ration entitlement although they did not appear to know the name of the donor. Only one refugee interviewed said that she thought the food came from ECHO. Another claimed it was from the Polisario. WFP's name and logo could not be seen in any of the camps visited. Whilst the refugees claimed they received the food every month, they also claimed the rations were insufficient.

70. Up until January 2005, the food distributions were undertaken on a monthly basis starting from the 20th of the month. Since then, the distributions have begun on the 1st of each month. Deliveries to the camps are made commodity by commodity – instead of dispatching a complete food basket. This is inefficient and creates a waste of time and energy. The refugees stated that they were informed about distributions about one hour before they took place by way of loudspeaker. OSDI observed the following from the distributions:

- The food was simply offloaded from the trucks and stacked in the open air – there was no FDP.
- There were no weighing scales in use, although the refugees interviewed claimed they could easily estimate the total amount.
- Each district within the camp (daira) is sub-divided into groups of individuals. Each group has 150 refugees with one "open" group which has less than 150. Each group is headed by a group leader who is always a woman. The group leader receives the food from the Head of the daira for all of the refugees in her group.
- At the place of distribution, the group leader sub-divides the food amongst members of her group. It was reported to OSDI that if a family is unable to attend the distribution, the group leader keeps the food until she can collect it.
- It was also reported to OSDI that the families are closely knitted and the solidarity which exists among the refugees ensures that no one is left out.

71. There is an office within each Daira- "the distribution office" in which is kept all the documents pertaining to the groups and the distributions. A document called "Distribucion de Alimentos" indicates the population of each daira and the quantity of food distributed is based on this document. There are also documents posted on the walls of the distribution offices which indicate the names of the group leaders and the numbers of beneficiaries

attached to their groups. It would be possible to perform a reconciliation between the total quantity sent to each daira as per the truck albarons and the total amount of food distributed according to the "distribution de aliments". This would require a significant investment of time.

C. MONITORING

72. UNHCR is responsible for distribution monitoring. It was reported to OSDI that UNHCR have not conducted any distribution monitoring in Algeria since 2001. The division of responsibilities concerning monitoring should be included in a country level agreement between UNHCR and WFP but unfortunately there has never been such an agreement (although UNHCR have not expressly abdicated responsibility for monitoring). This is a major weakness which must be addressed.

73. However, regular WFP "verification" monitoring and reporting only commenced in the camps in February 2005 (2 x FAM's were recruited in January 2005). In 2004, there is evidence of only 11 monitoring visits. Monitoring records for 2003 are virtually non-existent. OSDI considers that the amount of distribution monitoring by both UNHCR and verification by WFP has been unacceptably low. OSDI considers this as a fundamental control weakness of UNHCR and recommends that the CO work with UNHCR to find a solution. The CO must ensure that this situation is reversed. This situation was found all the more unacceptable given the following statements:

➤ The project document for PRRO 10172.1 presented to the Executive Board in May 2004 stated: "WFP will monitor food movements by tracking deliveries and distribution. It will pay particular attention to the end-use of its commodities and prepare a consolidated report in consultation with implementing partners. WFP will regularly oversee food distribution in the four camps. In accordance with the memorandum of understanding between UNHCR and WFP, both agencies will jointly monitor operational activities. They will continue to adopt the direct and random beneficiary contact approach to ascertain whether beneficiaries have received their food entitlement..."

➤ Regarding a meeting between representatives of ECHO, UNHCR, and WFP which took place in Tindouf in September 2004, it was reported in the notes of the meeting "Regarding monitoring, ECHO wanted to know how WFP carries out its monitoring activities in the camps. The reply was that monitoring is done on a weekly basis for both food distribution and post delivery monitoring"

➤ The 2003 SPR stated: "Post-delivery monitoring is carried out regularly through random beneficiary contact" The SPR for 2004 for both PRRO 10172.0 and 10172.1 stated: "Distribution and post-delivery monitoring is regularly carried out through random beneficiary interviews and household visits"

74. Furthermore, it is stated in the PRRO document: "women will head all the food distribution committees at the district and neighbourhood level and will be present during all the period of distribution, usually lasting about ten days in each camp. These women will fill in monitoring forms on the commodities distributed, any losses and the number of beneficiaries actually reached" OSDI did not find any evidence that the completion of the monitoring forms was taking place. This was also reported in the mid-term self evaluation of the previous PRRO in September 2003 and the joint WFP-UNHCR assessment mission in January 2004.

75. Staff in the SO reported that one of the major obstacles to conducting monitoring is that they do not have unrestricted access to the camps. However, UNHCR staff do have unrestricted access. OSDI recommends that the CO ensure that SO staff have free and easy access to the camps at all times.
76. The sub-office in Tindouf (SO) has up until recently been staffed by a Programme Officer (P3), Programme Assistant (G-6), Logistics Assistant (G-6), and a driver. Recently the staffing of the SO was enhanced with the addition of a Logistics Officer (P3), 2 x Food Aid Monitors (G-5) and two drivers. The two Food Aid Monitors are male and it is not clear why the CO did not comply with WFP gender policy in that at least 75% of local food aid monitor recruits should be qualified women.
77. SO staff reported the following factors preventing them from carrying out monitoring in the camps:
- CRS do not provide a daily distribution plan.
 - SO staff are only allowed to perform monitoring in camps if they are accompanied by staff members from CRA and CRS and this is often difficult to arrange. OSDI considers this undesirable – WFP monitoring must take place independently.
 - CRS do not permit SO staff to complete checklists in the camps but do allow them to take notes – again the CO should rectify this.
 - Insufficient number of SO staff.
 - Insufficient number of SO vehicles.
78. The current CD visited Tindouf on only one occasion since he became CD in August 2004. His visit to Tindouf took place in January 2005. The CD cites the reason for this being that he was not able to present his credentials to the Minister of Foreign Affairs until January 2005. OSDI considers this excuse as unsatisfactory given that the CD could still travel and review the CO operations without being accredited by the Government. In addition, the refugee operation is the only CO operation and therefore merits the immediate attention of the CD upon taking up his assignment. OSDI recommends that the CD visit the SO, camps and warehouse more frequently and at least on a monthly basis.
79. The previous CD only visited the SO on five occasions in the period from March 2003 to June 2004 for a total of 21 days. Again, the number of visits and duration of time spent at the SO was inadequate.

IV. RATING

Number of Findings by Functional Area and Risk Severity

Functional Area	Merits Attention	Significant	Fundamental	Total
General		1		1
Logistics - Warehouse	27	4		31
Commodity Management	14	5		19
Monitoring	2	3		5
TOTAL	43	13	0	56



Inspector General's Office / Investigation Unit
Bureau de l'Inspecteur Général / Unité des enquêtes

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IOM/65/2003 – FOM/65/2003 of 9 October 2003, on the role and functions of
the Inspector General's Office.*

Inquiry Report

INQ/04/005

Geneva, Switzerland, 12 May 2005

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. UNHCR's Inspector-General's Office (IGO) was contacted at the end of September 2004 by the Office Européen de Lutte Anti-Fraude (OLAF) who informed the IGO that OLAF was conducting a large-scale investigation into allegations of diversion of ECHO food aid and non food items (NFI) destined for Sahrawi refugees in Tindouf, Algeria. According to various protected sources, food and NFI were being diverted at the Port of Oran, en route to Tindouf and after arrival at the Rabouni warehouse in Tindouf, and were then transported to parts of Algeria, Mauritania and Western Sahara. Again according to OLAF, those responsible for the diversion of humanitarian aid were Algerian and Sahrawi nationals working for NGOs such as the Algerian Red Crescent Society (CRA) and the Sahrawi Red Crescent Society (CRS).
2. As there were no allegations of misconduct by UNHCR staff, the IGO considered that these allegations did not fall within the investigative competence of the IGO. However, in accordance with paragraphs 6.2 and 6.3 of IOM/FOM 65 of 2003, the case was registered as an inquiry (INQ/04/005).
3. The OLAF report to UNHCR coincided with statements by the Moroccan Ambassador during ExCom 2004 about the numbers of Sahrawi refugees in the Tindouf camps and reiterating requests for the refugee population to be registered¹.
4. The IGO initiated the inquiry by collecting and analysing available documentation on this issue.
5. On 8 December 2004, a meeting between OLAF, WFP (Office of the Inspector General - OSDI), and UNHCR (IGO) was organised in Geneva. The purpose of the meeting was for the three organisations to share information on the allegations, and the refugee operation in Algeria. Since 2000, the UNHCR/WFP assistance programme to Sahrawi refugees in the Tindouf area has been implemented on the basis of 155,430 beneficiaries. However, it is important to note that no registration of the Sahrawi refugee population has ever been undertaken (see below for more information on this).
6. During the meeting, OLAF provided a satellite imagery report commissioned from the European Commission Joint Research Centre, Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen, which, according to them, endorsed the view that the population of Sahrawi refugees in the area surrounding Tindouf was around 91,000 (with a margin of error of 7,000)².
7. It was agreed at the 8 December meeting that UNHCR and WFP would undertake a joint fact-finding mission to Algeria in early 2005 to identify possible vulnerabilities in the food distribution system. In the meantime, OLAF would provide copies of the testimonies it had so far received on the allegations of diversion of food aid, and would begin their investigation into the tender process and the dispatch of food to Oran port.

¹ Déclaration de M Omar Hilale, Ambassadeur, Représentant Permanent du Royaume du Maroc, 31^e Réunion du Comité Permanent du HCR, 23 septembre 2004.

² European Commission Directorate General JRC, Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen Support to External Security Unit, Estimation of population in refugee camps in Western Sahara [sic], a Study in support of OLAF, September 2004.

8. The joint WFP/UNHCR mission to Algeria took place from 5-12 March 2005, and its findings are outlined below. A follow-up meeting took place between the IG offices of WFP and UNHCR in Rome on 20 April 2005. Agreed recommendations are also included as part of this report.

II. METHODOLOGY

9. As noted above, the IGO initiated this inquiry in accordance with paragraph 6.2 of IOM/FOM 65 of 2003. As well as meeting with other concerned entities (namely OLAF and WFP), the IGO undertook research into the UNHCR archives, internet searches into publicly available documentation, and a field mission to Tindouf where IGO met with UNHCR and WFP field staff, CRA and CRS staff and refugees in three of the four refugee camps.

10. The IGO notes that the conduct of this inquiry did not always run smoothly. In particular, the planned IGO mission to Tindouf encountered several obstacles, and was almost postponed on several occasions. The mission was eventually allowed to go ahead, but its scope was limited to looking into the food distribution system in place.

11. The IGO would like to thank all staff of UNHCR SO Tindouf as well as the Representative in Algiers for their cooperation during the inquiry mission.

III. THE ISSUE OF REGISTRATION OF SAHRAWI REFUGEES IN ALGERIA

12. The issue of the numbers of Sahrawi refugees is a contentious one, intrinsically linked to the political goals of both Morocco and the Polisario. In fact, a background note on the question of registration of the "Sahrawi refugees" forwarded to the UN Secretary General in February 1977 from the then High Commissioner indicated *"that the number and origin of Sahrawi refugees in the Tindouf area has become, by the nature of things, the central point on which may hinge the ultimate solution of the problem of Western Sahara"*.

13. Currently, as in the past, UNHCR and WFP are working with the numbers provided by the Algerian Government. From year 2000 – September 2004, this was 155,430 refugees, however since September 2004 the figure has been increased to 158,000.

14. No registration exercise of Sahrawi refugees has ever taken place, and UNHCR has continuously relied on figures provided by the Algerian Government³. Throughout the existence of this operation, the reliability of these figures has continually been questioned.

15. The influx of Sahrawis into the Tindouf area of Algeria first occurred in late 1975. At the time, the Algerian local authorities referred to 20,000 persons (although a UNHCR mission in December 1975 thought the real number was probably lower: around 12,000). In March 1976, following a new influx into Algeria, the Algerian authorities and the CRA referred to a new figure of 45,000 refugees in the Tindouf area. In April 1976, UNHCR appealed for funds for the Sahrawi refugee population using the new figure of 45,000. In November 1976, the figure of Sahrawis appeared to have increased to 50,000 and in January 1977, WFP announced the provision of food aid for 50,000 refugees on a "working basis".

³ See Annex 1 for a chronology of discussions on the question of figures and registration of Sahrawi refugees. In 1975-1977, the Algerian authorities repeatedly claimed that they were using the figures as estimated by UNHCR field missions.

16. During this same period (1975-1982), the question of the number of Sahrawi refugees in Algeria was raised several times. It appears from the archived documentation that figures provided by CRA and the Algerian authorities tended to be higher than those estimated by UNHCR. However, UNHCR eventually accepted the Algerian authorities' figure. When WFP first began to provide food assistance for this caseload, although they accepted the estimation of 50,000 refugees, they cautioned that this was only in order to provide assistance and did not amount to an acceptance of the figure provided.

17. A letter from WFP (Mr. Vishnu Dhital) to UNHCR (Mr. Zia Rizvi) dated September 1977, specifically indicated that *"you may also wish to note that the number of refugees estimated is far from accurate and the estimate of individual family size appears to be very large. While the Algerian Red Crescent itself is providing food for an average of 50,000 persons the estimate of 70,000 appears to be highly exaggerated"*.

18. As noted, the whole question of registration of this caseload was raised as early as October 1976 by the Moroccan authorities during ExCom. Interestingly, this was followed by a UNHCR internal memorandum which referred to a possible forthcoming request by the Algerian authorities for refugee registration. However, there is no record that this request was in fact ever made.

19. In February 1977, a note on the *"Question of census of Sahrawi refugees"* was prepared by UNHCR for the then Secretary-General of the UN. The note indicated that the three parties concerned with the idea of a registration exercise (Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania) of Sahrawi refugees all appeared to see some advantages to the proposal. There was no reference to the views of the Sahrawi refugees themselves. The note also mentioned the fact that UNHCR had no previous experience of conducting registration exercises.

20. In April 1977, the Secretary-General informed the High Commissioner that the Algerian authorities had agreed to a registration exercise. Subsequently, on 18 May 1977, UNHCR wrote to the Algerian Permanent Mission in Geneva with details of the proposed registration exercise, referring to the Algerian agreement with the Secretary General. There is no record of a response to this *note verbale*. In August 1977, the Moroccan Government agreed to the proposed registration exercise. That same year, during ExCom, the Algerian delegation made a statement indicating that they were considering the modalities of such an exercise. No further feedback was received from the Algerian authorities and a protected source recently told IGO that the Algerian Government was never in agreement with this proposal.

21. More recently, in 1999/2000, UNHCR undertook a pre-registration exercise for voluntary repatriation. In order to conduct this pre-registration, UNHCR relied on the MINURSO identification exercise and the documentation that those identified were given by MINURSO. According to information available on file⁴, the objectives of the pre-registration exercise were *"to assess the number of refugees and their immediate family members willing to repatriate to the Territory in order to participate in the referendum of self-determination and to determine [their] final destination within the Territory"*.

22. In the course of this exercise, UNHCR pre-registered some 126,000 Sahrawis in the Tindouf area. However, there were concerns expressed by UNHCR Headquarters at the time the exercise was undertaken. These concerns referred to the fact that there were no

⁴ Mission report: Pre-registration exercise in Tindouf, 9 June 2000, and exchange of emails between UNHCR Geneva and Algeria, dated 5 June 2000, on suspension of the pre-registration.

safeguards in place to avoid double registration, and that dependants were registered based only on "word of mouth of the principal applicant". In fact, the pre-registration team only saw 19,984 principal applicants and the remaining 106,213 were registered as dependants with no random family visits being undertaken to double-check the information provided by the principal applicants. Furthermore, UNHCR pre-registration lists were not checked against MINURSO provisional voter lists. It is quite possible that some family members not physically present in the refugee camps were included as part of this pre-registration exercise.

23. The 1999/2000 pre-registration exercise was not completed and UNHCR estimated that approximately 28,000 refugees had not been registered (25,000 of which formed the so-called residual "non-voter" caseload and 3,000 who did appear on the Minurso provisional voter lists but who had not been pre-registered by UNHCR before the exercise was halted).

24. This pre-registration exercise formed the basis of the new beneficiary figure of 155,000. It is worth reiterating in this context that individual family members did not have to be present for pre-registration, and that all family members who had been identified, but not necessarily only those who were present in the Tindouf refugee camps, were included. It is also important to note that concerns of possible fraud had already been expressed by UNHCR at the time of the pre-registration exercise. The figures obtained as a result of this exercise have since formed the basis of UNHCR's and WFP's continued provision of assistance to Sahrawis.

25. Altogether, as far as UNHCR records showed, there were three formal requests from UNHCR to the Algerian Government for the registration of Sahrawi refugees: 18 May 1977 (as noted above), 7 June 2003 when UNHCR sent another *note verbale* to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Algiers on the same matter, which remained unanswered. Finally, on 23 March 2005, during a debriefing session on the IGO mission to Tindouf, the Deputy Director of CASWANAME made a formal demarche to the Algerian Permanent Mission in Geneva on the issue of registration. The Mission's response was that the matter would have to be raised with Algiers. UNHCR indicated that a written request from UNHCR and WFP on this matter was likely to follow. On 25 April 2005, UNHCR Algiers followed this verbal request with a written request to the Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs asking for the registration of Sahrawi refugees in the Tindouf area. The IGO takes note of this recent initiative and emphasises that UNHCR should not compromise its registration standards when it comes to planning and carrying out this exercise.

26. The IGO would also like to point out that the non-registration of a refugee population for such a prolonged period constitutes an abnormal and unique situation in UNHCR's history. The political dimension given to the refugee numbers in this context should not be considered an acceptable obstacle, in 2005 (i.e. almost 30 years after the arrival of these refugees), to a full and standard refugee registration of persons in need of international protection and assistance.

27. Various other sources have questioned the numbers of Sahrawi refugees in Algeria. A US Committee for Refugees (USCR) report on Western Sahara⁵ reported 80,000 refugees in Algeria. A later USCR report for Algeria⁶ indicated that there were an estimated 165,000 Sahrawi refugees in Tindouf. The report added that USCR had previously cited 80,000 refugees and that this revised figure of 165,000 arose as a result, not of a new influx, but "after further research and an extensive site visit to North Africa to examine the plight of

⁵ World Refugee Survey 2003 Country Report

⁶ World Refugee Survey 2004 Country Report

Sahrawi refugees [...], USCR is readjusting the figure to reflect the number of beneficiaries served by international humanitarian agencies".

28. It would therefore seem reasonable to conclude that the various doubts raised about the numbers of Sahrawi refugees in south-western Algeria are well-founded. The IGO would like to recommend that a full standard registration exercise (PROFILE), with DOS support, be undertaken by UNHCR in order to establish the number of refugees receiving international protection in Tindouf. Any sub-standard registration exercise, as with the 1999/2000 pre-registration exercise, would lead to new controversies on refugee figures.

29. In the event that the Algerian authorities refuse to allow the registration of Sahrawi refugees in the Tindouf area, UNHCR should seriously consider reducing without delay the beneficiary number to 90,000. This figure was mentioned by a Polisario representative, Mr. Haddad, during his early March 2005 visit to UNHCR Geneva⁷.

IV. ACCOUNTABILITY OF UNHCR'S IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS

30. UNHCR's main implementing partner in Algeria is the Algerian Red Crescent Society (CRA). Not only is the CRA responsible for receiving food and NFI at Oran Port, but it is also responsible for onward transportation to Tindouf and for various other programming activities such as supply of gas bottles to refugees, supply and maintenance of medical equipment, rehabilitation of youth centres in the refugee camps, and community services activities.

31. An audit of UNHCR's operation in Algeria took place in 2001. The audit made several observations with regard to CRA, including reference to the fact that "*no reliance could be placed on [CRA's] accounting and internal control mechanism*".

32. The audit also referred to the lack of methodology for allocating costs common to several donors, such as the costs of transportation, the mixing of funds from different donors in one account, the lack of monitoring reports on distribution of food and NFI and the lack of transparency with regard to the various CRA donors. WFP noted similar difficulties during their March 2005 mission and indicated that any comparison of transportation costs was extremely complex as CRA used different accounting methods for different donors.

33. During the IGO's mission to Tindouf, the IGO observed that some of these issues were still outstanding. In particular, no monitoring reports were available (see below), and clear differentiation between donors was not done. CRA explained that in practice CRS was responsible for actual distribution to beneficiaries, and CRA relied on distribution figures provided by CRS. However, no formal delegation was done between CRA and CRS, so only CRA was legally accountable to UNHCR for the correct disbursement of funds. Furthermore, as noted in paragraph 24 below, CRS has been given, through CRA, the use of a number of UNHCR trucks and other vehicles for which no right of use agreement has been signed.

34. The IGO noted that previous recommendations on these issues, including audit recommendations, have not been adequately implemented by UNHCR operational sections (more on this in the section devoted to allegations of diversion of food aid).

35. The IGO remains very concerned by the lack of clarity regarding CRA's funding, coupled with its inadequate accounting and control procedures. In their report, the auditors

⁷ See the Note for the File on the Meeting between CASWANAME and the Frente Polisario, Geneva, 1 March 2005

had highlighted the fact that CRA was receiving funding from over 30 different donors. This situation, compounded by the lack of donor coordination, creates a significant risk of “double funding” for some projects and activities undertaken by CRA. Such a situation is frequently conducive to the development of fraud.

36. The IGO is therefore of the opinion that CASWANAME should ask CRA to provide detailed information on related inputs from all their donors, and that a comprehensive audit of CRA be undertaken.

V. ALLEGATIONS OF DIVERSION OF FOOD AID

37. As noted above, the main aspect of the OLAF investigation was to look into allegations of diversion of aid intended for Sahrawi refugees. It was after these allegations had been brought to the IGO's attention that it was decided that an IGO mission to Tindouf should take place with a view to looking into the food distribution mechanisms, paying particular attention to existing areas of vulnerability. The mission was conducted parallel to an ongoing WFP Inspection mission in Tindouf.

38. The mission terms of reference did not include looking into numbers of refugees or the issue of registration, although this issue is intrinsically linked to the allegations of diversion of food aid. Given that beneficiaries in the camps do appear to receive their monthly rations, if food diversion is occurring, it is likely to be at the level of the Rabouni warehouse and because the number of beneficiaries is lower than the number for whom food is provided by the international community.

39. The current food basket provided by WFP is 13.5 kg of cereals per person per month, 1 kg of sugar, 2 kg of pulses, 1 litre of oil, 0.2 g of yeast (per family), and 0.21 g of tea (over 14 yr olds only). Food is provided for 158,000 beneficiaries.

40. Most of the food basket is provided by WFP with the exception of the yeast and the tea for which UNHCR is responsible. The tea has not been distributed since sometime in 2004 due to problems with the quality of the 2004 shipment.

41. When the food arrives at Oran port, WFP, through the CRA, is responsible for the offloading of the food and its onward transportation by road to Rabouni warehouse (EDP) near Tindouf. The LTSH⁸ costs to EDP paid by WFP amount to US \$83.01 per MT. This is apparently higher than they would be were WFP to subcontract commercially, but CRA is obliged to use government transportation companies for this and rates are fixed. As part of their efforts to tighten up on weaknesses in the distribution chain, WFP will recommend that WFP takes over transport of food from the port to EDP.

42. Once the food arrives at the EDP, it becomes UNHCR's responsibility under the terms of the 2002 UNHCR/WFP global Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The MOU provides for a local Joint Plan of Action to be elaborated spelling out the respective organisations' responsibilities, including monitoring responsibilities, within each operation. To the best of IGO's knowledge such a plan has not been agreed on for the Algeria operation, although a draft seemingly prepared by WFP Algiers was given to IGO on 20 April 2005.

43. CRA is UNHCR's implementing partner for secondary transport and maintains a presence at the Rabouni warehouse. In practice CRS manages the warehouse. CRS is not an

⁸ Land Transport Storage and Handling

implementing partner of either UNHCR or WFP, nor does it have any formal arrangement with CRA for delegation of authority. However, as well as managing the warehouse, CRS is responsible in practice for the distribution of monthly food rations to beneficiaries, including organisation of transportation. CRS also reports on the monthly distributions to CRA.

44. It is the IGO's understanding that UNHCR and WFP have held discussions about the possibility of WFP remaining responsible for the food distribution to beneficiaries. The IGO recommends that this issue be further examined with WFP by CASWANAME.

45. UNHCR does not provide any funding to CRA for food distribution with the exception of an amount allocated for paying incentives to those responsible for loading and offloading the trucks. Fuel is donated by the Algerian Government and drivers are volunteers. Protected sources have indicated that some of these drivers in the past may have included Moroccan prisoners of war. Given the serious nature of such an allegation, UNHCR should, from now on, obtain names and details of any volunteers employed as drivers or elsewhere in the food distribution process.

46. A fleet of trucks is at the disposal of the CRS. This includes, but is not limited to, around 30 trucks provided by UNHCR (some of which are reportedly no longer in use). It should be noted that UNHCR has not signed any Right of Use agreements with CRA (or CRS) for use of the trucks. Furthermore, several interlocutors in Algeria, and WFP itself, have expressed concerns about the state of vehicles used for food distribution and the fact that their poor condition means it can take up to four weeks to complete food distribution to all camps.

47. Distribution of food in the Sahrawi refugee camps relies on the grouping method, whereby food is distributed to group leaders who are responsible for its distribution to a sub-group and then to heads of families. Group leaders are all refugee women.

48. In terms of tracking, whenever trucks leave the warehouse at Rabouni, they are provided with an "albaron" (bordereau de distribution) in two copies. Upon arrival at the specified "daira" (neighbourhood) in the refugee camp, the food is offloaded and counted, whereupon the chief of the "daira" signs the albaron, and a copy is returned to the CRS in Rabouni. The "daira" chief himself then allocates food to the group leaders. Groups are formed of 150 persons, with some "open" groups (not amounting to 150 persons). Each group leader then signs for the food received, and copies of these albarons are kept at "daira" level until the end of the year whereupon they are all transferred to CRS Rabouni. It should be noted that this system was in place and consistent in all "dairas" visited in Smara and Layun camps.

49. Refugees were interviewed by WFP / UNHCR in the camps of Layun, Smara and Dakhla. All those spoken to knew how much per person the food ration was, and reported having received it. All, however, complained about the small quantities provided and the lack of diversity, especially in recent months.

50. The IGO also observed that the UNHCR office in Tindouf did not conduct regular monitoring of food and NFI distributions. In fact, such monitoring had not taken place regularly since 2001. This appeared to be due to a number of factors including lack of personnel in Tindouf. UNHCR did not seem to have any difficulties with access to the different refugee camps and was able to proceed freely to any camp without advance notification to the Algerian authorities or to CRS. WFP on the other hand, appeared to be

much more limited in its movements and was not able to proceed to the camps without authorisation and an escort by CRS.

51. The IGO noted that the lack of regular monitoring and reporting was raised in the context of the 2001/2002 audit of UNHCR's operations in Algeria and the situation did not appear to have improved since then. Finalisation of a joint plan of action with WFP (see paragraph 32 above) needs to urgently address this issue.

52. As mentioned above, monthly food distribution figures are provided by CRS to CRA who transmits them to UNHCR (and UNHCR gives them to WFP). Consistently, the monthly figures reflect the amounts approved for distribution to the Sahrawi refugees by the monthly coordination meeting on food in Algiers. Only where there is a commodity shortage do the food distribution figures differ from those approved by the food meeting.

53. Given the existence of the albarons, it should be possible to verify the actual amount of food distributed at least to the group leader level by reviewing both the albarons for the trucks, and those of the group leaders and reconciling the two. In theory, each food commodity quantity trucked from Rabouni warehouse to each "daira" should be equal to the sum of all the "*grupo de distribucion*" albarons for the same "daira" per food commodity. If the total food quantity approved for distribution by the monthly food coordination meeting is actually distributed to refugees, the "*grupo de distribucion*" albarons should add up to that figure. If this is the case, it is likely that there are actually 158,000 refugees. If, however, a sum of the "*grupo de distribucion*" albarons is less than the amount approved by the monthly food coordination meeting, then it would seem likely that some of the food rations are being diverted and are not distributed at camp level.

54. An initial review of truck albarons for November and December 2004 for flour and lentils indicated that for both months and for both commodities, the amount accounted for in the albarons fell short of the amount reported as distributed. This could be due to missing albarons, or have another explanation: because there are not 158,000 beneficiaries in the camps, the actual amount of food distributed is less than the amount approved for distribution by the monthly coordination meeting.

55. In order to reach a decisive finding on this issue, a more comprehensive review of all albarons would be required per commodity per month, however this would be a time-consuming exercise with possibly inconclusive results given that some albarons may be missing or faked. WFP also noted that WFP staff collect the albarons from CRS however, given UNHCR responsibility for food distributions from EDP, UNHCR staff should be doing this.

56. Another issue which was looked at was the actual stock in Rabouni warehouse. The warehouse stock report indicated a total of over 9000 MT of flour as of 9 March 2005 (both WFP and ECHO buffer stock). This reconciled with WFP's own stock-keeping records. However, when a physical verification was undertaken by WFP logistics staff, on 10 March 2005, they only saw approximately 6000 MT. A second visit to the warehouse took place on 12 March and WFP was able to identify an additional 2000 MT. As of the writing of this report, WFP reported the following stocks as unaccounted for: 268 MT of flour, 42MT of lentils and 15,000 litres of oil from the WFP stock, and 243 MT of flour, 104 MT of sugar and 12,600 litres of oil from the ECHO buffer stock.

57. Both WFP and UNHCR were able to observe that many warehousing procedures were not implemented. ECHO and WFP stocks were not clearly separated, and large

quantities of, for example, flour were kept in small containers scattered throughout the warehouse area with no clear indication of quantities in a given container or of donor. WFP is addressing a number of the shortcomings identified in warehouse management through its recommendations, including a proposal to relocate the warehouse closer to Tindouf town.

58. It should be noted that many of these problems in food and NFI distribution, particularly the lack of CRA responsibility and CRS accountability are not new issues and, like the issue of registration, have permeated the operation from the beginning. For example, IGO traced a note for the file dating from 1977 and entitled "*Difficultés entre le Croissant Rouge Algérien et le HCR*". This report referred to a refusal by CRA to submit reports on the distribution of NFIs, in particular 45,000 blankets and 2,000 tons of flour destined for Sahrawi refugees.

59. Another report obtained by IGO⁹ referred to allegations of diversion of humanitarian aid by Polisario. In particular, the report accused Polisario of diverting humanitarian assistance to support the army and to replenish the private accounts of the Polisario President's family.

60. The same report included several statements by NGO workers or others¹⁰ indicating that they believed some humanitarian assistance, not limited to food items, was not reaching the designated beneficiaries. A former employee of "*Enfants réfugiés du monde*" was concerned that school supplies had not been distributed, and former Polisario cadres made similar allegations concerning other types of humanitarian assistance.

61. With regard to the allegation that humanitarian assistance was being diverted in order to supply troops, a protected source at Headquarters indicated, in March 2005, that Polisario had asked whether UNHCR would consider supplying food to combatants. Furthermore, another reliable protected source shared their view with the IGO that it was not unlikely that food aid in particular was being sent to Western Sahara to supply troops.

62. Given these numerous allegations relating to diversion of humanitarian assistance, IGO would urge that a proper registration of refugees takes place to determine the precise number of beneficiaries in order to properly plan the amounts of assistance required, and that adequate procedures be put in place to monitor the delivery of assistance.

⁹ Maintien des réfugiés sahraouis en état de séquestration au sud de l'Algérie et détournement de l'aide humanitaire. COREFASA, undated

¹⁰ Statements in above mentioned report by former staff of Enfants réfugiés du Monde, Danish Professor Erik Nielson Revilla, Radda Barnen, IFRC and former Polisario cadres.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

63. The most striking aspect of this inquiry is that many of these issues (problems with refugee numbers, lack of registration, lack of CRA accountability, lack of monitoring) arose as early as 1977 and 28 years later the same problems persist.

64. As an outcome of this inquiry, the IGO would like to make a number of recommendations for follow-up action:

- a) UNHCR should undertake a formal demarche with the Algerian authorities to register the Sahrawi population in the Tindouf camps. This issue requires CASWANAME follow-up and could be undertaken jointly with WFP. [Note: a *note verbale* was sent by BO Algiers to the Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 25 April 2005].
- b) Registration should be undertaken with DOS assistance and applying using the standard Profile registration package.
- c) If the Algerian authorities do not agree to a registration exercise taking place, UNHCR and WFP should discuss unilaterally reducing the number of beneficiaries.
- d) The operational divisions of UNHCR (CASWANAME) and WFP should continue discussions about the possibility of WFP taking over the responsibility for food distribution from EDP to beneficiary. If this proposal is not accepted by WFP, UNHCR needs to urgently strengthen the food distribution mechanisms in place from EDP to beneficiary in order to ensure that food diversions cannot easily occur at this stage of the food distribution chain.
- e) UNHCR and WFP should pursue discussions at field level with a view to developing a Joint Plan of Action clearly defining respective monitoring responsibilities.
- f) SO Tindouf should resume regular and thorough monitoring of food and NFI distributions and ensure their reports are shared with BO Algiers and CASWANAME.
- g) As part of this monitoring role, SO Tindouf should randomly undertake a reconciliation and analysis of all available albarons per food commodity for a given month, both from Rabouni to "daira" and from "daira" to group leader.
- h) In order to avoid a situation of "double-funding" of CRA, an in-depth audit of CRA by OIOS Internal Audit Service is recommended together with a request to CRA to clearly identify their other donors.
- i) The IGO recommends to the Acting High Commissioner that this report be shared, on a confidential basis, with WFP and OLAF.

65. Many of these recommendations are for follow-up by the relevant operational sections of UNHCR and/or WFP, and the IGO would like to request CASWANAME to keep the IGO informed of developments in this area.

IGO/IU

12 May 2005

ANNEX 1

Chronology based on a file review of UNHCR's archived records for the "Western Sahara" operation

8 December 1975

Request for UNHCR assistance sent to UNHCR by Permanent Mission of Algeria in Geneva. No numbers mentioned. UNHCR reply is sent to the Algerian authorities on 27 December 1975 (no numbers mentioned).

14-20 December 1975

UNHCR first evaluation mission sent to the area. Based on its findings, \$US 500.000 are transferred by UNHCR to the Algerian Red Crescent (CRA) for assistance activities. The mission report dated **21 December 1975** refers to the estimates given by the local Algerian authorities: 20.000 persons. The authors of the report consider that the number is probably lower and give an estimate of 10.000 to 12.000 persons. The report also refers to the figure used by the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, which is 20.000. The report indicates that a few hundred refugees already arrived in the area as early as 1970. A UN visiting mission who went to Tindouf area estimated the number to be 7.000 refugees in May 1975.

27 December 1975

Response of the HC to the Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs indicating UNHCR's readiness to assist the competent authorities in the relief efforts.

7 January 1976

Draft joint appeal for funds (League of Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and ICRC) shared with UNHCR stressing that the number of refugees in Algeria is 20.000 and that some 20.000 Sahrawis are displaced in the areas controlled by the Polisario.

21 January 1976

Meeting at the Algerian Permanent Mission in Geneva with the CRA (Bellouane). The meeting is attended by a UNHCR staff member (Arnaout). Dr Bellouane indicated that there were 20.000 refugees in Algeria and 40.000 displaced persons in the zones controlled by the Polisario. UNHCR representative insisted that any request for support from WFP should come from the Algerian authorities, not from UNHCR, which can only assist this process.

26 January 1976

Meeting at UNHCR headquarters where an ICRC representative (Grand-Hauteville) declared that different governments have contested the figure of refugees used. He indicated that the Moroccan authorities had stated that according to the Spanish census, the Sahrawi population amounted to 74.000 persons and that it difficult to accept that 60.000 persons have been displaced. The CRA (Bellouane) responded that the Spanish census only related to inhabitants of cities, not villagers. Dr Bellouane also stated that many Sahrawis who been expelled by the authorities from the Canary Islands were not accounted for, nor expellees from Mauritania.

19-20 February 1976

Second evaluation mission sent by UNHCR to Tindouf to assess the scale of the new arrivals.

5 March 1976

Letter from Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the UNSG stating that UNHCR had estimated during its visit to Tindouf in December 1975 the number of refugees to amount to 15.000 persons. The same letter indicates that following the deterioration of the situation, the UNHCR mission, which visited Tindouf area on 19-20 February 1976, has estimated that the number of refugees is 45.000.

8 March 1976

Cable from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Algeria to the HC stressing that the figure of 15.000 refugees comes from an estimate of the UNHCR mission who visited the Tindouf area mid-December 1975. The same cable indicates that Mr Arnaout (UNHCR) was able to assess ("*a pu le constater*") that the number have gone over 45.000. On the same day, the HC replied that he wants to send a mission to Algeria to discuss the post-emergency phase with the competent Algerian authorities.

12 March 1976

An official press communiqué from the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies indicates that the number of refugees has gone from 15.000 to 45.000 persons.

12 March 1976

Letter from the UNSG to the Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs replying to his letter of 5 March 1976. The letter informs the Algerian authorities that UNHCR would like to discuss with the Algerian authorities assistance in order to plan beyond the emergency phase. The letter does not refer to a request for registration.

12 March 1976

Letter from the Algerian Ambassador in Geneva to the HC stating that: "*le nombre de 45 000 réfugiés Sahraouis mentionné dans la correspondance ministérielle du 5 March 1976 n'est pas celui des autorités algériennes mais, comme vous le savez, a été constaté sur place et arrêté par la mission du HCR qui a visité plusieurs camps de réfugiés Sahraouis installés dans la région frontalière du Sahara Occidental. Quand aux estimations du Croissant Rouge Algérien, opérateur, elles sont bien plus importantes*". The same letter indicates that: "*il ne paraît pas indiqué pour le moment qu'une mission du HCR se rende en Algérie pour discuter les modalités techniques d'une telle procédure*". The letter does not clarify what is meant by "*procédure*".

March 1976

The CRA changes the number of beneficiaries from 20.000 to 45.000 persons. Following a new appeal by UNHCR on 8 April 1976, another \$US 495.806 are provided by various donors to the CRA. The appeal refers to refugees from Western Sahara and cites the figure of 45.000 persons as estimated by the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

19-21 July 1976

Visit by the HC to Algeria.

27 July 1976

The Moroccan and Mauritanian Governments sent cables to the HC expressing their wish for the repatriation of their nationals. No number cited.

29 July 1976

Reply from the HC. No numbers cited.

5 August 1976

Request by the Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the UN Secretary-General to ask the HC to coordinate assistance by the international community.

7 September 1976

Positive reply by the UNSG.

25 October 1976

New appeal by UNHCR. \$US 1,306,624 collected. The appeal does not mention the number of refugees to be assisted. These appeals do not refer to Sahrawi refugees, but to "*Sahrawis in the Tindouf region*", "*groups of Sahrawis in the Tindouf region*" or to "*the humanitarian assistance programme in Tindouf region*".

October 1976

Request by the Moroccan delegation at UNHCR's Excom to UNHCR "*de procéder à un recensement contradictoire des personnes authentiquement Sahraouies pour déterminer exactement leur nombre* » (A/AC.96/CR.274).

9 November 1976

Internal memorandum from Mr Arnaout to the DHC (Mace) raising the issue of the registration of the Sahrawis in Tindouf and of the legal status of these persons. The memorandum refers to a remark made by the CRA (Ben Mahmoud) suggesting that the Algerian authorities will request UNHCR to undertake a registration of the refugees. The same document indicates that the Algerian authorities (Taïbi) made such a request to UNHCR on 6 November 1976 during a visit to Geneva.

16 November 1976

Request by UNHCR (Luke) to WFP to provide the food component for the assistance programme.

22 November 1976

Outgoing cable by UNHCR's DHC (Mace) to WFP stating that 50,000 persons is the total caseload estimated by the Algerian authorities (80% women and children, 10% elderly, 10% men).

26 November 1976

Request by the HC to WFP Executive Director to provide food assistance. The letter refers to groups of Sahrawis in Western Algeria and indicates that UNHCR has identified a group of refugees and displaced persons in need of assistance.

5 January 1977

First provision of food aid announced by WFP for 50,000 refugees for a period of three months. The text of the cable from WFP says: "*without recognizing or rejecting Algerian Government estimate of fifty thousands refugees, this figure was used as working basis subject to review through visits to refugee areas*". (The Algerian authorities had approached WFP with such a request on 5 August 1976).

12-15 January 1977

Visit by the HC in the camps. No numbers cited.

17 January 1977

Incoming cable from UNHCR representative in Algiers (Arnaout). Report on local press coverage of recent visit by HC to the camps. Local newspaper "*El Moudjahid*" quotes the HC as saying that assistance in forthcoming appeal has been planned for 50,000 refugees.

25 January 1977

Outgoing cable by the HC. Report on visit by HC to the camps on 13-14 January 2005. No numbers mentioned.

January 1977

The figure of above 100,000 refugees is mentioned in the Algerian press (source a WFP report).

7 February 1977

Confirmation by WFP of their decision of 5 January 1977. Their cable indicates that the number of beneficiaries estimated at 50,000 persons "*est indiqué à titre purement indicative, il ne constitue ni une confirmation, ni une infirmation des estimations faites par différentes sources. Le nombre des bénéficiaires sera déterminé à l'issue de visites sur le terrain que des fonctionnaires du PAM effectueront en temps opportun*".

22 February 1977

Letter from the HC to the UNSG forwarding a background note on the question registration of the "Sahrawi refugees". The covering letter indicates that "*it is my sincere hope that the proposed census of the "Sahrawi refugees" would contribute significantly towards the promotion of a satisfactory solution of the overall problem*". (Philippa, please read this report and check my selection of quotes, this is a key document). The background note prepared by UNHCR indicates "*that the number and origin of "Sahrawi refugees in the Tindouf area has become, by the nature of things, the central point on which may hinge the ultimate solution of the problem of Western Sahara*". (You may wish to be this quote for the introduction of the report). The note claims that the figure of 50,000 refugees is based on the figures given by the country of asylum, but that the Sahrawi sources put the figure at more than 100,000 persons.

The background note indicates that the HC has been able "*to identify a certain convergence of opinion regarding the desirability*" of the registration among the authorities consulted in Algiers, Nouakchott and Rabat. The HC stated that both Mauritania and Morocco see the registration as an advantage to have an international body to explode the myth of high numbers, whereas Algeria would be able to show that the number is higher than what is

claimed by both Morocco and Mauritania. The background note outlines that the registration would have a two-fold objective: to determine the number of refugees and where they come from. The note recognizes that the technical modalities of such a census would have to be the subject of further discussions with the parties concerned. UNHCR thought at that time that the registration could also play a useful role in "mitigating the spirit of confrontation" prevailing in the area and in paving the way for an exchange of information on split families and lead to family reunion both ways. The background note outlines that UNHCR never conducted such a registration exercise, but that such exercise is "feasible and desirable" and that the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and ICRC could cooperate in this endeavour.

27 February 1977

Internal UNHCR memorandum by UNHCR (Luke) on WFP assistance to refugees in Tindouf. Extracts: *"WFP emergency project for the Tindouf group was authorized largely under the pressure of UNHCR and in the spirit of otherwise excellent co-operation between our two organizations. Nevertheless, I understand that some senior WFP officials have had second thoughts and expressed the view that this particular project is a mistake. It has already created considerable difficulties for WFP and UNHCR has not shown much understanding or solidarity. It is a WFP rule, and a logical one after all, that the number of beneficiaries and the period of assistance are the basic minimum criteria needed to determine the volume of any project. Since the question of the number of the beneficiaries is politically controversial and WFP (like any other international organization) has to bear in mind its relations with all governments concerned, a compromise formula has to be devised. Our continuing obstinacy in the face of WFP's policy and regulations which, after all, are not so different from our own, could be detrimental to the excellent relations we have with WFP"*.

11 March 1977

Letter from the UNSG to the HC acknowledging the receipt of the background note on the issue of the registration prepared by UNHCR. In his letter, the UNSG states: *"I concur with you in thinking that if the three governments of Algeria, Mauritania and Morocco were ready to accept the idea of a census organized by the United Nations it would certainly contribute towards the solution of the difficult situation still prevailing in the area. But the question remains are all of them ready to do so?"* The UNSG ends his letter by saying that he will resume his consultations with the three parties and will try to find out whether UNHCR proposal to carry the registration *"could be acceptable to them"*.

27 April 1977

Letter by the UNSG to the HC indicating that the Algerian authorities have agreed to have UNHCR conducting a registration of the refugees comparing data collected in Tindouf and the 1974 Spanish-made census records. The letter also stresses that both the Governments of Morocco and Mauritania have not formulated any objection to this registration. The letter asks the HC to take all the appropriate measures to start the registration.

16 May 1977

Disappearance in Algiers of UNHCR's Programme Officer in charge of the operation (Ben).

18 May 1977

Note Verbale sent by UNHCR to the Algerian permanent Mission in Geneva indicating that the UNSG has requested the HC to register the refugees in Tindouf region. The letter refers to an agreement given to the UNSG by the Algerian authorities for this registration. UNHCR indicates that the registration will be facilitated by *"une formule d'identification des Saharouis à partir des données qui ont servi au recensement fait par l'Espagne en 1974 et qui ont été communiqués au Secrétaire général des Nations Unies"*. The same *Note Verbale* outlines the procedure, the human resources and the logistical support which will be used for the registration. The *Note Verbale* indicated that UNHCR wants to proceed with the registration as soon as possible and request the Algerian authorities any suggestion in this respect. No reply to this letter is available in UNHCR archives

21 May 1977

Mr Ben regains consciousness in a hospital and informs UNHCR of his location.

5 - 8 June 1977

Inquiry mission by UNHCR to clarify the circumstances of the accident of its head of operation. The detailed report concludes that the UNHCR staff member has been a victim of *"an involuntary accident"* and that *"le silence qui s'en est suivi est le résultat d'une longue série de coïncidences malheureuses et de négligences répétées dans tous les services concernés"*. [Note: Although this is the report on file, a protected source informed the IGO that this was not an accurate account of the incident. According to this source, considered reliable by the IGO, Mr. Ben had been involved with two young Algerian girls whose fathers were in the police and security forces. The girls' families did not approve of Mr. Ben's activities with their daughters' and detained Mr. Ben for several days during which time his ear was cut off. Furthermore the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made it known to UNHCR that Mr. Ben's behaviour was not acceptable].

3 August 1977

The Moroccan authorities gave their agreement to the census in a letter addressed to the HC.

Excom 1977

The Algerian delegation make a statement that the on the registration of refugees. The delegation stated that *"the matter was under study in respect of the manner in which it would be carried out and the purpose and context of the operation in terms of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly. It had not been the practice of UNHCR to carry censuses. In his relations with host countries, the High Commissioner accepted the statistics submitted to him"*. (doc. ref not known to me).

9 September 1977

Letter from WFP (Dhital) to UNHCR (Rizvi) stating that the *"number of refugees estimated is far from being accurate and the estimate of individual family size appears also to be very large. While the Algerian Red Crescent itself is providing food for an average of 50.000 persons the estimate of 70.000 persons appears to be highly exaggerated"*. The letter includes a report from WFP on a mission undertaken in Tindouf region between 28 February and 6 March 1977. The report includes detailed statistical information provided by the Sahrawi camp leaders. According to these camp leaders, the total number of refugees is 103.486.

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2 February 1978

Cable from CRA (Bellouane) to HCR Geneva referring to cooperation between CRA and HCR since an exchange of letters on 10/01/77, and referring to assistance needs of Sahrawi refugees. Cable ends with a request by CRA for the removal of Arnaout (HCR Representative in Algiers). There is a reference to Mr. Arnaout's behaviour which is considered unacceptable (includes what are termed insulting remarks by Arnaout about CRA) and lack of contact between him and CRA since May 1977.

23-30 March 1980

NFF on a mission of J Cuenod and R Yazgi to Algeria to assess the situation, including a basic needs assessment, of Sahrawi refugees (but not to focus on eligibility or registration). NFF mentions past difficulties between UNHCR and CRA.

19 August 1980

Draft agreement between the Government of Algeria and UNHCR on cooperation over Sahrawi refugees in Algeria (unsigned).

24 December 1980

Draft sub-agreement between CRA and HCR (unsigned).

7 October 1981

Telex from HCR (Makonnen/Koulisher) to NY on the question of registration and the fact that UNHCR has not done this and does not consider registration an HCR activity but rather a government one. Figure mentioned in this telex refers to 50,000 Sahrawi refugees which is figure provided by Algerian authorities.

20 October 1981

Cable from NY to Geneva (Koulisher) requesting Geneva feedback in order to respond to the OAU query on registration of Sahrawi refugees and to get copies of Moroccan statement to ExCom.

1 February 1982

Cable from Djemali/Koulisher to New York regarding registration of Sahrawis, and UNHCR position on registration in general, with reference to HCR's Statute. Cable refers to information from the Algerian Government that the number of Sahrawi refugees was 150,000.

Internal memorandum from Mr. Noel to the HC on "UN Assistance to the OAU Implementation Committee on W. Sahara".

28 June 1982

Letter to Mr. Gordon-Lennox, NY, from Mr. A Noel on same issue which noted that UNHCR would only intervene in refugee registration if the basis of registration was agreed between the Moroccan and Algerian governments and they requested UNHCR assistance.

IU/IGO

12 May 2005

The History of the Western Sahara

A Timeline

The sovereignty of the Western Sahara remains the subject of a dispute between Morocco and the Polisario Front, a separatist group based in southern Algeria. Morocco reasserted its sovereignty over the territory after Spain withdrew its colonial interests from the area in 1975. The Polisario Front has challenged Morocco's control over the Western Sahara.

The Moroccan Government has undertaken a sizable economic development program in the Western Sahara to provide economic, political and social infrastructure for the region's residents. Today, international efforts are underway to encourage a political settlement between Morocco, the Polisario Front, and Algeria that would resolve sovereignty over the Western Sahara through autonomy.

1578 to 1727 Moroccan Kings rule over the territory currently known as the Western Sahara

1884 Spanish colonization begins

1956 Morocco claims independence from France

Morocco reclaims the Western Sahara at the UN for the first time

1958 King Mohammed V formally lays claim to the Sahara

1963 The UN includes the Western Sahara on the list of non self-governing territories

1965 The UN General Assembly adopts its first resolution calling on Spain to decolonize the Sahara

1973 The Polisario Front is founded and stages its first attack

1974 Algeria begins to oppose Moroccan policy on the Sahara and trains Polisario guerillas

1975 The Green March takes place in which 350,000 unarmed Moroccans march South into the desert to reassert the sovereignty of the Sahara from the Spanish

Morocco signs Madrid Agreement which seeks to transfer control of the Sahara to a three party administration divided between Morocco, Spain and Mauritania

Spain officially terminates its administration of the Sahara

1976 The Polisario declares the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and raises the flag of "Western Sahara"


1977 Spanish-Moroccan fishing agreement is signed; the Polisario begins attacks on Spanish fishing vessels

1990 Morocco and the Polisario accept a UN peace plan, in which a referendum will be held.

1991 UN Security Council approves the establishment of Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Organisation d'un Référendum au Sahara (MINURSO)

"By giving the people of the Western Sahara a true voice in their future through the full benefits of autonomy as presented by Morocco, a credible political solution can be achieved."

-Former U.S. Sec. of State Madeleine Albright, June 6, 2007



"[T]he Kingdom [of Morocco] has proposed a serious and credible autonomy plan as a basis of negotiation [...] and it constitutes a new proposal element after years of stalemate."

-French President Nicolas Sarkozy, October 23, 2007

"My conclusion that an independent Western Sahara is not an attainable goal is relevant today because it lies at the root of the current negotiation process..."

- UN Secretary General's Personal Envoy for the Western Sahara Peter Van Walsum, April 21, 2008

Cease-fire declared in the disputed Western Sahara region

Former US Sec. of State James Baker III appointed as UN Special Envoy in the Sahara region

Houston Accord is signed between Morocco and Polisario establishing the implementation of a referendum to decide the future of the Western Sahara

UN Sec. Gen. Kofi Annan presents the Security Council with four options to break the impasse in the Western Sahara: referendum, autonomy, partition, or complete withdrawal

James Baker III announces the "new Baker Plan" for Self-Determination which describes a proposed Western Sahara Authority to administer the territory autonomously until 2007 or 2008, when the referendum would be held

Dutch ambassador Peter Van Walsum is confirmed as the new UN Sec. Gen. Special Envoy to the Western Sahara

Morocco releases autonomy under sovereignty plan for the Western Sahara which is endorsed by the United States, Spain and France

Morocco and the Polisario Front conduct first two rounds of negotiations

The Polisario Front threatens a return to armed conflict with Morocco

Third round of negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario Front takes place in January; a fourth round resumes in March

UN Sec. Gen. Special Envoy Van Walsum calls for realism and deems independence an unattainable option. Parties to the negotiations agree to a fifth round of negotiations to take place at a later date.

UN Sec. Gen. appoints seasoned US Diplomat Christopher Ross as the new Special Envoy for the Western Sahara.

This information has been produced by the Moroccan American Center for Policy (MACP). MACP is a registered agent of the Government of Morocco. Additional information is available at the Justice Department in Washington, D.C.



Moroccan American Center for Policy • 1220 L St NW, Suite 411 • Washington, DC 20005
Tel: (202) 587-0855 • www.moroccanamericanpolicy.org • info@moroccanamericanpolicy.com

Assessment of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara

1. During my visit to the region, I told each of my hosts that I stood by the conclusions I had drawn in my first briefing to the Security Council on 18 January 2006. As the Council had made it clear from the outset that it could only contemplate a consensual solution to the question of Western Sahara and, more specifically, had not reacted in 2004 when Morocco decided that it could not consent to any referendum in which independence was an option, I had concluded that there was no pressure on Morocco to abandon its claim of sovereignty over the Territory and, therefore, that an independent Western Sahara was not a realistic proposition. I felt it necessary to reiterate this conclusion, because it might have become obscured by the fact that both the Moroccan proposal and that of the Frente Polisario were on the agenda of the Manhasset negotiations.
2. My interlocutors in Tindouf and Algiers did not contest my analysis, but disagreed strongly with my conclusion; first, because international legality had to prevail, and second, because the circumstances I described as 'reality' might change.
3. My conclusion that an independent Western Sahara is not an attainable goal is relevant today because it lies at the root of the current negotiation process. In my briefing to the Security Council in January 2006, I observed that once the Council recognized that Morocco would not be made to give up its claim to Western Sahara, it would realize that there were only two options: indefinite prolongation of the deadlock or direct negotiations between the parties.
4. On this basis, Secretary-General Annan recommended, first in April and again in October 2006, that the Security Council call on the two parties to enter into negotiations without preconditions. The Security Council did not act on these recommendations. In the second week of April 2007, both parties introduced their respective proposals for the solution of the question of Western Sahara. In his report to the Security Council of 13 April 2007 (S/2007/202), the Secretary-General acknowledged receipt of both proposals and repeated the recommendation to call on the two parties to enter into negotiations without preconditions. Subsequently, in its resolution 1754 (2007) of 30 April 2007, the Security Council took note of both proposals and followed the Secretary-General's recommendation, presumably due to the impact of the Moroccan proposal to negotiate an autonomy statute for the region. And finally, during the first round of the negotiations, on 18 June 2007, I explained to the parties that I had drawn the conclusion that both proposals were on the agenda.
5. Although this procedure cannot be faulted, its outcome is paradoxical. While Morocco's rejection of a referendum with independence as an option had triggered the Council's recourse to recommending negotiations without preconditions, one of the two proposals that are now on the table in these negotiations demands precisely the holding of a referendum with independence as an option. This contradiction may explain why the negotiation process is not leading anywhere: the fundamental positions of the two parties are mutually exclusive. What is an absolute necessity for one is absolutely unacceptable

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for the other. For the Frente Polisario, a referendum with independence as an option is indispensable for the achievement of self-determination, whereas Morocco is unable to accept such a referendum, but believes self-determination can be achieved through other forms of popular consultation.

6. As a result, an even more unyielding impasse has established itself right in the heart of the process that was meant to show a way out of the impasse brought about by Morocco's rejection of the Baker Plan (Peace Plan for Self-Determination of the People of Western Sahara) in 2004 (S/2004/325). A month after the end of my latest tour of the region from 5-15 February 2008, the parties and neighbouring countries met again in Manhasset, from 16-18 March 2008, for the fourth round of their talks. As had been the case in the first three rounds, from 18-19 June and 10-11 August 2007 and 7-9 January 2008, there was hardly any exchange that could be characterized as negotiations. Since April 2007, the equal treatment the Secretary-General had allotted to the two proposals had been progressively modified by the Security Council through the addition of certain references to the Moroccan proposal. First, in resolution 1754 (2007), the Council had inserted the words "welcoming serious and credible Moroccan efforts to move the process forward towards resolution" (fifth preambular paragraph) and called upon the parties to take into account "the developments of the last months" (paragraph 2), and later, in resolution 1783 (2007), it had expanded the latter phrase to: "taking into account the efforts made since 2006 and developments of the last months." In Manhasset, I reminded the delegations that these insertions were integral parts of the two Security Council resolutions, as was the Council's "taking note" of both proposals.

7. Both parties repeatedly commented on the exact meaning of resolutions 1754 (2007) and 1783 (2007), and, it goes without saying, they attached paramount importance to very different elements. For the Frente Polisario, all that matters is that both proposals are on the table, while according to Morocco the Council has established a clear order between the two. This exercise in textual explanation may be intellectually challenging, but it does not yield the kind of authoritative interpretation that induces the parties to reconsider their positions and to negotiate a compromise solution. What is needed is clearer guidance from the Council itself. I am, of course, aware of the constraints under which Security Council resolutions come into being; but the answer to the vital question of whether one proposal has priority over the other cannot be left to the inevitably controversial interpretation of a number of indistinct phrases. If the Council cannot make a choice, the parties cannot either.

8. There is no conceivable compromise between the parties' views on the role of a referendum with independence as an option. However, I had hoped that the parties, who at the conclusion of the second round of talks agreed that the current *status quo* was unacceptable, would sooner or later show some willingness to explore the implications of possible movement on the basis of the principle that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed;" but in four rounds of talks, no sign of such willingness has been detected. Therefore, the process is at a standstill, despite the agreement to meet for a fifth round at a date still to be determined.

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9. Much will now depend on the interaction between the Security Council's adoption of a new resolution before the end of April, and that fifth round of the negotiation process. If the Council simply extends the process begun by resolution 1754 (2007) and continued by resolution 1783 (2007), there is no doubt that the fifth round will be no different from the first four, and the process will be rightly regarded as deadlocked. Yet, this seems the most likely outcome because in the wider international community the feeling that the *status quo* in Western Sahara is unacceptable is far less prevalent than the feeling that, on balance and all alternatives considered, it may be the least disadvantageous option. Numerous countries consider the *status quo* quite tolerable because it relieves them from the necessity of making painful choices, such as taking sides between Algeria and Morocco. Consolidation of the *status quo* may well be the natural outcome – so to speak, the *default mode* – of the negotiation process.

10. Apart from what the Security Council may or may not be able to do, countries that have close ties with either party might make a greater effort at counteracting that party's tendency to overestimate the strength of its position. Both parties are quick to interpret positive comments from third countries as support for their cause. I have the impression that the prevalence of this phenomenon is responsible for a large number of misconceptions that weaken the political will to search for compromise solutions. In the international community, there is a widespread view that legally the Frente Polisario has the stronger case, but that it is not incumbent on the Security Council to pressure Morocco to pull out of Western Sahara thirty-three years after its taking possession of the Territory. It is as if the Frente Polisario hears only the first part of this sentence, and Morocco only the second. By far the greatest misconception in this category must be the belief that once the current negotiations have foundered, the Security Council will realize that the question of Western Sahara can only be solved by means of a referendum with independence as an option and take action accordingly.

11. If the negotiations end in stalemate again, the continuation of the *status quo* seems unavoidable. It is highly unlikely that in such a situation the Security Council would unanimously lend its full support to one of the two proposals. Yet, the stalemate would have been caused by the fact that the process was launched with two proposals on the table, one that requires a referendum with independence as an option, and the other that rules that out. A way out of this dilemma might be a tentative and temporary change of focus.

12. To initiate this, the Security Council might ask the parties:

- to reconfirm their acceptance of the principle that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed";
- to temporarily (e.g. for six to nine months) remove both proposals from the agenda of the talks;
- to negotiate, this time really without preconditions but on the temporary assumption that there will not be a referendum with independence as an option and that, therefore, the outcome will necessarily fall short of full independence.

In addition, the Council might announce its intention to evaluate the process at the end of the trial period. If at that time it perceives the contours of a possible political solution, it may decide to extend the trial period; if it does not, the *status quo* – with the existing incompatible positions of the parties – will resume of itself.

13. I am aware that the removal of the two proposals from the table would be largely symbolic. Still, as the negotiations are hindered by the fact that two irreconcilable proposals are on the table, the right solution might be to remove both of them. Of course, they would not cease to exist; but their status would be clear: they would just be the parties' goals, to be negotiated between them on the basis of two realities:

- (for the Frente Polisario:) that the Security Council will not make Morocco accept a referendum with independence as an option;
- (for Morocco:) that the United Nations does not recognize Moroccan sovereignty over any part of Western Sahara.

It is important to be as explicit about the latter as about the former because, in the context of the current negotiation process, Morocco so consistently refers to its sovereignty over Western Sahara that it would seem advisable to clarify that this can only express a Moroccan claim, so that in case of an unexpected breakdown of the negotiations there will be absolute clarity about the status of Western Sahara as disputed territory.

14. From the outset, I have emphasised the need to respect political reality alongside international legality. Morocco's physical possession of Western Sahara is political reality, but so is the reality that no country has so far recognized its sovereignty over the Territory. This fact is linked to international legality; the two concepts do not exist in separation. What matters is how political reality and international legality interact to enable us to take the best decisions in real life. I do not accept the view that taking political reality into account is a concession or a surrender, and that it is wrong ever to settle for less than pure legality. The choices to be made are not limited to the dilemma between international legality and political reality. There is also a moral dilemma that comes to light when the virtue of international legality is weighed against the consequences of its pursuit for the people of Western Sahara in real life. The main reason why I find the *status quo* intolerable is that it is too readily accepted, not only by uncommitted onlookers in distant lands, but also by deeply involved supporters of the Frente Polisario, who do not live in the camps themselves but are convinced that those who do would rather stay there indefinitely than settle for any negotiated solution that falls short of full independence.



Security Council

Sixty-third year

Provisional

5884th meeting

Wednesday, 30 April 2008, 10.25 p.m.
New York

<i>President:</i>	Mr. Kumalo	(South Africa)
<i>Members:</i>	Belgium	Mr. Verbeke
	Burkina Faso	Mr. Kafando
	China	Mr. Liu Zhenmin
	Costa Rica	Mr. Urbina
	Croatia	Mr. Viločić
	France	Mr. Ripert
	Indonesia	Mr. Kleib
	Italy	Mr. Spatafora
	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Mr. Dabbashi
	Panama	Mr. Suescum
	Russian Federation	Mr. Safronkov
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Quarrey
	United States of America	Mr. Wolff
	Viet Nam	Mr. Hoang Chi Trung

Agenda

The situation concerning Western Sahara

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara
(S/2008/251)

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room C-154A.



in favour of the resolution in the hope that through the negotiating process and with the support of MINURSO the people of Western Sahara can one day achieve their right to self-determination.

I now resume my function as President of the Council.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour:

Belgium, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Indonesia, Italy, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Panama, Russian Federation, South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Viet Nam

The President: There were 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 1813 (2008).

I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting.

Mr. Wolff (United States of America): I had intended to focus my remarks on the issue before us, and will do so. But that does not mean we agree with either the interpretation of the process that led to this resolution or the representation of the arguments presented by Council members on the specific issues raised by both Ambassador Urbina and Ambassador Kumalo reflecting the substance of the issue. But let me focus on the issue as we see it before us.

The Western Sahara conflict has gone on too long, provoking tensions, causing human suffering and preventing progress towards regional integration in North Africa. I am sure that all of us around this table yearn for a mutually agreed political solution to this conflict. Four rounds of discussions in the framework of the latest settlement initiative have, however, confirmed the difficulty of arriving at such a solution, despite the seriousness, dedication and sincerity of the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy, Peter van Walsum.

In the absence of a settlement, my Government judges the mission of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara to be vital and is pleased that the Council has renewed its mandate for a full year; we appreciate the fact that it was done consensually.

It is our hope that this will permit the parties to engage in the search for a solution in a sustained, intensive and creative manner. To encourage them to do so, we intend to broaden our own engagement with them over the coming weeks and months. For our part, we agree with Mr. van Walsum's assessment that an independent Sahrawi State is not a realistic option for resolving the conflict and that genuine autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty is the only feasible solution. In our view, the focus of future negotiation rounds should therefore be on designing a mutually acceptable autonomy regime that is consistent with the aspirations of the people of the Western Sahara.

In that regard, Morocco has already produced a proposal that the Security Council has qualified as serious and credible, and we urge the POLISARIO to engage Morocco in negotiation of its details — or to submit a comprehensive autonomy proposal of its own.

Mr. Ripert (France) (*spoke in French*): With the adoption of resolutions 1754 (2007) and 1783 (2007), the international community unanimously welcomed the end of the stalemate on Western Sahara, with the commencement of negotiations without preconditions and in good faith. The lack of progress in the Manhasset negotiations undermines the search for a mutually acceptable, just and lasting political solution negotiated under United Nations auspices, allowing for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara. The continuation of the status quo in Western Sahara is an obstacle to building an integrated, prosperous Maghreb and poses a threat to the stability of the entire region.

By resolutions 1754 (2007) and 1783 (2007), the Security Council unanimously welcomed the serious and credible Moroccan efforts to produce an autonomy plan for Western Sahara. That, of course, is not a *sine qua non*: the autonomy plan proposed by Morocco forms the basis for serious and constructive negotiation aimed at a negotiated settlement between the parties, with respect for the principle of self-determination, to which we are committed.

We have taken note with interest of the assessment of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General, which supplements the information set out in the report of the Secretary-General (S/2008/251). We pay tribute once again to Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy for their efforts to resolve the question of Western Sahara.

**Security Council**Distr.: General
30 April 2008

Resolution 1813 (2008)**Adopted by the Security Council at its 5884th meeting, on
30 April 2008***The Security Council,**Recalling* all its previous resolutions on Western Sahara,*Reaffirming* its strong support for the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy to implement resolutions 1754 (2007) and 1783 (2007),*Reaffirming* its commitment to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and noting the role and responsibilities of the parties in this respect,*Reiterating* its call upon the parties and States of the region to continue to cooperate fully with the United Nations and with each other to end the current impasse and to achieve progress towards a political solution,*Taking note* of the Moroccan proposal presented on 11 April 2007 to the Secretary-General and welcoming serious and credible Moroccan efforts to move the process forward towards resolution; also taking note of the Polisario Front proposal presented 10 April 2007 to the Secretary-General,*Taking note* of the four rounds of negotiations held under the auspices of the Secretary-General; *welcoming* the progress made by the parties to enter into direct negotiations,*Welcoming* the agreement of the parties expressed in the Communiqué of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara of 18 March 2008 to explore the establishment of family visits by land, which would be in addition to the existing program by air, and *encouraging* them to do so in cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,*Welcoming* the commitment of the parties to continue the process of negotiations through United Nations sponsored talks,*Noting* the Secretary-General's view that the consolidation of the status quo is not an acceptable outcome of the current process of negotiations, and *noting further*

that progress in the negotiations will have a positive impact on the quality of life of the people of Western Sahara in all its aspects,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 14 April 2008 (S/2008/251),

1. *Reaffirms* the need for full respect of the military agreements reached with MINURSO with regard to the ceasefire;
2. *Endorses* the report's recommendation that realism and a spirit of compromise by the parties are essential to maintain the momentum of the process of negotiations;
3. *Calls upon* the parties to continue to show political will and work in an atmosphere propitious for dialogue in order to enter into a more intensive and substantive phase of negotiations, thus ensuring implementation of resolutions 1754 and 1783 and the success of negotiations; and *affirms* its strong support for the commitment of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy towards a solution to the question of Western Sahara in this context;
4. *Calls upon* the parties to continue negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General without preconditions and in good faith, taking into account the efforts made since 2006 and subsequent developments, with a view to achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and noting the role and responsibilities of the parties in this respect;
5. *Invites* Member States to lend appropriate assistance to these talks;
6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed on a regular basis on the status and progress of these negotiations under his auspices, and expresses its intention to meet to receive and discuss his report;
7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide a report on the situation in Western Sahara well before the end of the mandate period;
8. *Urges* Member States to provide voluntary contributions to fund Confidence Building Measures that allow for increased contact between separated family members, especially family visits, as well as for other confidence building measures that may be agreed between the parties;
9. *Decides* to extend the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until 30 April 2009;
10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to take the necessary measures to ensure full compliance in MINURSO with the United Nations zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to keep the Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take appropriate preventive action including pre-deployment awareness training, and other action to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel;
11. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

June 6, 2007

The Honorable George W. Bush
President of the United States of America
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Mr. President:

We applaud the support of your Administration for the adoption of Resolution 1754 by the United Nations Security Council on April 30, 2007, which incorporates the historic initiative by Morocco to end the conflict in the Western Sahara through direct negotiations. This new direction for solving the crisis is in large part the result of your efforts and encouragement.


As the first country to officially recognize the United States in 1777, Morocco has been an historic and reliable ally to our great nation, and we encourage you to continue this cooperation in the challenging months ahead as the negotiations are inaugurated.

Recent terrorist attacks in Morocco and Algeria show that we cannot afford to continue to ignore the problems of this region. Failure to resolve this conflict jeopardizes international stability, our fight against terrorism, and economic integration efforts in the region.


By giving the people of the Western Sahara a true voice in their future through the full benefits of autonomy as presented by Morocco, a credible political solution can be achieved. Morocco's commitment merits the support of the international community and we must ensure that its neighbors assume their responsibility for contributing to the success of these negotiations, as called for in UNSC Resolution 1754.

Mr. President, we know that with your encouragement and support Morocco has courageously shown its leadership with this initiative. Your commitment can make possible a solution to this lingering issue and reaffirm our bipartisan support to a realistic and lasting peace in North Africa.


Sincerely,




Madeleine K. Albright
Former United States Secretary of State



Frank Charles Carlucci III
Former United States Secretary of Defense



Mickey Kantor
Former United States Secretary of Commerce and
Former United States Trade Representative




Hazel R. O'Leary
Former United States Secretary of Energy



Wesley Clark
Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander



Ben Gilman
Former Member, United States House of Representatives and
Chairman, House Committee on International Relations



Thomas Daschle
Former United States Senator and Senate Majority Leader




Thomas R. Pickering
Former United States Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and
Former United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Russia, India,
Israel, El Salvador, Nigeria, and Jordan



Martin Indyk
Former Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs and Former United States Ambassador to Israel



Edward S. Walker Jr.
Former Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs and Former United States Ambassador to Israel, Egypt, and the
United Arab Emirates




Thomas Nassif
Former United States Ambassador to Morocco and Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and
South and Central Asian Affairs




Michael Ussery
Former United States Ambassador to Morocco and Deputy Assistant
Secretary for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and South and Central
Asian Affairs




Frederick Vreeland
Former United States Ambassador to Morocco and Deputy Assistant
Secretary for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and
South and Central Asian Affairs



Dov Zakheim
Former Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and
Chief Financial Officer for the Department of Defense



Peter W. Rodman
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs



Leon Fuerth
Former National Security Advisor to Vice President Albert A. Gore Jr.



American Jewish Committee

Office of Government and International Affairs

1156 Fifteenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005 www.ajc.org 202-785-4200 Fax 202-785-4115 E-mail ogia@ajc.org

Jason F. Isaacson
DIRECTOR

April 19, 2007

Dear Representative:

The American Jewish Committee, an organization that advances inter-religious and inter-ethnic understanding and is dedicated to the success of moderation and pluralism in the Arab and Muslim world, urges your endorsement of a letter circulated by Representatives Ackerman and Diaz-Balart supporting a just-released proposal for autonomy in the disputed Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty.


The Ackerman/Diaz-Balart letter asks President Bush to support the Moroccan plan – and seek international acceptance of it – as a sound basis to resolve the Western Sahara conflict, a source of regional instability and human suffering for more than 30 years.

Cognizant of the historic links between – and the broad common interests of – the United States and Morocco, and as an institutional partner of the Moroccan Jewish community, the American Jewish Committee strongly supports efforts by our Government and the Kingdom to enhance cooperation in many spheres, from the struggle against terrorism and extremism, to expanded economic opportunity in the Maghreb, cultural and educational exchange, and political reform. It was our faith in this vital relationship that underlay AJC's support for the U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement of 2004, and is the foundation of our ongoing dialogue with Moroccan officials and civil society on pressing issues of regional peace, security and human rights.

Reinforced by the recent assertion of Under Secretary Burns that the Moroccan proposal is "serious and credible" and would "provide real autonomy for the Western Sahara," we view U.S. advocacy of this approach as critical to the further enhancement of ties between our nation and the Kingdom, the continued advance of political and economic progress in Morocco, and effective pursuit of cooperative strategies to counter regional instability and international terrorism. We urge your signature on the Ackerman/Diaz-Balart letter to President Bush.

With appreciation for your consideration of AJC's views on this matter, I remain,

Respectfully,



Jason F. Isaacson

American Jewish Committee
A Century of Leadership

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

April 26, 2007

The Honorable George W. Bush
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:


The Kingdom of Morocco, one of our oldest and closest allies, recently submitted a proposal to resolve the three decade long struggle over the Western Sahara. This historic initiative grants profound local autonomy to the Western Sahara while recognizing Morocco's territorial integrity. This compromise is a breakthrough opportunity to find an enduring political solution, and U.S. support is critical to its successful implementation.

As you know, the conflict in the Western Sahara has gone on for too long at great humanitarian cost. Since the 1991 UN imposed cease-fire, all efforts to provide a realistic and durable solution to the conflict have failed. The new Moroccan proposal provides a realistic framework for a negotiated political solution, which is the best way to ensure a lasting peace for all parties.


The United States has a major national security interest in the stability and economic prosperity of North Africa. With al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups expanding their presence into North Africa, we are concerned that the failure to resolve this conflict of more than 30 years poses a danger to U.S. and regional security, while simultaneously preventing the economic integration of the Arab Maghreb Union.

The Moroccan autonomy proposal constitutes an historic opportunity for the United States to help end this problem and provide a better future for the entire region. We urge you to embrace this promising Moroccan initiative so that it receives the consideration necessary to achieve international acceptance.

Sincerely,



Tomi Lanto



George W. Bush

Lincoln Diaz-Balart (FL)
Tom Lantos (CA)

David Scott (GA)
Art Davis (AL)
Tom Allen (ME)
David Wu (OR)
Joe Courtney (CT)
Allyson Schwartz (PA)
Mel Watt (NC)
Jane Harmon (CA)
Tom Bishop (NY)

Alcee Hastings (FL)
Ruben Hinojosa (TX)
Charles Boustany (LA)
Jeff Fortenberry (NE)
John Tanner (TN)
James Clyburn (SC)
Mary Bono (CA)
David Scott (GA)
Chris Murphy (CT)

Shelly Berkeley (NV)
Solomon Ortiz (TX)
Bud Cramer (AL)
Rahm Emanuel (IL)
Marcy Kaptur (OH)
Bob Filner (CA)
Roscoe Bartlett (MD)
Norm Dicks (WA)
Jim Moran (VA)

D. Wasserman Schultz (FL)
Eric Cantor (VA)
Michael Capuano (MA)
Jim Costa (CA)
Edward Markey (MA)
Henry Waxman (CA)
Doc Hastings (WA)
Ken Calvert
Bart Gordon

Mike McNulty (NY)
Carolyn Maloney (NY)
Steve Israel (NY)
Russ Carnahan (MO)
William Jefferson (LA)

Gary Ackerman (NY)
Steny Hoyer (MD)

John Larson (CT)
Bill Delahunt (MA)
Barney Frank (MA)
Ellen Tauscher (CA)
Jim Matheson (UT)
Neil Abercrombie (HI)
Carolyn McCarthy (NY)
Jim Marshall (GA)
Elliot Engel (NY)

Tammy Baldwin (WI)
Vernon Ehlers (MI)
Keith Ellison (MN)
John Boehner (OH)
Pat Murphy (PA)
Steve Chabot (OH)
Ron Klein (FL)
Brian Higgins (NY)
Adrian Smith (NE)

Ed Pastor (AZ)
Jerrold Nadler (NY)
Loretta Sanchez (CA)
Maurice Hinchey (NY)
Leonard Boswell (IA)
Nick Rahall (WV)
Jesse Jackson (IL)
John Dingell (MI)
Brad Sherman (CA)

Jean Schmidt (OH)
Chris Van Hollen (MD)
Robert Aderholt (AL)
Mike Pence (IN)
Anna Eshoo (CA)
Donald Manzullo (IL)
Michael McCaul (TX)
Rick Renzi
Ed Whitfield

Michael Arcuri (NY)
Joe Crowley (NY)
John Barrow (GA)
Albert Wynn (MD)
Frank Pallone (NJ)

Steve Rothman (NJ)
Jose Serrano (NY)
Robert Wexler (FL)
Gregory Meeks (NY)

Cliff Sterns (FL)
Wally Herger (CA)
Rob Bishop (UT)
Randy Kuhl (NY)
Jack Kingston (GA)
Vito Fossella (NY)
Chris Cannon (UT)
Bill Young (FL)
John McHugh (NY)
Joe Knollenberg (MI)

Ron Lewis (KY)
Joe Wilson (SC)
Dennis Hastert (IL)
John Duncan (CA)
Hal Rogers (KY)
Thad McCotter (MI)
John Sullivan (OK)
Steve Buyer (IN)
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (FL)
Virginia Foxx (NC)

John Mica (FL)
Dave Weldon (FL)
Adam Putnam (FL)
Ric Keller (FL)
Dan Burton (IN)
Tom Reynolds (NY)
Phil Gingrey (GA)
John Linder (GA)
Randy Forbes (VA)
John Shadegg (AZ)

Frank LoBiondo (NJ)
Tom Feeney (FL)
Ander Crenshaw (FL)
Jeff Miller (FL)
Scott Garrett (NJ)
Phil English (PA)
Kevin Brady (TX)
Gus Bilirakis (FL)
John Doolittle (CA)
Tom Tancredo (CO)

Anthony Weiner (NY)
Janice Schakowsky (IL)
Dan Boren (OK)
Edolphus Towns (NY)

Elton Gallegly (CA)
Chip Pickering (MS)
Kay Granger (TX)
Candice Miller (MI)
Howard Coble (NC)
Mark Souder (IN)
Dan Lungren (CA)
Roy Blunt (MO)
Lee Terry (NE)
Steve King (IA)

Walter Jones (NC)
Mario Diaz-Balart (FL)
Vern Buchanan (FL)
Sue Myrick (NC)
Jo Ann Davis (VA)
Thelma Drake (VA)
Spencer Bachus (AL)
Nathan Deal (GA)
Lamar Smith (TX)
Bob Goodlatte (VA)

Darrell Issa (CA)
Ted Poe (TX)
Connie Mack (FL)
Pete Sessions (TX)
Devin Nunes (CA)
Tom Price (GA)
Mike Simpson (ID)
Sam Johnson (TX)
Tom Petri (WI)
Mike Ferguson (NJ)

Ginny Brown-Waite (FL)
Bill Shuster (PA)
Steve LaTourette (OH)
Pat Tiberi (OH)
Rodney Frelinghuysen (NJ)
Ray LaHood (IL)
Brian Bilbray (CA)
Jerry Weller (IL)
Buck McKeon (CA)
Jim Saxton (NJ)

Moroccan American Center for Policy

The Moroccan Initiative in the Western Sahara

Background:

The Moroccan initiative comes in response to repeated requests of the United Nations Security Council and several of its key members, including the United States, that Morocco propose a solution to this longstanding problem that could facilitate the opening of negotiations for a "just, durable and peaceful" political solution.

After nearly a decade of trying to bring the Polisario and Morocco to agreement to conduct a referendum to determine the territories future, Kofi Annan, then Secretary General, and James Baker, then Personal Envoy for the Western Sahara, reported to the Security Council that it was not possible to achieve agreement between the Polisario and Morocco on the central issue of who should be permitted to vote in a referendum. Consequently, Annan and Baker recommended that the Security Council encourage Morocco and the Polisario to enter into direct negotiations to find a compromise political solution. The Security Council accepted the assessment of Annan and Baker that a referendum would not be possible, and began a process carried through several years of UNSC resolutions calling for direct negotiations.

James Baker proposed two such compromise political solutions based on the underlying assumption that the proposals would allow Morocco to remain sovereign in the Western Sahara, but that the territory would benefit from a substantial autonomy that would allow it to become self-governing. Morocco accepted the first Baker proposal as the basis for direct negotiations, but the Polisario refused. The Polisario accepted the second Baker proposal, but Morocco refused since it did not allow for direct negotiations between the parties on the terms of the arrangement.

The Moroccan proposal is the first and only proposal to come from one of the Parties to the conflict in response to the Security Council encouragements. In various forms, the Polisario has continued to insist that the referendum be held, and threatens a renewal of hostilities and the eviction of the United Nations peacekeeping force from the territory under its control, despite the fact that the Security Council repeatedly has made clear that this solution is no longer viable.

Summary of the Moroccan Initiative:

The initiative is the product of a year long internal and foreign Moroccan consultation process. All sectors of the Sahrawi population were included in the consultations and the views of foreign governments and expert international authorities were sought before the plan was finalized for presentation to the United Nations.

The plan itself represents an outline for a political solution that traces what Morocco considers to be the broad scope of an autonomy arrangement for the Western Sahara. It does not go into extensive detail on its various aspects on the assumption that such specific arrangements should be the result of direct negotiations rather than the imposition of only one of the parties to the dispute.

The plan provides for a local elected legislature that would subsequently elect an executive authority. It also would establish a separate judiciary for the autonomous region with competence to render justice on matters specific to the autonomous status of the region. The legislature would elect a chief executive.

The formula proposed by Morocco would ensure majority representation in the legislature for Sahrawi inhabitants of the autonomous region, while also ensuring credible legislative representation for non-Sahrawis who have been long-time residents in the territory. Residents of the autonomous region would also continue to elect representatives to the national legislature.

The government of the autonomous region would have exclusive authorities on some issues, shared authority with the central government of Morocco on others and consultative rights on authorities that remain reserved to the central government and that effect the region.

The autonomous government would control local administration, local police, education, cultural development, economic development, regional planning, tourism, investment, trade, public works and transportation, housing, health, sports and social welfare. It would have taxing authorities to support these functions and would continue to receive funding from the central budget as well. It would be able to establish foreign regional trade relations offices and would have consultative rights on other sovereign foreign agreements affecting the region.

The central government would retain exclusive jurisdiction over the normal elements of sovereign authority: national defense, currency, postal, and foreign affairs and religion, over which the Monarchy has a special status in Morocco.

The chief executive of the autonomous region would be elected by the legislature, but would be invested by and serve in the name of the Monarchy.

The initiative also envisages transitional bodies to guide the central government and the autonomous authority through the initial stages of implementation of the plan.

All individual rights guaranteed under the Moroccan Constitution would continue to apply to all residents of the autonomous region.

MOROCCAN INITIATIVE FOR NEGOTIATING AN AUTONOMY STATUTE FOR THE SAHARA REGION

I. Morocco's commitment to a final political solution

1. Since 2004, the Security Council has been regularly calling upon *"the parties and States of the region to continue to cooperate fully with the United Nations to end the current impasse and to achieve progress towards a political solution."*
2. Responding to this call by the international community, the Kingdom of Morocco set a positive, constructive and dynamic process in motion, and pledged to submit an autonomy proposal for the Sahara, within the framework of the Kingdom's sovereignty and national unity.
3. This initiative is part of the endeavors made to build a modern, democratic society, based on the rule of law, collective and individual freedoms, and economic and social development. As such, it brings hope for a better future for the region's populations, puts an end to separation and exile, and promotes reconciliation.
4. Through this initiative, the Kingdom of Morocco guarantees to all Sahrawis, inside as well as outside the territory, that they will hold a privileged position and play a leading role in the bodies and institutions of the region, without discrimination or exclusion.
5. Thus, the Sahara populations will themselves run their affairs democratically, through legislative, executive and judicial bodies enjoying exclusive powers. They will have the financial resources needed for the region's development in all fields, and will take an active part in the nation's economic, social and cultural life.
6. The State will keep its powers in the royal domains, especially with respect to defense, external relations and the constitutional and religious prerogatives of His Majesty the King.
7. The Moroccan initiative, which is made in an open spirit, aims to set the stage for dialogue and a negotiation process that would lead to a mutually acceptable political solution.
8. As the outcome of negotiations, the autonomy statute shall be submitted to the populations concerned for a referendum, in keeping with the principle of self-determination and with the provisions of the UN Charter.
9. To this end, Morocco calls on the other parties to avail the opportunity to write a new chapter in the region's history. Morocco is ready to take part in serious, constructive negotiations in the spirit of this initiative, and to contribute to promoting a climate of trust.
10. To achieve this objective, the Kingdom of Morocco remains willing to cooperate fully with the UN Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy.

II. Basic elements of the Moroccan proposal

11. The Moroccan autonomy project draws inspiration from the relevant proposals of the United Nations Organization, and from the constitutional provisions in force in countries that are geographically and culturally close to Morocco. It is based on internationally recognized norms and standards.

A. Powers of the Sahara autonomous Region

12. In keeping with democratic principles and procedures, and acting through legislative, executive and judicial bodies, the populations of the Sahara autonomous Region shall exercise powers, within the Region's territorial boundaries, mainly over the following:

- Region's local administration, local police force and jurisdictions;
- in the economic sector: economic development, regional planning, promotion of investment, trade, industry, tourism and agriculture;
- Region's budget and taxation;
- infrastructure: water, hydraulic facilities, electricity, public works and transportation;
- in the social sector: housing, education, health, employment, sports, social welfare and social security;
- cultural affairs, including promotion of the Saharan Hassani cultural heritage;
- environment.

13. The Sahara autonomous Region will have the financial resources required for its development in all areas. Resources will come, in particular, from:

- taxes, duties and regional levies enacted by the Region's competent authorities;
- proceeds from the development of natural resources allocated to the Region;
- the share of proceeds collected by the State from the development of natural resources located in the Region;
- the necessary funds allocated in keeping with the principle of national solidarity;
- proceeds from the Region's assets.

14. The State shall keep exclusive jurisdiction over the following in particular:

- the attributes of sovereignty, especially the flag, the national anthem and the currency;
- the attributes stemming from the constitutional and religious prerogatives of the King, as Commander of the Faithful and Guarantor of freedom of worship and of individual and collective freedoms;
- national security, external defense and defense of territorial integrity;
- external relations;
- the Kingdom's juridical order.

15. State responsibilities with respect to external relations shall be exercised in consultation with the Sahara autonomous Region for those matters which have a direct bearing on the prerogatives of the Region. The Sahara autonomous Region may, in consultation with the Government, establish cooperation relations with foreign Regions to foster inter-regional dialogue and cooperation.
16. The powers of the State in the Sahara autonomous Region, as stipulated in paragraph 13 above, shall be exercised by a Representative of the Government.
17. Moreover, powers which are not specifically entrusted to a given party shall be exercised by common agreement, on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity.
18. The populations of the Sahara autonomous Region shall be represented in Parliament and in the other national institutions. They shall take part in all national elections.

B. Bodies of the Region

19. The Parliament of the Sahara autonomous Region shall be made up of members elected by the various Sahrawi tribes, and of members elected by direct universal suffrage, by the Region's population. There shall be adequate representation of women in the Parliament of the Sahara autonomous Region.
20. Executive authority in the Sahara autonomous Region shall lie with a Head of Government, to be elected by the regional Parliament. He shall be invested by the King.

The Head of Government shall be the Representative of the State in the Region.
21. The Head of Government of the Sahara autonomous Region shall form the Region's Cabinet and appoint the administrators needed to exercise the powers devolving upon him, under the present autonomy Statute. He shall be answerable to the Region's Parliament.
22. Courts may be set up by the regional Parliament to give rulings on disputes arising from enforcement of norms enacted by the competent bodies of the Sahara autonomous Region. These courts shall give their rulings with complete independence, in the name of the King.
23. As the highest jurisdiction of the Sahara autonomous Region, the high regional court shall give final decisions regarding the interpretation of the Region's legislation, without prejudice to the powers of the Kingdom's Supreme Court or Constitutional Council.
24. Laws, regulations and court rulings issued by the bodies of the Sahara autonomous Region shall be consistent with the Region's autonomy Statute and with the Kingdom's Constitution.
25. The Region's populations shall enjoy all the guarantees afforded by the Moroccan Constitution in the area of human rights as they are universally recognized.
26. An Economic and Social Council shall be set up in the Sahara autonomous Region. It shall comprise representatives from economic, social, professional and community groups, as well as highly qualified figures.

III. Approval and implementation procedure for the autonomy statute

27. The Region's autonomy statute shall be the subject of negotiations and shall be submitted to the populations concerned in a free referendum. This referendum will constitute a free exercise, by these populations, of their right to self-determination, as per the provisions of international legality, the Charter of the United Nations and the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.
28. To this end, the parties pledge to work jointly and in good faith to foster this political solution and secure its approval by the Sahara populations.
29. Moreover, the Moroccan Constitution shall be amended and the autonomy Statute incorporated into it, in order to guarantee its sustainability and reflect its special place in the country's national juridical architecture.
30. The Kingdom of Morocco shall take all the necessary steps to ensure full integration, into the nation's fabric, of persons to be repatriated. This will be done in a manner which preserves their dignity and guarantees their security and the protection of their property.
31. To this end, the Kingdom of Morocco shall, in particular, declare a blanket amnesty, precluding any legal proceedings, arrest, detention, imprisonment or intimidation of any kind, based on facts covered by this amnesty.
32. Once the parties have agreed on the proposed autonomy, a Transitional Council composed of their representatives shall assist with repatriation, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed elements who are outside the territory, as well as with any other action aimed at securing the approval and implementation of the present Statute, including elections.
33. Just like the international community, the Kingdom of Morocco firmly believes today that the solution to the Sahara dispute can only come from negotiations. Accordingly, the proposal it is submitting to the United Nations constitutes a real opportunity for initiating negotiations with a view to reaching a final solution to this dispute, in keeping with international legality, and on the basis of arrangements which are consistent with the goals and principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter.
34. In this respect, Morocco pledges to negotiate in good faith and in a constructive, open spirit to reach a final, mutually acceptable political solution to the dispute plaguing the region. To this end, the Kingdom of Morocco is prepared to make a positive contribution to creating an environment of trust which would contribute to the successful outcome of this initiative.
35. The Kingdom of Morocco hopes the other parties will appreciate the significance and scope of this proposal, realize its merit, and make a positive and constructive contribution to it. The Kingdom of Morocco is of the view that the momentum created by this initiative offers a historic chance to resolve this issue once and for all.


2009 SEP 20 PM 4:11

TRENDS & TIMELINE: Terrorism in N. Africa

Sept. 11, 2001 – Dec. 2008

Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya,
Mauritania, and Mali

Attacks by Terrorists in N. Africa Since 9/11



Since Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks by Al-Qaeda and other militant extremists based in North Africa have increased more than 430%, from 21 to 113 a year, through 2007. More than 500 terrorist bombings, murders, kidnappings and ambushes, in and out of region, have claimed more than 1,000 lives and 4,000 victims – in Algeria, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia and elsewhere.

Civil Defence barracks at
Azeffoun, Tizi Ouzou, stealing a
sizeable stock of supplies and
equipment
www.elwatan.com

December 20, 2008

20 people killed and several
taken hostage in an attack by
Tuareg rebels on a military base
in northern Mali
www.bbc.co.uk

December 8, 2008

One civilian was killed and two
injured when a bomb exploded in
Umm Touba, Skikda wilaya, east
of Algiers
www.magharebia.com

December 20, 2008

3 alleged terrorists were shot
dead after evidence emerged
that the three men had been
sent to carry out terror attacks in
Oran from AQMI's main
stronghold in Kabylia
www.magharebia.com

December 5, 2008

A bomb wounded 2 people in
Umm Touba, Skikda wilaya, east
of Algiers
www.magharebia.com

November 24, 2008

At least 2 soldiers were injured in
a bomb explosion at Djemoura
municipality, Biskra province.
The bomb targeted security
forces carrying a racking
operation in the region
www.magharebia.com

November 6, 2008

Terrorists assassinated the president of the
Communal Popular Assembly (APC) in the
eastern Algerian town of Timezrit. Bejaia
province after abducting him. His body was
found inside the charred remains of his
official vehicle
www.magharebia.com

November 5, 2008

The National Gendarmerie dismantled
a bomb in Kedara, Boumerdes. The
explosive reportedly targeted security
services in the region
www.magharebia.com

November 1, 2008

Al-Qaeda militants from Tunisia have
handed 2 Austrians they kidnapped in
February to military authorities in Mali
www.bbc.co.uk

October 18, 2008

Algerian security forces who stopped
a vehicle at a Rakouba checkpoint
uncovered 25 tons of chemical
fertilizer allegedly bound for an al-
Qaeda bomb-making workshop in
Souk Ahras province
www.magharebia.com

October 15, 2008

A bomb explosion in the region of
Setif, east of Algiers killed 3
municipal guards and injured
another 2
www.magharebia.com

October 8, 2008

A bomb attack in Msila province, 250
km southeast of Algiers, killed an
Algerian army major. The bomb was
reportedly hidden in the body of a dead
man kidnapped earlier in the week by
an armed Islamist group.
www.magharebia.com

October 2, 2008

A bomb exploded at the new headquarters
of the municipal guards in Timizar, Tizi
Ouzou province, 100 km east of Algiers.
No casualties were reported
www.magharebia.com

September 30, 2008

6 Algerian communal guards were ambushed and killed near their barracks at Thénia El Had by around 20 AQIM militants in Sidi-Boutouchent, Tissemsilt province
www.magharebia.com

September 19, 2008

Malian army attacks anti-Touareg militia, 2 killed including a soldier
www.alertnet.org

August 20, 2008

In Bouira, 2 car bombs were detonated by remote control. More than 11 killed and 31 injured
wits.nctc.gov

August 6, 2008

Troops staged a coup in Mauritania and held the President after he tried to dismiss the military's top commanders
www.bbc.co.uk

June 26, 2008

4 police officers killed, 2 others wounded in armed attack by suspected AQIM in Aftis, Jijel
wits.nctc.gov

June 5, 2008

A suicide bomber targeted a military barracks in an eastern Algiers suburb but killed only himself
wits.nctc.gov

June 6, 2008

A roadside bomb killed 6 soldiers and wounded 4 in Cap Djenat
www.magharebia.com

May 17, 2008

1 civilian killed in a bomb attack in Cap Djinet, Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

May 11, 2008

A group of bandits attacked a Malian gendarme base in the town of Ansongo, south of Gao, in eastern Mali
wits.nctc.gov

April 30, 2008

5 accused terrorists were arrested on charges that they organized and led attacks in Mauritania by an al-Qaida-linked cell
www.magharebia.com

April 5, 2008

5 civilians wounded in a bomb attack by AQIM in Zemmouri, Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

March 22, 2008

Touareg rebels ambushed a military convoy, killing 3 soldiers capturing at least 20 and seizing 8 vehicles near the town of Abeibara
www.bbc.co.uk

September 28, 2008

A suicide car bomber attacked the coastal town of Dellys in the Takdempt district. 3 were killed
wits.nctc.gov

September 14, 2008

12 Mauritanian soldiers were captured and later beheaded in northern Mauritania
wits.nctc.gov

August 19, 2008

A suicide car-bomber attacked a police academy in Boumerdes Province. 43 were killed including a policeman and 45 were injured
wits.nctc.gov

July 14, 2008

A leader of Al-Qaida in Algeria was killed in a security forces raid
wits.nctc.gov

June 8, 2008

2 explosions in the town of Beni Amrane 13 killed
wits.nctc.gov

June 6, 2008

2 soldiers killed, 4 civilians wounded in suicide bomb attack by AQIM in Bordj el Kiffan
wits.nctc.gov

May 22, 2008

Touareg rebels attack an army post in Mali's extreme northeast, killing 27 people including 10 government soldiers and injuring 31 others
www.bbc.co.uk

May 16, 2008

1 vehicle damaged in arson in Thenia, Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

May 6, 2008

Touareg rebels attacked two army camps in Mali on Tuesday, killing one soldier and looting a weapons store
www.stratfor.com

April 10, 2008

Mastermind behind December 2007 killings of French tourists arrested
www.ihf.com

April 5, 2008

1 police officer killed in armed attack by AQIM in Tizirt, Tizi Ouzou
wits.nctc.gov

April 9, 2008


Armed assailants fired upon and killed 2 hostage negotiators and their driver near Kidal
wits.nctc.gov

March 21, 2008

Touareg rebels are accused for killing 5 civilians including a child when their vehicle ran over a landmine in Mali's northern desert
wits.nctc.gov

March 21, 2008

Assailants detonated a bomb as a vehicle passed, killing 5, in Ti-n-Zaouatene, Kidal. Tuaregs believed responsible
wits.nctc.gov



October 9, 2007

3 militants, including the GSPC deputy leader, were killed during clashes in Kabylia
wits.nctc.gov

October 9, 2007

Armed assailants fired upon and killed two members of a local militia group in Jijel
wits.nctc.gov

October 8, 2007

A bomb exploded in Tizirt, Tizi Ouzou, damaging a gendarmerie surveillance post but causing no injuries
wits.nctc.gov

October 8, 2007

In Thenia, a bomb exploded, wounding 1 militia member
wits.nctc.gov

October 7, 2007

In Mezaourou, Sidi Bel Abbasan, a bomb exploded as two shepherds were passing by with their flock, wounding both shepherds
wits.nctc.gov

October 7, 2007

In Taghazout, Bouira, 4 armed assailants killed 2 civilians and 1 police officer and wounded 3 civilians in a grocery store café. AQIM is suspected
wits.nctc.gov

October 1, 2007

Assailants remotely detonated a bomb as a fuel train passed in Bouira
wits.nctc.gov

October 4, 2007

2 police officers wounded in mortar attack by suspected AQIM in Dellys, Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

September 27, 2007

1 municipal guard and 1 paramilitary member wounded in armed attack near Gouraya
wits.nctc.gov

September 26, 2007

In Boumerdes, assailants detonated a bomb near a police vehicle, killing two police officers and damaging their vehicle
wits.nctc.gov

September 24, 2007

In Boumerdes, 3 armed assailants fired upon and killed a Bordj Menaiel prison guard in front of his parents' residence
wits.nctc.gov

September 21, 2007

A suicide bomber wounded 9 people, including 2 Frenchmen and an Italian, in an attack in Lakharia
www.magharebia.com

September 20, 2007

1 paramilitary member killed, 1 other wounded in a bomb attack by suspected AQIM in Larba, Blida
www.magharebia.com

September 18, 2007

In Ighzar Oumeziane, assailants detonated a bomb, killing 1 LDG member and wounding 1 other
wits.nctc.gov

September 16, 2007

Armed assailants fired upon a military column near Ti-n-Zaouatene, Kidal. 1 soldier was killed. Former Malian Touaregs blamed
wits.nctc.gov

September 14, 2007

3 police officers, 1 civilian killed, 6 civilians wounded in a bomb attack by AQIM in Zemmouri, Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

September 13, 2007

Armed assailants in northern Mali fired upon a US military aircraft delivering supplies to Malian soldiers. There were no injuries or damage. Malian Touaregs believed responsible
wits.nctc.gov

September 13, 2007

Authorities defused a bomb which was hidden in a green shopping bag and left outside a girls' primary school
wits.nctc.gov

September 12, 2007

3 electrical pylons destroyed in assault and bombing by suspected AOIM near Si Mustapha. Boumerdes

September 11, 2007

Armed assailants fired at an apartment complex, wounding two children and damaging a mosque
wits.nctc.gov

August 28, 2007

Touareg gunmen seized a military supply convoy in northern Mali taking 23 soldiers hostage
www.alertnet.org

August 27, 2007

Touareg rebels captured 15 Malian soldiers in a remote Saharan town and carried them off toward Niger
www.alertnet.org

August 26, 2007

3 civilians, 2 police officers wounded in a bomb attack in Bordj Menaiel, Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

August 24, 2007

Assailants detonated an IED in a school classroom in Lahlaf village, Benahmed, Chaouia-Ouadigha. No casualties or injuries
wits.nctc.gov

August 19, 2007

1 vehicle damaged in a bomb attack by suspected AQIM in Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

August 16, 2007

1 municipal guard wounded near his home in a bomb attack in 'Ain Zaouia, Tizi Ouzou
wits.nctc.gov

August 14, 2007

A car bombing in the eastern Larba, critically injures a former Islamist leader who renounced violence
wits.nctc.gov

August 13, 2007

A bomber attempted to detonate a bomb on a bus in Meknes. No injuries or damage
wits.nctc.gov

August 7, 2007

1 civilian killed by suspected AQIM in T'Kout, Batna
wits.nctc.gov

July 31, 2007

In Khenchela armed assailants assaulted and killed a civilian when he refused to provide them with logistical support
wits.nctc.gov

July 30, 2007

1 police officer killed in armed attack in Biskra
wits.nctc.gov

July 28, 2007

In Annab, a bomb exploded when a civilian stepped on it, wounding the civilian
wits.nctc.gov

July 23, 2007

2 municipal guards were wounded when a homemade bomb exploded as they were fetching water at a local watering hole in the forest
www.mipt.org

July 20, 2007

9 railroad cars derail when AQCAM attacks a fuel freight train 9 miles southeast of Boumerdes
www.magharebia.com

July 19, 2007

Assailants attacked a military base overnight, wounding 2 paramilitary police in a gun battle and kidnapping 3 others
www.news24.com

July 11, 2007

An 18 year old suicide bomber drove a refrigerator truck filled with explosives into military barracks and blew it up, killing 10 and wounding 23
www.mipt.org

July 11, 2007

In Tizirt, Tizi Ouzou, assailants remotely detonated 2 bombs as a vehicle carrying gendarmes passed by, killing 1 gendarme, wounding 1 other
wits.nctc.gov

July 11, 2007

A homemade bomb, placed in front of a major financial center, was defused in downtown Relizane. There were no injuries
www.mipt.org

July 10, 2007

In Tizi Ouzou, 2 bombs were detonated near the entrance to a market while a gendarmerie patrol was passing by. No injuries were reported
wits.nctc.gov

July 6, 2007

A 17 year old man was seriously injured when a bomb went off in the evening as he was returning home from work
www.mipt.org

July 5, 2007

The Algerian governor of Tizi Ouzou survives a roadside bomb attack targeting his car; a policeman in a separate car was wounded
www.stratfor.com

July 5, 2007

1 civilian killed, 1 other wounded in bombing near Tebessa
wits.nctc.gov

July 3, 2007

1 police officer killed by AQIM in Aomar, Tizi Ouzou
wits.nctc.gov

July 4, 2007

Near Djinet, Boumerdes, armed assailants fired upon a gendarmerie checkpoint, wounding 4 gendarmes
wits.nctc.gov

June 22, 2007

2 security guards killed, 1 other wounded in armed attack by suspected AQIM in Draa el Mizan, Tizi Ouzou
wits.nctc.gov

June 25, 2007

In Batna a bomb exploded when a civilian picked it up to examine it, wounding the civilian
wits.nctc.gov

June 13, 2007

In Boumerdes, assailants remotely detonated a bomb in front of a cellular telephone store, wounding 3 civilians
wits.nctc.gov

June 21, 2007

In Naciria, Tizi Ouzou a bomb exploded while a police convoy escorting the Malian ambassador was passing, wounding 1 police officer. Police defused 2 more bombs at the same location
wits.nctc.gov

June 6, 2007

In Tizi Ouzou a bomb exploded in front of a bus station, killing 1 police officer, wounding 10 civilians
wits.nctc.gov

June 2, 2007

In Tizi Ouzou, armed assailants fired upon and killed an off-duty municipal guard. AQIM claimed responsibility
wits.nctc.gov

May 29, 2007

In Boudoukhane, Boumerdes, armed assailants fired upon and wounded 1 municipal guard and 1 civilian
wits.nctc.gov

May 16, 2007

1 police officer killed, 2 other people wounded in a bomb attack by AQIM in Constantine
wits.nctc.gov

May 15, 2007

Militants from AQIM damaged the town of Timidaouen's gas mains with a homemade bomb
wits.nctc.gov

May 14, 2007

20 militants were killed in clashes near the capital
www.bbc.co.uk

May 13, 2007

A bomb exploded at a police checkpoint in Constantine, 1 policeman was killed and 2 wounded
www.magharebia.com

May 11, 2007

6 Islamists, 1 soldier and 1 policeman were killed in separate clashes
www.magharebia.com

May 11, 2007

Armed assailants attacked a security post in Ti-n-Zaouatene, Kidal, killing 2 soldiers and wounding 3. Touareg rebels were blamed
wits.nctc.gov

April 27, 2007

Al-Qaeda-Maghreb acknowledged that their member had been killed 45 km east of Algiers
wits.nctc.gov

April 25, 2007

1 paramilitary member killed in armed attack by suspected AQIM in Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

April 24, 2007

1 civilian killed in armed attack near Jijel
wits.nctc.gov

April 17, 2007

In Les Issers, assailants detonated 2 bombs as a National People's Army convoy drove past, wounding 1 nearby civilian
wits.nctc.gov

April 16, 2007

In Les Issers, armed assailants fired upon a police roadblock, wounding 1 police officer
wits.nctc.gov

April 15, 2007

In Boumerdes, assailants detonated 2 bombs while a National Gendarmerie patrol was driving by, wounding 1 gendarme
wits.nctc.gov

April 14, 2007

2 suicide bombers blew themselves up near the American Language Center, in Casablanca. 2 Bombers were killed and 1 person injured
www.bbc.co.uk

April 13, 2007

2007

March 6, 2007

1 police building damaged in a bomb attack in Baghlia, Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

March 3, 2007

Islamic extremists bombed a bus carrying workers for a Russian company. 1 Russian engineer and 3 Algerians were killed
www.magharebia.com

February 26, 2007

In Ouled Moussa, armed assailants ambushed a paramilitary member and his family, killing 1 family member, and wounding him and 2 of his family members
wits.nctc.gov

February 9, 2007

In Laadjarda, assailants detonated 2 bombs wounding 2 civilians
wits.nctc.gov

February 2, 2007

In Benchoud, Boumerdes, assailants detonated a bomb in a municipal soccer stadium, wounding 2 civilians
wits.nctc.gov

January 30, 2007

5 soldiers and 10 Islamists were killed in fighting in the eastern region of Batna
www.bbc.co.uk

January 27, 2007

1 police officer wounded in armed attack by suspected AQIM in Si Mustapha, Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

January 21, 2007

In Tidjelabine, Boumerdes, armed assailants attacked a Gendarmerie roadblock, wounding 2 gendarmes
wits.nctc.gov

January 2007

Tunisia said it killed 12 GSPC militants while losing 2 Tunisian security men
www.ihf.com

March 4, 2007

7 gendarmes killed, 1 other wounded in bombing attacks in Tizi Ouzou
wits.nctc.gov

February 28, 2007

In Boumerdes, armed AQIM militants attacked a Gendarmerie guard post, wounding 2 civilians
wits.nctc.gov

February 12, 2007

7 bombs explode east of Algiers. 6 people were killed and 13 injured
wits.nctc.gov

February 6, 2007

The mayor of Benchoud is assassinated outside his home
wits.nctc.gov

January 30, 2007

In Zemmouri, Boumerdes, a bomb planted in a vehicle exploded, wounding the occupant
wits.nctc.gov

January 28, 2007

1 government building damaged in a bomb attack by suspected AQIM in Ouled Aissa, Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

January 21, 2007

A roadside bomb exploded under an army vehicle in eastern Algeria. 1 soldier was killed and 8 wounded
www.ihf.com

January 5, 2007

Insurgents killed 18 soldiers in an ambush south of Algiers
wits.nctc.gov

December 10, 2006

A bomb tore apart a bus carrying foreign oil workers in Algiers, killing 2 and wounding 8
wits.nctc.gov

December 8, 2006

In Biskra, assailants fired upon and wounded a police officer
wits.nctc.gov

November 28, 2006

10 militants were killed in clashes in remote mountainous regions
wits.nctc.gov

November 22, 2006

In Lagraf, Biskra, armed assailants kidnapped 2 civilians and killed 3 soldiers and 2 civilians who tried to rescue the kidnapped victims
wits.nctc.gov

November 21, 2006

GSPC shoots down a military helicopter, killing 3 soldiers and 2 local guards
wits.nctc.gov

November 13, 2006

1 police officer wounded in a bomb attack in Tizirt, Tizi Ouzou
wits.nctc.gov

November 9, 2006

Militants ambushed an army patrol in Bouira killing 7 soldiers and wounding 13
www.stratfor.com

November 8, 2006

In Batna, armed assailants killed 1 civilian and stole 80 sheep
wits.nctc.gov

November 3, 2006

15 militants ambushed an army patrol in the Ain Defla region killing 8 soldiers
www.magharebia.com

November 2, 2006

1 civilian killed, 4 soldiers wounded in coordinated bombing attacks in Sidi Daoud, Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

November 1, 2006

In Sidi Daoud, Boumerdes, a bomb exploded wounding 1 civilian
wits.nctc.gov

October 30, 2006

In Boumerdes, a bomb exploded wounding 1 civilian and damaging the vehicle he was driving
wits.nctc.gov

October 29, 2006

GSPC members detonated 2 truck bombs in Reghaia and Dergana. 3 civilians were killed and 24 were wounded
wits.nctc.gov

October 28, 2006

In Pirette, Tizi Ouzou, armed assailants attacked a roadblock, wounding 2 civilians and 1 police officer
wits.nctc.gov

October 23, 2006

3 civilians held hostage in a cafe by suspected GSPC in Chabet El Ameur, Tizi Ouzou
wits.nctc.gov

October 23, 2006

Algerian Islamic insurgents launched a revenge attack against a group of former Touareg rebels in the deserts of northern Mali, killing nine of them
wits.nctc.gov

October 22, 2006

In Boumerdes, assailants erected a barricade on a road and extorted money from passing civilians no one was injured
wits.nctc.gov

October 21, 2006

In Thenia, Boumerdes, assailants fired upon a taxi carrying a driver and 4 soldiers, killing the driver, wounding the soldiers
wits.nctc.gov

October 21, 2006

In Jijel Province, armed assailants killed 3 members of the Jijel National Gendarmerie group
wits.nctc.gov

October 19, 2006

An explosive device detonates at a police station in El Harrach. Separately, a fuel cistern explodes in Lakhdaria
wits.nctc.gov

October 19, 2006

6 soldiers wounded in a bomb attack by suspected GSPC in Algiers
wits.nctc.gov

October 19, 2006

1 residence, 1 vehicle damaged in a bomb attack by suspected GSPC in Lakhdaria, Tizi Ouzou
wits.nctc.gov

October 15, 2006

3 police officers wounded in a bomb attack by suspected GSPC in Bordj Menaiel, Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

October 15, 2006

8 security guards killed in attack by suspected GSPC in Sidi Medjahed, Ain Defla
wits.nctc.gov

attack near Chabet el Ameur,
Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

September 29, 2006
1 freight train derailed in a bomb attack by suspected GSPC
near Kadiria, Bouira
wits.nctc.gov

September 10, 2006
2 police officers wounded in
armed attack by suspected
El-Arkam Brigade in Thénia
wits.nctc.gov

September 10, 2006
In Boumerdes, assailants
fired missiles at 2 police
vehicles, causing no
injuries
wits.nctc.gov

September 11, 2006
Assailants placed a bomb near a
public dump and remotely detonated it
as a municipal guard vehicle passed
by injuring the guard
wits.nctc.gov

September 7, 2006
In Lakhdaria, Bouira, 4 assailants
detonated a bomb in a square frequented
by prison guards, causing no injuries
wits.nctc.gov

September 9, 2006
In Taher, Jijel, assailants fired a grenade at a Judicial Police
Mobile Brigade convoy, wounding 3 police officers
wits.nctc.gov

September 2, 2006
1 legitimate defense group
member killed and 1 wounded
in 2 bomb attacks by
suspected GSPC in Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

September 6, 2006
Near Beni Douala, assailants remotely
detonated a bomb as the vehicle carrying
the chief of Beni Douala's security agency
passed near it, causing no injuries
wits.nctc.gov

September 2, 2006
2 communal guards killed in
armed attack by suspected
GSPC in Ouled Hamza,
Medea
wits.nctc.gov

September 2, 2006
4 police officers killed, 5
others wounded in bomb
attack by GSPC near Adekar
Kebouche, Bejaia
wits.nctc.gov

August 29, 2006
Suspected GSPC attacked a roadblock
in El-Kseur. 2 policemen and 1 civilian
were killed and 1 wounded
wits.nctc.gov

August 20, 2006
In Sidi Bel Abbès, a bomb hidden
underneath the body of 1 of 2
unidentified dead persons
exploded, wounding 1 police officer
wits.nctc.gov

August 20, 2006
In Tizi Ouzou, the body of a former terrorist
was found in a cemetery 4 or 5 days after
he died from a bullet wound to his head
wits.nctc.gov

August 17, 2006
Near Ben Adjal, Boumerdes, armed
assailants ambushed a vehicle,
seriously wounding the driver
wits.nctc.gov

August 19, 2006
ANP and BMPJ thwart incursion by suspected GSPC in
Beni Amrane, Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

August 11, 2006
In Ain El Hamra, Boumerdes, a bomb
exploded, wounding a civilian who was
walking along a path to his home
wits.nctc.gov

August 12, 2006
In Oumm Toub, Skikda, a bomb exploded,
seriously wounding a shepherd
wits.nctc.gov

August 9, 2006
1 civilian killed in an armed attack at an illegal
road block in Oued Zeguirre, Skikda
wits.nctc.gov

August 10, 2006
1 hotel damaged in a bomb attack in Lakhdaria, Bouira
wits.nctc.gov

August 7, 2006
6 civilians wounded in a bomb
explosion in Reghaia, Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

August 8, 2006
In Boudouaou, Boumerdes, a bomb
exploded as a patrol of the BMPJ was
passing by, wounding 3 police officers
wits.nctc.gov

August 4, 2006
In Bordj Menaïel, the mayor was attacked
outside of his home by suspected GSPC
wits.nctc.gov

August 3, 2006

In Bordj el Kiffan, assailants detonated a bomb placed in a trash can near a routine police roadblock by a signal from a cell phone, wounding 3 police officers
wits.nctc.gov

July 20, 2006

Insurgents killed 4 government municipal guards
www.stratfor.com

July 19, 2006

In Tamedna, Skikda, assailants lobbed homemade mortars into the town, barely missing a cafe, but causing no injuries
wits.nctc.gov

July 10, 2006

In Bumerdes suspected GSPC assassinated killed the brother of a former member of GSPC as he was standing in front of his house
wits.nctc.gov

July 6, 2006

In Tidjelabine, Bumerdes, assailants detonated a remote-controlled bomb, killing 2 municipal guards, wounding another and 6 civilians
wits.nctc.gov

July 3, 2006

in Lakhdaria, Bouira, 2 bombs placed on railroad tracks exploded, causing damage but no injuries
wits.nctc.gov

June 21, 2006

7 soldiers killed in fighting with insurgents in Ghzerwal
wits.nctc.gov

June 20, 2006

5 farmers killed in assault and arson by suspected GSPC in Blida
wits.nctc.gov

June 18, 2006

1 police officer wounded in bomb attack in Baghlia, Bumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

June 14, 2006

2 civilians killed by Islamists near Gouraya, Tipaza for their failure to follow Islamist teachings

July 29, 2006

Authorities found the bodies of 2 civilians near Chrea, Blida
wits.nctc.gov

July 19, 2006

In Tanouna, Jijel, suspected GSPC killed a former municipal guard at his home
wits.nctc.gov

July 12, 2006

5 municipal guards were killed in an ambush in the province of Tipasa
wits.nctc.gov

July 10, 2006

In Annaba, assailants ambushed a Patriot militia group patrol, killing 1 member
wits.nctc.gov

July 10, 2006

1 civilian killed, 2 others taken hostage, later released in armed attack in Sidi Chaib, Sidi Bel Abbes
wits.nctc.gov

July 5, 2006

In Ammal, Bumerdes, assailants detonated a remote-controlled bomb wounding 3 municipal guards
wits.nctc.gov

July 2, 2006

Poultry workers targeted in a stop work order by armed assailants in Taliouine, Bouira
wits.nctc.gov

June 20, 2006

5 civilians killed in fighting between Algerian troops and insurgents in Khenchela
www.stratfor.com

June 19, 2006

In Bumerdes, a bomb exploded, wounding 3 police officers and 1 civilian near a bus station
wits.nctc.gov

June 18, 2006

In Tizi Ouzou, a remotely-controlled bomb exploded, killing 3 civilians and wounding 3 others
wits.nctc.gov

May 30, 2006

In Bumerdes, assailants detonated a remotely

April 26, 2006

A suicide bomber attacked the base of the Multinational Forces and Observers at al-Jura wounding 2 members of the force
www.stratfor.com

April 22, 2006

In Si Mustapha, Boumerdes, assailants kidnapped a businessman and held him for ransom
wits.nctc.gov

April 20, 2006

1 civilian killed in armed attack by suspected GSPC in Keddara, Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

April 7, 2006

In Al-Mani'aa, Ghardaia, armed assailants attacked a convoy of vehicles carrying customs agents, killing 13 of the agents and wounding 10 others
www.stratfor.com

April 6, 2006

In Naciria, Tizi Ouzou, assailants detonated a bomb near a fixed police roadblock, causing no injuries. Explosive experts defused 2 other bombs placed nearby
wits.nctc.gov

April 5, 2006

In Ouled Boufefa, Jijel, assailants kidnapped two young people
wits.nctc.gov

March, 24 2006

In Benchoud, Boumerdes, suspected GSPC assailants fired upon and killed the mayor, Brahim Djelladi
wits.nctc.gov

March 20, 2006

Near Gouraya, Tipaza, a bomb exploded wounding 2 shepherds
wits.nctc.gov

March 9, 2006

In El Oued, suspected GSPC assassinated Emir Abd El Kerim Kaddour, a former high-ranking member of GSPC
wits.nctc.gov

April 23, 2006

In Skikda, suspected GSPC detonated a bomb in front of a van and then fired upon the passengers, killing 9 municipal guards and 1 civilian and wounding 8 other guards
wits.nctc.gov

April 22, 2006

In Thenia, Boumerdes, GSPC members injured 2 security guards at the SNC-Lavalin Company
wits.nctc.gov

April 9, 2006

1 civilian, 1 child killed in a bomb attack in Djebel Messaoud, M'sila
wits.nctc.gov

April 6, 2006

In Bordj Menaiel, Boumerdes, assailants wounded a former member of GSPC
wits.nctc.gov

April 5, 2006

1 civilian kidnapped by suspected GSPC then later released in Thenia, Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

April 1, 2006

Members of the GSPC murdered a civilian outside Tizirt. The victim was believed to have been an informant for the government against the GSPC
wits.nctc.gov

March 23, 2006

4 civilians killed in armed attack by suspected GSPC in Zerarkia, Blida
wits.nctc.gov

March 16, 2006

In Tizi Ouzou Province, armed assailants stopped an automobile at a bogus roadblock, kidnapped the 3 occupants and stole the vehicle
wits.nctc.gov

March 1, 2006

Algerian troops diffused a homemade bomb in a Tizirt market. The bomb was planted on what was to one of the busier days at the market
wits.nctc.gov

February 23, 2006

1 municipal guard killed, 1 other wounded in a bomb attack by suspected GSPC in Beni Mehoub, Jijel
wits.nctc.gov

February 23, 2006

In Zemmouri, Boumerdes, armed assailants killed a militia member and sabotaged a National Gas Company (Sonelgaz) installation. They then set a cement plant and several vehicles on fire
wits.nctc.gov

February 21, 2006

1 civilian killed in armed attack by suspected GSPC in Cap Djinet, Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

February 18, 2006

10 people killed and several injured in clashes during a cartoon protest outside an Italian consulate in Benghazi
www.bbc.co.uk

February 17, 2006

In Oued Taourrira, Sidi Bel Abbes, armed men killed two members of a self-defense group
wits.nctc.gov

January 27, 2006

In Ammal, Boumerdes, armed assailants entered the town, but they were forced back by Algerian security forces
wits.nctc.gov

January 26, 2006

In Ammal, Boumerdes, armed assailants kidnapped a baker, held him for ransom, then released him when they received the money they had demanded
wits.nctc.gov

January 26, 2006

1 train, 1 railway damaged in a bomb attack by suspected GSPC near Ammal, Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

January 17, 2006

Spiritual leader Ahmed Abou al-Baraa killed by Algerian government forces in mountains near Toudja
www.jamestown.org

January 23, 2006

1 civilian kidnapped at roadblock by suspected GSPC near Beni Amrane, Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

January 16, 2006

A farmer was kidnapped, interrogated, and then killed by members of GSPC in Sidi Daoud, Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

January 16, 2006

3 civilians wounded in bombing in Mizrana
wits.nctc.gov

January 3, 2006

4 workers from the Algerian Water Company were killed by suspected GSPC in Thenia
wits.nctc.gov

2006**December 4, 2005**

1 civilian wounded in armed attack in at a fake roadblock Tamda, Tizi Ouzou
wits.nctc.gov

December 2, 2005

1 police station damaged in armed attack by suspected GSPC in Adekar Kebouche, Bejaia
wits.nctc.gov

December 1, 2005

In Algiers, armed assailants kidnapped the head of a major public works company for a ransom then released him
wits.nctc.gov

November 17, 2005

3 Algerian nationals are arrested in Naples, Italy on suspicion of planning a terrorist attack
www.bbc.co.uk

November 16, 2005

2 civilians kidnapped by suspected GSPC at a fake roadblock in Bourmerdes, Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

November 14, 2005

A bomb was discovered prior to a convoy's arrival in Sidi Daoud. GSPC Militants planted it targeting the convoy carrying the Minister of Employment and National Solidarity, Djamel Ould Abbes
wits.nctc.gov

November 11, 2005

In Beni Boussaid, Tlemcen, armed assailants fired upon a group of people on vacation killing 1 civilian and

wounding a farmer
wits.nctc.gov

October 4, 2005

In Thenia, Boumerdes, a cell phone-initiated bomb exploded as a police vehicle passed, causing no injuries
wits.nctc.gov

September 27, 2005

In Boukhil, Djelfa, a bomb exploded as a vehicle drove over it, killing 3 civilians and wounding 1 other
wits.nctc.gov

September 25, 2005

Militants killed 5 members of the security forces. 3 days later 10 others were killed in 2 other attacks
www.stratfor.com

September 17, 2005

In Bordj, a bomb exploded, killing a guard responsible for security at the Sonelgaz natural gas company
wits.nctc.gov

September 15, 2005

Power station damaged in a bomb attack by suspected GSPC in Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

September 10, 2005

In El-Golea, suspected GSPC fired upon a convoy of 5 customs vehicles, wounding several customs officers and stealing 2 of the vehicles
wits.nctc.gov

August 21, 2005

In El Milia, Jijel, a bomb exploded and wounded 2 cork collectors by suspected GSPC
wits.nctc.gov

August 17, 2005

In Bourmerdes, Boumerdes, a vehicle-borne bomb exploded, killing a police officer, wounding his wife, and damaging their vehicle
wits.nctc.gov

August 3, 2005

Maaouya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya was ousted by the military of Mauritania and replaced by the Military Council for Justice and Democracy
www.magharebia.com

military convoy passed, killing 1 soldier, wounding 4 children and 2 soldiers
wits.nctc.gov

October 6, 2005

In El Milia, Jijel, armed assailants fired upon a vehicle, killing 3 civilians, wounding 2 others
wits.nctc.gov

September 30, 2005

A 62-year old stockbreeder from Ain Rich was decapitated by members of the GSPC
www.mipt.org

September 26, 2005

In Boukhil, Djelfa, a bomb exploded, killing the head of the Djelfa Judicial Police and 1 other officer, and wounding 2 officers
wits.nctc.gov

September 22, 2005

10 people, including 7 soldiers were killed in 2 attacks in eastern Algeria
www.stratfor.com

September 16, 2005

Assailants slit the throat of 2 men and engage security forces in a gunfight, 2 killed and 4 wounded
www.stratfor.com

September 14, 2005

3 soldiers and a police officer were killed in Boumerdes
www.stratfor.com

September 1, 2005

The mayor of Ammal is killed by insurgents aligned with GSPC
www.stratfor.com

August 31, 2005

In Sidi-Aich, Bejaia, armed assailants set up a roadblock and seized a cistern truck, stealing the passengers' belongings but causing no injuries
wits.nctc.gov

August 19, 2005

6 civilians killed, 5 others wounded and 1 civilian kidnapped by in an illegal roadblock in Batna
wits.nctc.gov

August 16, 2005

In Ain Romana, armed assailants fired upon an apartment complex, killing 3 civilians
wits.nctc.gov

July 18, 2005

Islamist militants killed 5 policemen in an ambush in western Algeria
www.stratfor.com

July 12, 2005

In El Milia, Jijel, assailants fired upon and killed a municipal guard as he was walking towards a water supply post
wits.nctc.gov

July 12, 2005

In Ahnif, a bomb planted on a path used by municipal guards exploded, killing 1 guard
wits.nctc.gov

July 6, 2005

Near Tizi Ouzou, armed assailants slit the throats of 3 Algerian soldiers and shot and killed 1 civilian
wits.nctc.gov

July 4, 2005

In Oued El-Merdja, Blida, assailants wearing Afghan attire and carrying machine guns fired upon and wounded 4 civilians as they were hiking
wits.nctc.gov

July 4, 2005

Radio journalist kidnapped, beaten and left for dead by unidentified assailants in Bamako
wits.nctc.gov

June 23, 2005

An explosive device kills 1 policeman on the road
www.stratfor.com

June 22, 2005

In Skikda, assailants detonated a bomb as a vehicle passed, killing the driver and wounding 2 other passengers
wits.nctc.gov

June 18, 2005

Near Djelfa, a bomb buried under the road exploded after a police patrol ran over it, killing the head of the police in Djelfa and wounding 2 police officers
wits.nctc.gov

June 18, 2005

An explosive device killed a policeman during a police raid in El-Djer
www.stratfor.com

June 14, 2005

1 civilian abducted by suspected GSPC in Draa el Mizan, Tizi Ouzou
wits.nctc.gov

June 13, 2005

An explosive device kills 3 soldiers and 2 civilians west of Tipaza
wits.nctc.gov

June 13, 2005

2 police officers, 2 civilians killed and 6 civilians wounded in armed attack in Khadirat El Nukta, Tebessa Province
www.stratfor.com

June 9, 2005

An explosive device kills 13 local government guards in a truck in Algeria's M'sila region southeast of Algiers
www.bbc.co.uk

June 4, 2005

15 Mauritanian soldiers were killed and 17 injured in an attack by GSPC on the Lemgheity army base
www.bbc.co.uk

June 4, 2005

Deputy mayor killed in armed attack by suspected GSPC in Aomar, Bouira
wits.nctc.gov

May 31, 2005

1 civilian killed in armed attack in Tarik Ibn Ziad, Ain Defla
wits.nctc.gov

May 28, 2005

Near Batna, assailants killed a shepherd and burned his body
wits.nctc.gov

May 27, 2005

1 soldier killed in bomb explosion by suspected GSPC in Ain Defla Province
wits.nctc.gov

May 20, 2005

1 civilian, 3 children kidnapped by suspected GSPC at a bogus roadblock in Beni Khelifa, Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

May 15, 2005

Insurgents ambushed an army convoy in the region

1 civilian kidnapped by suspected GSPC in Serdj-El-Ghoul, Setif Province
wits.nctc.gov

April 8, 2005

2 civilians killed in armed attack in Chekfa, Jijel
wits.nctc.gov

April 4, 2005

Near Dellys, Boumerdes, assailants detonated a bomb and fired upon a police vehicle carrying prisoners, killing 5 police officers, wounding 11 others
wits.nctc.gov

April 3, 2005

Suspected GSPC killed a civilian and stole his sheep in Chlef Province
wits.nctc.gov

April 3, 2005

2 municipal guards wounded in a bomb attack in Keddara, Blida Province
wits.nctc.gov

April 1, 2005

In Jijel Province, a bomb planted in a hen house exploded, wounding 2 children
wits.nctc.gov

March 19, 2005

In Jijel, a bomb exploded inside a hen house, injuring 2 Algerian civilians and killing an unspecified quantity of livestock
wits.nctc.gov

March 10, 2005

2 policemen killed, 2 others wounded in armed attack in Bouira
wits.nctc.gov

February 25, 2005

2 civilians wounded in a bomb attack in Souk El-Khemis
wits.nctc.gov

January 22, 2005

1 soldier killed in assault and arson attack at a fake roadblock by suspected GSPC in Tizi Ouzou
wits.nctc.gov

January 19, 2005

In Boumerdes, a bomb buried in the ground exploded, seriously injuring a 9-year-old boy
wits.nctc.gov

January 3, 2005

In Biskra assailants detonated a bomb and used small arms to attack a military convoy, killing 13 soldiers and 5 civilians
wits.nctc.gov

April 9, 2005

Militants killed 14 people at a fake roadblock. In addition another 36 people, including 15 security force members were killed since the start of March
www.stratfor.com

April 7, 2005

13 civilians killed, 1 other wounded in arson and armed attack by suspected GSPC at illegal roadblock in Tablat, Blida Province
wits.nctc.gov

April 3, 2005

3 civilians, 1 municipal guard killed, 3 police officers, 1 municipal guard wounded in a bomb attack by suspected GSPC near Dellys, Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

March 29, 2005

1 civilian kidnapped and killed by suspected GSPC near Thenia, Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

March 13, 2005

In Skikda, assailants opened fire on a car that refused to stop at a fake roadblock, injuring 2 civilians and taking 5 civilians hostage
wits.nctc.gov

March 9, 2005

Train track damaged by bomb blast in Ammal, Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

January 24, 2005

In Tizi Ouzou, armed assailants attacked a security patrol, killing 2 police officers and injuring 1 civilian
wits.nctc.gov

January 21, 2005

In Blida Province, a bomb exploded in a mausoleum at the Ain Romana cemetery, killing 3 civilians and injuring 5 others
wits.nctc.gov

January 19, 2005

In Adekar Kebouche, suspected GSPC killed a motorist at a fake roadblock
wits.nctc.gov

January 7, 2005

A GSPC attack against a military convoy at Biskra killed 13 soldiers and 5 civilians
www.stratfor.com

2005

December 13, 2004

GSPC insurgents shoot an individual dead at point-blank range in Corso
www.stratfor.com

November 27, 2004

Bomb explosion killed 1 Municipal Guard and wounded 3 others in Sidi Bel Abbes Province
wits.nctc.gov

November 4, 2004

2 police officers were killed and 1 wounded in an attack in Relizane
wits.nctc.gov

October 25, 2004

2 soldiers, 2 police officers, and 1 civilian were attacked and killed at an illegal roadblock near Tizi Ouzou
wits.nctc.gov

October 3, 2004

Suspected GSPC attacked a police patrol in central Algiers, wounding 8 police officers and 1 civilian
wits.nctc.gov

September 29, 2004

Militants attacked a civil defense post near the city of Ain Defla killing 6 members of the civil defense force
www.stratfor.com

September 18, 2004

4 civilians were killed and 1 abducted at a fake roadblock in Omar. No one claimed responsibility
wits.nctc.gov

August 26, 2004

Train was attacked while passing by the Ahnif station, but the bomb was set off prematurely; No injuries reported
wits.nctc.gov

August 22, 2004

A bomb explodes outside Boumerdes. No casualties reported; GSPC is suspected in the attack
www.stratfor.com

August 1, 2004

Bomb attack near an electricity company in Siam Mansouria killed 3 and injured 1
wits.nctc.gov

June 28, 2004

The army killed three Islamic extremists in a raid near the capital, Algiers
www.news24.com

December 28, 2004

Suspected GSPC shot and killed 3 civilians and wounded 1 child in Khraissia
wits.nctc.gov

November 28, 2004

Suspected Salafi Dawa attacked a group of civilians in Mascara, killing 1 man and wounding 3 others
wits.nctc.gov

November 18, 2004

Landmine believed to have been planted by GSPC killed 1 civilian in Mahrane
wits.nctc.gov

October 25, 2004

Bomb explosion near a municipal guard post in Skikda wounding 2 guards
wits.nctc.gov

October 22, 2004

Militants attacked a vehicle near Medea carrying fans to a football match in the capital Algiers killing 16 people
www.stratfor.com

October 2, 2004

Armed men attacked the National Security Chief's home in Nouakchott, causing damage but no casualties
wits.nctc.gov

September 20, 2004

Militants killed 4 people and abducted a woman in Bouira Province at a roadblock they set up
www.stratfor.com

September 15, 2004

A bomb was defused in a café in Jijel province
www.mipt.org

August 25, 2004

2 bombs damaged a line of track and injured a conductor outside Ahnif train station
wits.nctc.gov

August 3, 2004

A Boumerdes University truck was intercepted near Sghirat and subsequently burned
wits.nctc.gov

July 3, 2004

A bomb exploded in Taourarine causing no injuries or damage
wits.nctc.gov

June 21, 2004

A car bomb injured 11 people and damaged the

March 16, 2004

Gunmen ambush 2 ambulances traveling along the Medea-Berrouaghia road. 8 were killed and 2 wounded
wits.nctc.gov

an attack on a funeral procession in advance of a presidential visit to the area, south of Algiers
www.start.umd.edu

March 10, 2004

GSPC assassinates an imam from El Harrach for alleged collaboration with the Algerian security services
wits.nctc.gov

March 12, 2004

Suspected GSPC assassinated an elected official of the Municipal People's Assembly and 1 other man
wits.nctc.gov

February 11, 2004

A bomb attack by suspected GSPC wounded 1 police officer in Lakhdaria, Bouira
wits.nctc.gov

February 10, 2004

4 civilians killed, 3 wounded in an attack by suspected GSPC at a cafe near Jijel
wits.nctc.gov

February 12, 2004

Ambush on a police patrol killed 7 police officers and wounded 3 others
wits.nctc.gov

February 7, 2004

The Algerian Army attacks a band of militants in northern Mali, from where they are chased eastward across northern Niger and into Chad
wits.nctc.gov

February 7, 2004

The Algerian army killed 3 Islamic extremists in a raid near the capital, Algiers
wits.nctc.gov

2004

December 10, 2003

A homemade bomb exploded in an olive grove near El Milia. 2 women were seriously injured
www.mipt.org

November 27, 2003

In Messad, Algeria, a well-known poet and member of the extended Royal Saudi family was killed and 4 others were injured
www.bbc.co.uk

September 23, 2003

GSPC gunmen attacked a money transport truck near the town of Tizirt. No casualties reported
www.start.umd.edu

September 4, 2003

Suspected GSPC members killed 2 soldiers and injured 3 in a bomb attack east of Algiers
www.start.umd.edu

September 11, 2003

Jewish Moroccan national, Alberto Ribido, was killed by Salafia Jihadia, a radical Islamic group
FriendsOfMorocco.org

August 19, 2003

The GSPC released the 14 hostages to Malian Authorities. The 15th hostage, a German, died of heat exhaustion
www.bbc.co.uk

August 26, 2003

A member of the Republican National Alliance (ANR) was assassinated
www.mipt.org

May 27, 2003

Suspected GSPC gunmen killed 1 policeman in Zemmouri
www.start.umd.edu

July 4, 2003

Supposed GSPC extremists ambushed and killed 3 officials, including an MP, at a fake roadblock in Tizi Ouzou Province
www.start.umd.edu

May 19, 2003

Seventeen tourists taken hostage in the Sahara freed after being freed in a bloody gun battle between Algerian commandos and a terror group linked to al-Qa'ida. 9 militants killed in the fighting
www.independent.co.uk

May 25, 2003

Islamist extremists killed 8 civilians in an attack in Boukaat El Maqam
www.start.umd.edu

May 17, 2003

3 security force members were killed and 4 others wounded by an attack on their patrol by an armed Islamic group in the mountains east of Algiers
www.mipt.org

May 17, 2003

Assassination attempt on the mayor of Harchoun, which is located in Chlef Province
www.start.umd.edu

May 17, 2003

2 policemen were seriously wounded when a bomb exploded in Tizirt. No one claimed responsibility
www.start.umd.edu

May 6, 2003

Suspected GSPC militants ambushed and attacked 6 soldiers in Keddara
www.start.umd.edu

May 16, 2003

14 bombers attacked in Casablanca, targeting the Jewish and Western. 33 civilians were killed and more than 100 injured
www.bbc.co.uk

March 28, 2003

Suspected GIA (Armed Islamic Group) gunmen killed 4 civilians, including 2 children, and wounded 4 other children in an attack in Chiffa
www.start.umd.edu

March 28, 2003

Suspected GIA gunmen killed 8 people, 7 from the same family, in an attack in Chtathia
www.start.umd.edu

February 25, 2003

12 civilians were killed and several wounded when Islamist militants attacked a convoy of vehicles at a fake roadblock in a village west of Algiers
www.start.umd.edu

February 21, 2003

Islamic militants abducted and then killed 4 members of a Government Armed Civil Defense Patrol unit in Ouargla Province
www.start.umd.edu

February 13, 2003

GIA assailants attacked a family in El Atatfa municipality, killing 2 women and abducting 1 other
www.start.umd.edu

Feb -May, 2003

Free Salafists Group or GSL allegedly captures 32 European tourists in southern Algeria and were later moved to Mali
www.globalsecurity.org

January 29, 2003

GSPC gunmen opened fire on a guard barracks in M'kira, resulting in 3 fatalities and 4 wounded
www.start.umd.edu

January 18, 2003

A roadside bomb planted by extremists attacked a military convoy in Tizi Ouzou Province, wounding 3
www.start.umd.edu

January 7, 2003

8 soldiers on patrol were killed by two bombs set off by the GSPC in Tizi Ouzou
www.start.umd.edu

January 6, 2003

Militants ambushed a military convoy in north-east Algeria and attacked families near Algiers. 43 soldiers and 13 civilians were killed and 19 wounded
www.start.umd.edu

Militants killed 13 civilians in a remote village in western Algeria
www.news24.com

September 19, 2002
15 people are reported to have been arrested in Kabylie under suspicion of providing money and logistical help to the GSPC
www.bbc.co.uk

September 13, 2002
Militants killed 11 civilians on a road in near Sidi Lakhdar. So far 1 070 killed since beginning of the year
www.news24.com

August 14, 2002
A bomb exploded near a movie theater and the headquarters of the Islamist Movement for National Reform in Tebessa
www.mipt.org

August 12, 2002
GSPC militants opened fire in a restaurant in Baghlia killing 1 civilian security guard and kidnapping and later killing the other
www.start.umd.edu

August 7, 2002
Suspected Ed'daoua Es'salafia Lilqadha militants shot and killed 5 civilians in Ammi Moussa
www.start.umd.edu

August 9, 2002
A homemade bomb exploded at a resort near Skikda killing 5 (including 2 police officers) and injuring 6
www.start.umd.edu

August 1, 2002
Gunmen opened fire in Ain Defla wounding a policeman
www.start.umd.edu

August 1, 2002
2 bombs exploded in Metessa killing 1 soldier and injuring 4 others
www.start.umd.edu

August 1, 2002
A homemade bomb was found in Sofia Square near the Algiers Central Post Office
www.mipt.org

July 25, 2002
A bomb was discovered and defused in a café in Algiers
wits.nctc.gov

July 28, 2002
Militants killed 1 soldier and wounded 3 others when they ambushed their vehicle near Kadiria
wits.nctc.gov

July 16, 2002
Gunmen killed 6 civilians at a cafe in Benimen
www.start.umd.edu

July 17, 2002
Militants killed 7 civilians in Ouled Allal
www.start.umd.edu

July 5, 2002
A bomb exploded in an open-air market in Algiers killing 30 and injuring 36 others
www.start.umd.edu

July 5, 2002
A bomb exploded on Palm Beach injuring a young child
www.start.umd.edu

July 5, 2002
A bomb explosion at a cemetery honoring war veterans killed 1 civilian and injured 1 other
www.start.umd.edu

June 28, 2002
Gunmen opened fire on a passenger bus in Les Eucalyptus killing 13 people and injuring 9
www.start.umd.edu

June 27, 2002
Gunmen opened fire on a passenger bus in Bou Ismail killing the 2 people
www.start.umd.edu

June 23, 2002
Militants attacked youths playing football near a bus station in Zeralda killing 6 civilians and wounding 3 others
www.start.umd.edu

June 13, 2002
A homemade bomb exploded in a cafe in Djelida injuring 14 people
www.start.umd.edu

June 4, 2002
A homemade bomb wounded 4 children in Ait Mesbah
www.start.umd.edu

May 22, 2002
1 soldier was killed and another wounded in an armed attack on a roadblock set up in Blida
www.start.umd.edu

May 15, 2002

Bomb explosion in a market in Tazmalt killed 7 civilians and injured 15 others
www.start.umd.edu

May 12, 2002

4 soldiers were abducted at a fake roadblock near Boghni and found dead two days later near Mechtras
www.start.umd.edu

May 1, 2002

A total of 31 civilians were killed and 5 wounded in two overnight attacks by suspected GIA militants in Tiaret
www.start.umd.edu

April 24, 2002

Suspected Islamic militants killed 16 people from nomadic families in the Tiaret region
www.start.umd.edu

March 29, 2002

Two homemade explosive devices killed 2 civilians and wounded 18 in a food market in Blida
www.start.umd.edu

March 19, 2002

6 members of a family were killed by suspected GIA militants in the village of Souk El-Had
www.start.umd.edu

March 18, 2002

An explosive device detonated near the main post office in Algiers killing 3 civilians and wounding 13 others
www.start.umd.edu

February 9, 2002

GIA militants ambushed and killed 6 members of a family driving in a car in Oued el Hamel
www.start.umd.edu

February 4, 2002

Homemade bomb killed 1 security service official and injured 5 others near Morsott
www.start.umd.edu

January 26, 2002

Bomb injured 4 civilians at a bus stop in Bir Mourad
www.start.umd.edu

May 13, 2002

2 policemen directing traffic in Algiers were shot and killed by suspected Islamic militants driving by in a car
www.start.umd.edu

May 5, 2002

An ambush near Tizi Ouzou, in the Kabylie region of northern killed 15 government soldiers and abducting 7 others
www.start.umd.edu

April 25, 2002

Alleged GIA militants attacked the village of Mechraa Sfa, killing 4 civilians
www.start.umd.edu

April 11, 2002

Bombing of Ghriba synagogue by al- Qaeda group 21 killed more than 30 injured
www.bbc.co.uk

March 19, 2002

4 farmers were killed at a fake roadblock near Lardjem
www.start.umd.edu

March 3, 2002

6 civilians were killed and 6 wounded when gunmen attacked and set fire to a bus in El Affroun
www.start.umd.edu

February 5, 2002

A homemade bomb killed 1 civilian and injured 3 others in Chana
www.start.umd.edu

February 2, 2002

Suspected GIA and GSPC members shot and killed 12 men in an ambush attack near Algiers
www.start.umd.edu

January 18, 2002

December 15, 2001

GSPC shot and killed the city chairman of Ouled Aissa and his companion at a café in Ouled Aissa
www.start.umd.edu

December 15, 2001

Bomb explosion in Ait Ouabane killed 2 teenagers and seriously injured 2 others
www.start.umd.edu

December 13, 2001

1 guard was killed and 2 were seriously wounded in an attack in Chlef on a group of communal guards gathering to confront suspected terrorists
www.start.umd.edu

December 14, 2001

2 policemen were shot and killed by a group of 10 suspected Muslim militants in a café in Tafoughalt
www.start.umd.edu

December 9, 2001

2 people were killed and another wounded at an illegal roadblock in Chlef
www.start.umd.edu

December 8, 2001

GSPC attack at a café in Aomar killed 1 civilian and injured another
www.start.umd.edu

December 8, 2001

Militants attacked an Algerian Army patrol in Chrea wounding 1 soldier
www.start.umd.edu

December 6, 2001

17 people were killed and 5 injured by armed assailants in three houses in Aarib
www.start.umd.edu

December 5, 2001

Suspected GSPC militants shot and killed 2 soldiers and 3 communal guards in Zekri
www.start.umd.edu

December 3, 2001

2 people were killed and 2 girls kidnapped in an attack on a hamlet near Beni Bouateb
www.start.umd.edu

November 20, 2001

Bomb explosion at Tafourah bus station in Algiers injured 29 civilians and damaged a bus and nearby building
www.start.umd.edu

October 28, 2001

Attackers stormed the town in Bouira and opened fire, wounding 2 civilians
www.start.umd.edu

October 25, 2001

3 soldiers were killed and several wounded by a homemade mine in Oum Ali. The GIA was suspected
www.start.umd.edu

October 2, 2001

An explosive device detonated in a pizza parlor south of Algiers. Killed 1 and wounded 8 others
www.start.umd.edu

September 28, 2001

4 GSPC members killed 2 policemen and wounded another at a neighborhood celebration in Les Issers
www.start.umd.edu

September 27, 2001

22 people were shot and killed and 7 injured at a wedding in Larbaa
www.start.umd.edu

September 16, 2001

GSPC shot and killed a communal guard after exploding a device that killed a child in Azzaouen
www.start.umd.edu

September 16, 2001

Armed group wearing military uniforms attacked a civilian's home in Sig; 9 people were killed
www.start.umd.edu

September 13, 2001

Suspected Habi's Er'roub slit throats of 7 men at an illegal roadblock in Granine
www.start.umd.edu

2001

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Kestral Holdings

COMPANY PROFILE AND BACKGROUND

KESTRAL GROUP of companies are considered Pakistan's leading provider of structured program management and consultancy services with specialized skills in the field of aviation, defense, logistics, facilities maintenance and management, civil engineering, design engineering, aeronautical & marine engineering, information technology and telecommunications. Kestral Group provides services to selected multinational corporations and represents various divisions of Lockheed Martin, United Technologies, Raytheon, Pratt and Whitney (Canada), Kearfott, L3 Communications, Hydraulics International, Sagem, ITT Industries, Intermat, Sikorsky, General Dynamics, Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation, Goodrich Corporation, International Aero Engines, Oshkosh Truck Corporation, Daher, EDO and ISI Hellas. More than 350 employees including 75 professionals are working fulltime in seven companies: Kestral Holding (Pvt) Ltd (the parent company), Kestral Logistics (Smc-Pvt) Ltd, Kestral SPD (Pvt) Ltd, Kestral Energy (Smc-Pvt) Ltd, Dazzle Glass (Pvt) Ltd, Pakistan Facilities Management (Pvt) Ltd, and Global Response and Services (Pvt) Ltd.

KESTRAL Holding's head office is located in Islamabad with domestic offices in Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar, and global offices in Canada, Malaysia, United Kingdom, France and Dubai. The company's personnel include professionals and executives from the corporate sector and distinguished retired armed forces officers.

KESTRAL Logistics has been providing logistics, technical support and program management services to its valued customers since 1999 with excellence and dedication. Kestral Logistics employs over 45 full time employees as well as a number of term-contract professionals. The company has the necessary resources, including fully furnished and equipped offices and warehousing facilities, fleet of vehicles, as well as specialized staff and selected vendors & sub-contractors on its panel to handle a diverse range of programs. The company prides itself as being one of the few companies in the country that delivers complete turnkey solutions following strict standards of project management and quality while ensuring high level of HSSE. In fact, Kestral is probably the only Pakistani company that has systems in place to ensure standards of logistics and technical support projects that are expected from clients from United States and Europe. Moreover, the company has in depth knowledge of the US Government laws and regulations (FAR & DFAR) under which US Government funded programs are executed. Kestral's strong logistics, engineering and quality assurance experts are deployed both on the executing office site as well as in the field to provide timely interactive reporting which is routinely dovetailed into the detailed program plan. Routine audits at various stages of program execution are also performed to develop an early warning mechanism in case any limitations or problems are detected at any stage of operations. This ensures that the program is executed on time and within budget.

Kestral Logistics provides logistics support services, base operations support services and technical services support services. Logistics support services includes custom house brokerage, import/export services, LCL, FCL and break bulk operations, overland and multimodal transportation including air-charter, bulk fuel transportation, warehousing, transit logistics to Afghanistan as well as logistics provider services in Afghanistan, and provision of security and insurance during transportation and warehousing. Base operations support



services includes sourcing, procurements, delivery of services and supplies to base(s), facilities maintenance and management, provision of vehicles on rental basis, provision of heavy machinery and equipment on rental basis (including operation and maintenance), logistics, and provision of security services. Technical support services includes undertaking turn-key engineering projects and after sales support.

Kestral Logistics is a member of Pakistan International Freight Forwarding Association (PIFFA) and International Federation of Freight Forwarders Association (FIATA) and is in the process of acquiring the membership of The International Air Transport Association (IATA).

KESTRAL SPD (Private) Limited's two divisions of Design & Build and Engineering Services are ideally positioned to work on construction and engineering services assignment, particularly in difficult areas and for the capacity building endeavors of the US Government. Our client base includes many multinationals and foreign government agencies.

We have been and are presently engaged in the implementation of several capacity building projects. For example in the Design and Build Division, we have recently completed the construction (complete turnkey design and build responsibility) of 10 observation towers and related facilities of the Pakistan Coast Guard (PCG) for the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Afghanistan Engineer District (AED), using US construction methods and near-US specifications (Division 2-16 format). We are also presently constructing (complete turnkey design and build responsibility) 36 PCG outposts, again for the USACE, complete with billeting, offices and comms using independent solar and generator power generation capability (70% complete). In addition, Kestral SPD is constructing several buildings (about 20) in the FATA area and in Karachi for CNTPO in support of the capacity building component of its objectives in Pakistan. All of these projects require the ability to perform the work in remote areas in difficult terrain and requiring community buy-in. Even though these are medium-sized infrastructure projects, sophisticated program management and quality management processes are applied with due consideration to health, safety and the environment. Local small contractors and labor are used, where possible, but they are all fully trained in all aspects of quality construction methods and HSE. This has significantly helped the region with capacity building at the local level. As another example of familiarity of the region and capacity building at the local level,

Kestral is managing the construction of 12 schools for a US NGO (Shelter for Life) in the Mansehra district of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) where engagement of the locals is paramount to the success of the project. Similarly, as the lead construction and project management company for a camp expansion project in a very remote part of Baluchistan for a large Canadian/Chilean mining conglomerate, Kestral is deploying the local labor for many parts of the work which includes construction/renovation of facilities and complete water supply and sanitary systems.

Our established processes and methodological approach to the construction process renders us as the company of choice for our clients since most in this region do not conform to international standards or even to the defined quality of national standards. Our core team consists of highly skilled project managers, engineers, designers, CADD operators and field technicians employing sophisticated project management tools, such as Primavera P3. In addition to some of the projects of relevance mentioned above, we are presently the turnkey contractor for the complete design and build of the USAID Annex within the existing compound of the US Embassy in Islamabad under contract from the US State Department, Overseas Building Operations (OBO) office. This project, however, was suspended at the 65% design stage due to the radical change to the capacity requirements by USAID

Kestral SPD (Private) Limited is a member of the Kestral group of companies which has been in business since 1987 with presently over 300 employees and serving numerous

US and international multinational companies' and agencies' business activities in Pakistan, Kestral SPD (Private) Limited is ISO 9001 certified for all its construction and engineering service activities and is audit-approved pending certification for ISO 14001:2004 and OHSAS 18001:2007 environmental management and occupational health and safety management standards.